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Editorial Introduction: Special Issue on Inequality and Class in 
New Zealand 
 
Charles Crothers 
 
 
(1) The Need for A Special Issue and its Configuration 
Despite the much-vaunted supposed fascination of sociologists with class, and 
perhaps their also supposedly-renowned focus on surveys (particularly relevant 
to class analyses) the last book on social class in post-Second World War New 
Zealand was published 30 years ago in 1983 (Pearson and Thorns). Of course, a 
steady trickle of theses, articles, chapters etc. has kept the topic alive (Crothers, 
2008a, 2008b). This lacuna is of major significance since during the interim 
New Zealand has experienced the obvious upheavals associated with 
Rogernomics and the sharply shifting social patterns reverberating from that, 
but also huge shifts in employment and other aspects of inequality which have 
changed the contours of social class in New Zealand. 
          Recently, however, there seems to be an emerging tide of interest and 
concern about inequality in New Zealand. There are several immediately 
precipitating factors (mid-2013) which propel this special issue: 
- The launch of the Inequalities book edited by Max Rashbrooke 
(2013) and  the associated speaking tour by Robert Wade (see his 
article below in this special issue) and VUW one-day seminar (see 
Michael Forster’s presentation for the Wellington seminar which was 
based on recent work published already at OECD over the last two 
years, namely in the frame of our report “Divided we Stand”1; 
- Ongoing concerns with child poverty and more generally various 
recent government benefit ’reforms’: see discussion of former by 
Crothers (2012); 
- Lurking, unpublished (or insufficiently cited) analyses on class 
(including several being published in this special issue); 
                                                            
1 http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/dividedwestandwhyinequalitykeepsrising.htm, and a recent 
update available at http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/OECD2013-Inequality-and-Poverty-8p.pdf.  
A video of his presentation is available at http://video.oecd.org/?action=video&id=709. See 
also other presentations at http://igps.victoria.ac.nz/ events/previous_events-2013.html#Jul 
Websites contained further material concerning Inequalities are 
http://www.maxrashbrooke.org.nz/inequality/ and www.bwb.co.nz/books/inequality 
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- Advent of the latest 2013 Brian Perry/Ministry of Social 
Development update; 
- Recent issuing of the 2012 wave of the Statistics NZ General Social 
Survey (GSS) and other relevant data-sets;   
- An Antipodean echo of the ‘UK Big Class Debate’ (Savage et al. 
2013) in the form of  Du Fresnes’s 2013 Listener article;  
- Screening in August of Bryan Bruce’s recent television documentary 
Mind the Gap on Inequality2; 
- US class analyst Erik O Wright’s collegial visit to New Zealand in  
July3;  
- Continuing concern with the causes and social impacts of the 
immediate conjuncture with New Zealand (along with much of the 
rest of the world) falteringly emerging from the fairly long drawn out 
‘Global Financial Crisis’ which commentators have seen as the 
largest period of difficulty in the world economy for many decades 
(eg. OECD, 2011); 
- Ongoing interest in depiction of the changed configuration of 
capitalism over the last few decades under the ideological driver of 
‘neo-liberalism’ and variously involving massive technological 
developments, globalisation and the very considerable rise of 
inequalities.   
 
Sociologists have been but little involved in these various most recent issues - 
except where, for example, ethnicity (and maybe gender and gay/queer studies)  
is seen to have a class dimension: Tracey McIntosh and Evan Poata-Smith have 
chapters in Rashbrooke, 2013.  Moreover, the various exercises have varied in 
the extent to which they have drawn down on appropriate evidence or engaged 
with relevant theory. In particular, sociologists are concerned to frame 
inequality within a wider understanding of social class, and the layerings of 
meanings involved with this. There has been a rise in more abstract theorising 
using overseas theorists but with little attempt to finesse how local conditions 
are directly comparable to these models. Moreover, a wider array of important 
sources of analysis on New Zealand inequality and social class seem to have 
been overlooked in the intellectual material in recent circulation, and these need 
to be drawn on (see also Crothers, 2008a; 2008b which plot the contours of 
New Zealand sociology). In too much of the writing (see Easton’s critique in his 
Listener review (2013) of Rashbrooke and his article in this issue) there is a leap 
                                                            
2 http://www.nzonscreen.com/person/bryan-bruce http://www.tv3.co.nz/INSIDE-NEW-
ZEALAND-Mind-The-Gap/tabid/3692/articleID/94816/MCat/3061/Default.aspx 
3  Perhaps rather more tangentially related, but nevertheless of symbolic significance! 
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from immediate experiences with some backing data to policy prescriptions, 
without filtering the thinking through a drive to develop explanations (including 
links to further studies) about why things are shaping up the way they are. 
Moreover, explorations of policy alternatives need to be coupled with 
examination of the extent of societal support for these alternatives. So the 
special issue is concerned with mobilising appropriate academic resources. 
          While the origins of this special issue lie in a felt need to organise an 
appropriate review of the Inequality book, it made some sense also to bring into 
it some relevant articles already in hand. Because it is a collective effort some 
editorial attempt to reduce repetition has been made. It is intended this special 
issue will further an ongoing debate. 
          The special issue canvassed appropriate authors (known to the editor and 
his contacts) and is organised as follows: 
- Reactions to the Inequality book and related debates: Brian Easton 
(below provides a synoptic constructive overview of the studies by 
Perry and others while also commenting on Rashbrooke (ed.), and 
Peter Skilling reviews the Rashbrooke volume within the context of 
other literature on inequalities;    
- Ideological dimensions of Class/Inequality: e.g. see Pearson’s 
substantive article below; 
- Material dimensions of Class/Inequality; 
- More particular aspects of Class/Inequality (e.g. food security);   
- Sub-group  involvement in Class/Inequality (e.g. ethnic differences);  
- and to conclude: Issues concerning New Zealand Class/Inequality in 
Comparative Perspective: see in particular Robert Wade’s essay in 
this issue.  
To set the context for the articles and research notes included in the special 
issue, this editorial introduction will provide brief comments on recent 
sociological (and wider social science) conceptualisations of Social 
Class/Inequality and an appendix  provides a review of the scope of the New 
Zealand literature on Class/Inequality. 
 
(2) The Conceptualisation of Social Class/Inequality  
There is little attempt here to review class studies in Sociology as a whole, 
which would be a momentous task. However, I briefly endeavour to draw on 
appropriate conceptual and comparative material in order to provide some 
guidance in reading the material of the special issue. This whole area of study is 
too often bedevilled by lack of clear conceptualisation and by muddled 
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terminology and these notes may help untangle some of the complexities. In 
particular, there have been major developments in the last couple of decades, 
particularly following the interest in cultural dimensions of class and in the 
usefulness of ‘field theory’ inspired by Bourdieu’s writings. This has expanded 
the analytical repertoire of class researchers perhaps at some cost of neglect of 
macro-level issues although most recently there has been rather more interest, 
too, in re-capturing the wider political economic dimensions of class. 
         As well as conceptual analysis, class research can benefit from inventories 
(or better still meta-analyses) of the assemblage of studies deploying class-
related variables, although this more empirically-based approach is not 
discussed further in this introduction (see Reid, 1999 for a UK example of an 
inventory of social class differences across many domains).     
          In this introduction, inequality is seen as a particular aspect of the more 
generic interest in social differentiation, concerning much of the more 
materially-grounded aspects of the broader term. Inequality and class have been 
bracketed, as they clearly overlap. The common element concerns 
understandings about how (the social distribution involved in) society’s goods 
etc are produced, distributed and consumed. Whereas inequality particularly 
refers to study of the more immediately apparent issues of income, nonmaterial 
deprivations and hardships, and also affluence, the conception of class is seen as 
rather more structural and general lying behind this immediate appearance.  A 
somewhat related distinction is between descriptive and explanatory 
components in study, although again there are overlaps. In turn, the study of 
inequality can have various foci. Inequality refers to the overall distribution of 
resources. However, some studies are more focused on particular ranges of the 
income distribution: the Rich; the Poor; the Middle class and perhaps other 
groupings. Sometimes, such foci are pursued separately, but they all belong to 
the study of inequality and the various aspects all need to be covered. 
          Inequality is a central area of interest which necessarily focuses on 
income. However, attention to income needs to be supplemented by interest in 
other related topics which include: 
- Sources of income/market etc. 
- Non-income/material hardship/affluence 
- Wealth/Assets 
- Education 
- Cultural resources/life-style/status/prestige 
- Short-term mobility and change 
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- Inter-generational ‘inheritances’ and long-term mobility 
- Intra-household arrangements 
- Collective social mobility 
- Class awareness/consciousness 
- Political action (where class-based or class-mobilising) 
- Locality and other spatial and environmental aspects.  
 
In examining inequality, the framework used by OECD in its studies is 
particularly useful. See the very useful conceptual framework below: taken 
from OECD, 2011: 21 (for a wider perspective see Therborn, 2006): 
  
Chart: Identifying key drivers of income inequality: a partial and “step-wise” approach 
 
 
(Source: OECD, 2011: 21) 
 
Stepping back now from inequality to consider class analysis, a wider 
framework is required which more actively brings in both human and structural 
dimensions. Class analysis is often best seen as a level of analysis sandwiched 
between, and embedded within: 
- a political economic framework on the broader side, and  
- at a more detailed level, studies of occupations, sectors, workplaces, 
industries, beneficiary situations etc. on the other more detailed side. 
In both these other levels class is at least indirectly implicated, so there is some 
necessity to include or refer to this material as well, although it also necessary 
to avoid being overwhelmed by becoming too caught up in considerations of the 
general trajectory of the economy, state and society on the one hand or in the 
detailed configurations on the other. From a political economy viewpoint 
classes are amongst actors or potential actors shaping competitions and conflicts 
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and from a more detailed sociological level classes are essentially alliances or 
configurations of groupings of occupations etc. 
          At the heart of much contemporary thinking about social class various 
capitals are placed. However, as Carroll (2010:1) argues: “...the nature of capital 
does not dictate a specific form of capitalist class organisation since capitalism 
is divided into competing units, so sociological analysis is needed to understand 
how these are embedded in socio-political relations”. 
         Class has both objective and subjective aspects. To provide some 
preliminary guidance recourse is made to Sayer (quoting EP. Thompson) on the 
perils, when discussing class, of:  
 
..beginning with particular classes, for class is not this or that part of 
the machine, but the way the machine works once it is set in motion .. 
not this interest and that interest, but the friction of interests ..by a 
class we are thinking of a very loosely defined body of people who 
share the same categories of interests, social experiences, traditions 
and value-system, who have a disposition to behave as a class, to 
define themselves in their actions and in their consciousness in 
relation to other groups of people in class ways. But class itself is not 
a thing, it is a happening.  
 
The conclusion of this editorial returns to this viewpoint of classes in activity 
and action. Thompson’s account is useful in drawing attention to the end-point 
of class analyses which are often considered (in Weber’s terms) to provide 
explanations of differences in differential (objective) life chances and different 
life-styles (ways in which resources are used). Thompson’s account also raises 
the issue about whether classes are seen as graduated (spread across a range) or 
entities (with more distinct boundaries and which can engage in relationships 
with each other). Level of activity is another aspect in his and others’ thinking 
about class in which (latent) class structure can result in the expression of class 
interests which results in (or is accompanied by) class consciousness which 
results in class formation which results in class struggle, although movement up 
and down these levels of activity needs to be seen as interactive and dynamic, 
with feedback loops. 
          To begin with, Erik Olin Wright can provide useful guidance (for 
example, 2009). He sees three main sociological approaches to class analysis: 
- Marxist 
- Weberian, and  
- mainstream stratification research.  
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He argues that these different ways of analysing class can all potentially 
contribute to a fuller understanding by identifying different causal processes at 
work in shaping the micro- and macro- aspects of inequality in capitalist 
societies and that a ‘pragmatist realism’ should, and hopefully has, replaced the 
‘grand battle of paradigms’. Classes as seen from these perspectives involve: 
- attributes and material life conditions of individuals;  
- ways in which social positions afford some people control over 
economic resources while excluding others—defining classes relative 
to processes of ‘opportunity hoarding’;  
- structure by mechanisms of domination and exploitation in which 
economic positions accord some people power over the lives and 
activities of others.  
In the stratification approach, people can be categorised by age, gender etc. but 
also by their material conditions. ‘Class’ is those economically important 
attributes that shape people’s opportunities and choices in their material 
conditions of living. Such attributes include education in particular, but also 
more elusive attributes such as cultural resources, social connections and even 
individual motivations. Broad clusters of these different attributes and life 
conditions are termed ‘classes’: 
- The ‘middle class’ denotes people who have enough education and 
money to participate fully in ‘mainstream’ way of life (which might 
include particular consumption patterns, for example); 
- The ‘upper class’ designates people whose wealth, high income and 
social connections enable them to live their lives apart from 
‘ordinary’ people; while  
- the ‘lower class’ refers to those who lack the necessary educational 
and cultural resources to live securely above the poverty line;  
- finally, the ‘underclass’ are those who live in extreme poverty, 
marginalised from the mainstream of society by a lack of basic 
education and skills needed for stable employment. 
Since for most people  “... economic status and rewards are mainly acquired 
through employment in paid jobs, the central focus of research in this tradition 
has been the process through which people obtain the cultural, motivational and 
educational resources that affect their occupations in the labour market” (p. 
103). Since childhood is the platform for later developments much attention 
needs to be accorded to ‘class background’—the family and other settings in 
which key attributes are acquired. But this approach focuses more on the people 
in the ‘class slots’ rather than the relationship amongst the positions in the first 
place. 
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          Certain high income jobs (often also suffuse with other special 
advantages) can be sustained only if their incumbents have mechanisms for 
excluding others from access (i.e. ‘social closure’). Costly entry requirements, 
such as high educational credentials, is one such mechanism but so are tight 
admission procedures, high tuition costs and avoidance of making large loans to 
low-income people. Thus higher status groups ‘opportunity-hoard’. Three broad 
categories of opportunity-hoarding are:  
... capitalists, defined by private-property rights in the ownership of 
means of production; the middle class, defined by mechanisms of 
exclusion over the acquisition of education and skills; and the 
working class, defined by their exclusion from both higher 
educational credentials and capital. That segment of the working 
class that is protected by unions is seen either as a privileged 
stratum within the working class, or sometimes as a component of 
the middle class (p. 106).  
A more Marxist approach involves consideration of ‘domination’ (the ability to 
control the activities of others) and ‘exploitation’ (the acquisition of economic 
benefits from the labour of those who are dominated) although these are set 
within an ongoing wider framework of cooperation and tension.   
          Taking all of these processes together yields the following general picture 
of the American (although New Zealand’s would be very similar) class structure 
at the beginning of the 21st century (p. 114): 
-  At the top, an extremely rich capitalist class and corporate 
managerial class, living at extraordinarily high consumption 
standards, with relatively weak constraints on their exercise of 
economic power; 
-  An historically large and relatively stable middle class, anchored in 
an expansive and flexible system of higher education and technical 
training connected to jobs requiring credentials of various sorts, but 
whose security and future prosperity is now uncertain; 
-  A working class which once was characterised by a relatively large 
unionized segment with a standard of living and security similar to 
that of the middle class, but which now largely lacks these 
protections; 
-  A poor and precarious segment of the working class, characterized 
by low wages and relatively insecure employment, subjected to 
unconstrained job competition in the labour market, and with minimal 
protection from the state; and 
-  A marginalised, impoverished part of the population, without the 
skills and education needed for jobs that would enable them to live 
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above the poverty line, and living in conditions which make it 
extremely difficult to acquire those skills. 
Wright also notes that there is “a pattern of interaction between race and class in 
which the working poor and the marginalized population are disproportionately 
made up of racial minorities” (p.140). 
         A range of recent developments in class analysis have variously been 
generated in the UK, USA, Europe and Australia and the work of Mike Savage, 
who has been a leader in several of these, can provide a useful map. Savage et 
al. (2013) depict three phases in the analysis of class and stratification.  
- Up to the 1980s there was a dominance of ‘moralising’ official 
measures of class in which ‘standing within the community’ (replaced 
by ‘skill’ in the 1980s) was used to portray a six-fold class schema, 
with professionals at the top, and unskilled manual workers at the 
bottom – with this approach being accompanied by sociological criti-
quing in favour of more rigorous sociologically informed class 
schemas, variously deploying theoretical frameworks from Marx and 
Weber; 
- from the 1970s, this sociological critique triumphed, especially with 
the model of social class developed by John Goldthorpe et al. which 
was more widespread adopted than the rival Marxist framework of 
Erik Olin Wright. What is termed the Erikson–Goldthorpe–
Portocarero (EGP) model defined seven classes in relation to an 
individual’s employment position: differentiating between employees 
and employers and, amongst employees between those on a labour 
contract (routine, semi-routine, technical employees) and those in a 
more diffuse ‘service relationship’ (professionals and managers). This 
class schema also proved influential in the overhaul of official class 
schema, and in cross-national schemes for comparative analysis.  
Five main lines of criticism of this class analytical platform point to ways in 
which it is limited: 
- its validation as a deductive class schema predominantly focuses on 
the extent to which it measures postulated class-related features of the 
employment relations, but it is of less use in linking to wider cultural 
and social activities and identities;  
- a major appeal is its usefulness in placing individuals into social 
classes using standard nationally representative surveys with a 
moderate sample size (with appropriate data analysis strategies) - so 
that an ‘elite’ was not distinguished and (visible only in surveys with 
larger samples) and distinctive differences between ‘micro-classes’ 
could not be investigated; 
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- class is based on employment rather than income and wealth and so 
examining income and wealth variation within and amongst 
categories was not carried out; 
-  a focus on occupations occludes consideration of the more complex 
ways that class operates symbolically and culturally; 
- the comparative and contemporary validity of the scheme is thrown 
into doubt since it does not take highly important horizontal cleavages 
into account: for example it provides a too homogenous description of 
the salaried middle class and overemphasises the manual/non-manual 
divide in separating ‘male’ production workers and ‘female’ routine 
sales and service occupations. Neither does it capture the considerable 
cross-national differences with qualification levels, job autonomy, 
career prospects (i.e. social mobility), organisation of production, etc. 
 
Recent approaches often draw on Pierre Bourdieu who argues that there are 
three main different kinds of capital, each of which conveys certain advantages:  
(1) economic capital (wealth and income),  
(2) cultural capital (the ability to appreciate and engage with cultural 
goods, and credentials institutionalised through educational success), 
and  
(3) social capital (contacts and connections which allow people to 
draw on their social networks).  
Bourdieu’s point is that although these capitals may overlap, they are also 
different, and that it is possible to draw distinctions between people with 
different stocks of each of the three capitals, which then allows the provision of 
a more complex model of social class. Comprehensive questions on cultural and 
social capital are recently being asked on national surveys so these dimensions 
can now be explored. The social linkages framework advanced by Prandy: see 
Stewart et al., 1980.) looking at the array of social contacts reported by 
respondents is also seen as important in tracing the social texture of class 
relations. 
          Various of these ideas have been tested out in a variety of empirical 
studies. One which is of particular interest, because of its public dimension, was 
the Great British Class Survey (GBCS) - sponsored by the BBC’s Lab UK 
which commissioned in 2009 a major web survey on social class which 
generated, because of very considerable public interest in the topic, a large scale 
dataset (n=160k), with a wide range of information, and was supplemented by a 
nationally representative sample. The GBCS includes detailed measures of eco-
nomic, cultural and social capitals and might be taken as providing a ‘state of 
the art’ class measurement tool. Questions on cultural capital asked about 
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people’s leisure interests, musical tastes, use of the media, and food preferences.  
Questions on social capital mainly take the form of ‘position generator’ which 
measures the range of people’s social ties by asking respondents whether they 
knew anyone in 37 different occupations. Questions on economic capital asked 
about household income, savings and the value of owner-occupied housing. 
Finally extensive information was obtained about household composition, 
education, social mobility and political attitudes, to contextualise the measures 
of cultural, economic and social capital. Complex statistical analysis was then 
applied which led to the postulation of a 7-category class schema summarised in 
Table 1 (together with an estimate of the size of each).  
Table 1. Summary of UK social classes according to Savage et al., 2013. (including % of 
UK population) 
Elite Very high economic capital (especially savings), 
high social capital, very high highbrow cultural 
capital 
6 
Established 
middle class 
High economic capital, high status of mean 
contacts, high highbrow and emerging cultural 
capital 
25 
Technical 
middle class 
High economic capital, very high mean social 
contacts, but relatively few contacts reported, 
moderate cultural capital 
6 
New affluent 
workers 
Moderately good economic capital, moderately 
poor mean score of social contacts, though high 
range, moderate highbrow but good emerging 
cultural capital 
15 
Traditional 
working class 
Moderately poor economic capital, though with 
reasonable house price, few social contacts, low 
highbrow and emerging cultural capital 
14 
Emergent 
service workers 
Moderately poor economic capital, though with 
reasonable household income, moderate social 
contacts, high emerging (but low highbrow) 
cultural capital 
19 
Precariat Poor economic capital, and the lowest  15 
 
Oesch’s work (e.g. 2006) was mentioned in passing while summarising 
Savage’s account above: separate attention is warranted. He points out that the 
current generation of class schema are based on analyses which are at least three 
decades old and that major changes to the workforce and capitalism have since 
intervened, and  the effects of these changes on class formation needs to be 
attended to.  The major changes include the expansion of service occupations, 
often particularly occupied by women and a decline of the (often male) 
industrial workforce. Oesch endeavours to extend more usually hierarchical 
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schema along a horizontal axis which better represents cleavages in the 
employment structure. He distinguishes between three different ‘work logics’: 
- technical:  
- organisational and 
- interpersonal. 
In turn, these comprise 4 dimensions (see Table 2): 
-  how the work process is set 
-  the degree of authority relations 
-  the primary orientation, and 
-  skill requirements. 
 
 
Table 2: The dimensions at the basis of three different work logics of employees (Oesch, 
2006)  
 Interpersonal work 
logic 
 Technical work logic  Organizational work 
logic  
(a) Setting of 
work process 
Service setting based on 
face- to-face exchange 
Work process determined 
by technical production 
parameters 
Bureaucratic division of 
labour 
(b) Relations of 
authority 
Working largely outside 
the  lines of command 
command for higher 
grades, working within a 
clear-cut com 
 Working within a 
bureaucratic  command 
structure that  
corresponds to a career 
sequence 
(c) Primary 
orientation 
Orientation towards the 
client,  student, patient or 
petitioner 
Orientation towards the  
professional community 
or group of trades 
Primary orientation 
towards the employing 
organization 
(d) Skill 
requirements 
Expertise and social 
(communicative) skills 
for higher grades, social 
skills for   lower grades 
Scientific expertise for 
higher grades, craft and 
manual skills for lower 
grades 
Coordination and control 
skills for higher grades, 
clerical skills for lower 
grades 
 
As an example, comparing similarly ‘ranked’ occupations along the horizontal 
dimension of the three work logics, he contrasts the middle class examples of 
(he also provides examples of similar discrepancies in work situations amongst 
working class occupations): 
- Associate managers who coordinate/control others, are embedded in 
a career sequence and who must display a high degree of 
organisational loyalty; 
- Semi-professionals who focus on (social and technical) skills with 
considerable work autonomy which can include some advocacy of 
clients’ interests since their job tasks require client cooperation;  
- Technicians who are in an intermediate situation. 
Oesch also argues that class analysts need to bring institutions into their analysis 
since these can confer rights or grant resources that affect inequality – three key 
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such institutions are Welfare states, Trade Unions and Political citizenship.  
From this framework, Oesch then generates a 17-category class schema which 
can be readily reduced. 
            Hypotheses are proposed about the link between class locations and 
socio-economic characteristics which Oesch argues should be correlated to at 
least three different sets of characteristics: 
- to material advantage;  
- to the work setting; 
- to political preferences.  
Individuals in hierarchically higher classes – that is individuals in class 
locations where occupational skill requirements are more demanding – are 
expected to benefit from more advantageous employment relationships and thus 
to receive higher compensation for their work effort than individuals in 
hierarchically lower class locations. The notion of compensation encompasses 
both present compensation in the job, work income, and potential compensation 
and in the future, promotion prospects. This latter aspect corresponds to Erikson  
and Goldthorpe’s emphasis on the long-term dimension of the bureaucratic 
employment.  
          Nor should an earlier class analysis developed by Dunleavy (e.g. 
Dowding and Dunleavy, 1996) be entirely ignored. This schema widened the 
coverage of class-relevant social categories to include consumption more 
generally (e.g. the potential ‘class’ interests which might be generated by 
sharing ‘social housing’ or private renting or being dependent on public 
transport or of housing ownership perhaps leading to ‘housing classes’) as well 
as to the potential ‘class’-related differences in interests which might emerge as 
a result of employment in particular ‘sectors’: private enterprise, the state or the 
non-profit sectors. 
          There are a few other necessary complicating aspects of class analysis 
which must be noted and considered: 
- Multinationality; 
- Intersectionality (the interaction amongst class, gender and ethnicity 
which is often complex);  
- Unequal intra-household asset-sharing. 
 
Each of these points signals attention that is needed to significantly extend class 
analysis.  That a national framing of inequality and social class no longer 
suffices is clearly evident. As Carroll (2010) states: “Rising volumes of trade 
and foreign investment, the growing share of the world economy claimed by the 
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largest transnational corporations (TNCs), the expansion of global 
transportation and communication flows and the formation of integrated global 
financial markets are all indicative..” of globalisation of the forces and relations 
of production. And class is strongly embedded in other social dimensions: 
particularly ethnicity and gender. Moreover, these topics are in turn entwined 
with the brute fact that we are each not just individual agents but share assets 
and trajectories with various social units that we are embedded in: particularly 
our families and households. 
          Some literature has focused on inequality per se rather than the more 
hierarchical distribution of assets.  In particular, in their The Spirit Level 
Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) (together with a large supporting literature) has 
shown a convincing link between inequality and a range of unfortunate societal 
outcomes, although there is also some stringent critique of this work, in 
particular focusing on the lack of convincing causal mechanisms linking 
inequality levels to the outcomes. Further empirical testing and theoretical 
development is needed.  
          Penultimately, it is not enough to assemble the analytical apparatus but 
sociological accounts need to show it at work. The fate of particular class 
groupings depends on the nexus of alliance/competition/conflict amongst the 
classes, bearing in mind that their organisational and ideological capacities for 
such interrelationships may vary considerably.  In the most recent conjuncture 
some of the changing crucial capacities include (according to Wade, 2013 in 
Rashbrooke, but extended – see also Hacker and Pierson, 2010): 
- Concentration of financial power 
- Interests of the rich/upper class 
- Interests of the middle class 
- Conservative ideology and its links to ‘non-negotiable’ values 
- Economists’ defence of inequality 
- Declining capacity of the working class 
- Globalisation. 
Needless to say, understanding of the ways in which an array of forces shape 
and are shaped by class and other competition and conflict is a topic requiring 
much further attention. 
          Finally, a widening ethical dimension is emerging which involves a turn 
to wider consideration of the ethics of asset distribution - extending the 
contemporary moral concern with poverty to also consider the moral worth of 
the situation of more wealthy people (e.g. Sayer, 2005). (In past decades – as 
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Sayer notes in Atkinson et al., 2012 – a moral vocabulary was deployed in 
relation to such people which is now apparently obsolete. See also Jones 2011 
for a thorough critique of the UK situation.) Alongside this, economists (and 
other social scientists) are increasingly turning attention to the viability of 
alternative ways of delivering policy which would ameliorate (or even repair) 
inequalities and class divisions. To these analytical efforts, political sociologists 
(and social marketers) need to add consideration for the levels of political 
support such strategies might gain. 
          Hopefully, some of this conceptual mapping will provide useful guidance 
in perusing the complexities that arise with the subject-matter of this special 
issue, and a provocation to further reading for those readers who have not been 
closely following trends in class analysis. Moreover, it may form a benchmark 
against which the provision and the lacks of New Zealand class analysis can be 
assayed. 
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Economic Inequality In New Zealand: A User’s Guide 
 
 
Brian Easton 
 
 
“When inequality is the common law of a society, the greatest inequalities do 
not call attention to themselves.” Democracy in America, A. de Tocqueville. 
 
Prologue 
This survey is a response to two recently published works on inequality in New 
Zealand. The first, a report by Bryan Perry (2013), although published in a 
government department, is an extensive scholarly study bringing together much 
material. The second, a book edited by Max Rashbrooke (2013), although with 
contributions by academics, is a popular exposition which offers a starting point 
for a discussion on inequality but both undersells the issue by not being up-to- 
date with the research, and oversells it – if we are in crisis we have been in it for 
over two decades.1 
          Reporting on either presents a reviewer with a considerable challenge. 
The Perry study is so marvellously detailed that one could well end up with a 
review as long as its 242 pages; tackling the Rashbrooke book at the same level 
would involve tediously correcting or elaborating a plethora of statements. 
          Instead, this has been written as a survey of what we know – and don’t 
know – about economic (mainly income and wealth) inequality in New Zealand. 
The works are referred to where they are a part of the exposition. 
          A surprising conclusion of the survey is just how much New Zealand 
research on economic inequality there has been. The incomplete list of 
references at the end cites more than 70 empirical studies. It is not practical to 
mention them all in this survey, even if those writing on the topic should be 
aware of these. 
                                                            
1 Rhetoricians with policy agendas will claim there is a crisis and propose their policy as a 
solution or partial solution to, say, the change in the level of inequality even though there is 
no apparent connection between the two. The classic political analysis of crisis politics is 
Democracy in Crisis (Jensen & Meckling, 1983) which explains how crises are manufactured 
to pursue policy ends. Ironically, as their title indicates, the writers use exactly the same 
political strategy themselves. 
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          Reading the Rashbrooke book, though, one recalls the story of the drunk 
who uses a lamppost for support rather than illumination. So it is for too many 
public policy rhetoricians.2 This survey is consciously explanatory about the 
underlying analytics. In each case the test is whether those who contributed to 
the Rashbrooke book would have benefited from having a better grasp of them. 
Key Messages 
Section 1: Why is Economic Inequality Important? 
1. The section identifies four main issues as to why inequality may be important 
 - equity 
 - plutocracy 
 - efficiency 
 - inequality may contribute to economic instability. 
Section 2: Measuring Inequality 
2. There is no single perfect measure of inequality. There are numerous 
imperfect measures which may be used for different purposes. Sometimes they 
contradict one another. 
3. The exact variable which is being measured matters. Among the options for 
measuring income (or wealth) are that of persons (adults with or without 
children) or of households and, in the case of income, before or after tax and 
transfers. Always check definitions (and don’t trust that inexpert writers have). 
Be aware that the measures may not be comprehensive.  
Section 3: The Census Income Distribution (Table 1) 
4. Total personal income of adults as measured by the census (which is - before 
tax - market income only to 1981 and includes social security from 1981) shows 
relatively stable inequality from 1926 to the 1950s and then falling to 1986, 
followed by rises.  
Section 4: Household Income Inequality (Table 2.3) 
5. There is an unequal distribution of (equivalised) household income 
distribution. In 2012 about two-thirds of New Zealanders were in households 
with an annual household income of between $29,000 and $48,400 per 
(equivalised) person. A sixth were in higher income households; a sixth were in 
poorer households.  
6. Today New Zealand is a more unequal society than it was three decades ago. 
                                                            
2 The comparable story about some researchers is of the drunk who looked for the car keys 
under a lamppost light, despite having lost them elsewhere, because the light was better there. 
Easton 
 
21 
However most of the increase in inequality occurred in the period between the 
mid-1980s and the mid-1990s. The width of the distribution (as measured by the 
Coefficient of Variation) increased by over a half. The trend after the mid-1990s 
is more ambiguous. The best interpretation is that the income distribution has 
remained at roughly the same level of inequality over the last two decades. 
Section 5: Household Market Incomes (Table 4) 
7. It is difficult to interpret changes in the household market income 
distribution. It probably follows much the same pattern as household disposable 
income. It may not be a particularly relevant indicator. 
Section 6: Explaining Changes in the Level of Inequality: Market Influences 
8. The rise in structural unemployment seems to have increased income 
inequality. Cyclical unemployment is important.  
9. A major influence was a rise in the income share of the top 1 percent of 
adults. Their share rose from about 6 percent in the early 1980s (that is 6 times 
the adult average) to 10 percent today (10 times the adult average). Most of the 
shift occurred in the period between 1998 and 2003. The two major influences 
seem to have been a change in the tax treatment of dividends and an increase in 
margins for management and professionals over average workers. 
10. There is not much evidence on the impact of prices and wage relativities 
(other than the margins mentioned in paragraph 9). 
Section 7: Explaining Changes in the Level of Inequality: Social Influences  
11. Changes in the family and household structure and in the socio-demographic 
attributes of households had some impact - raising the level of inequality.  
Section 8: Explaining Changes in the Level of Inequality: Redistribution  
12. A major reason for the rise in equivalised household disposable income 
inequality between 1985 and 1993 is partly explained by the dramatic changes 
in redistribution between income levels that New Zealand experienced. The 
income tax scale was flattened and the introduction of GST imposed more 
heavily upon those on lower incomes. There were savage cuts to benefit levels 
in 1991 and more user-pays for health and education so that more costs were 
pushed onto households, which the poorer ones found harder to bear.  
13. While there was relative stability in the household income distribution after 
1993, the relative share of the bottom quintile fell from the late 1990s. The 
group's real incomes rose, but less than average, probably because benefits were 
increased in line with prices rather than wages, so beneficiaries did not share in 
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the rising real wages. Beneficiaries were not entitled to the child tax credit, 
which was later expanded and called the 'in work tax credit' under working-for-
families, and because many beneficiaries were unable to take advantage of the 
booming labour market. 
Sections 9, 10.11: International Comparisons (Tables 5, 6) 
14. New Zealand was 9th out of 34 in the OECD ranking of inequality in about 
2009, after adjustment for population and per capita GDP. It was about 20th in 
1985, so it moved from being in the bottom half of the OECD to the top half. 
(The measure used here is internationally comparable Gini coefficients.)  
15. Over the whole three decades between 1982 and 2012 the increase in New 
Zealand income inequality was not the greatest. (The Swedish change seems to 
have been much higher.) But it had the greatest increase in income inequality in 
the decade to 1995.  
Section 12: What Happened Before 1985? 
17. We do not know what happened to household incomes before the 1980s 
because there are no data.  
18. However personal market income seems to have been stable in the interwar 
period and declined in the early post-war period to 1981.  
Section 13: What Happened After the Global Financial Crisis? 
19. The preliminary indication is that the Global Financial Crisis impacted more 
on top disposable incomes than bottom ones, so that there was some reduction 
in income inequality. This was despite the post-GFC income tax changes being 
biased towards the rich and despite some tightening of benefit entitlements. The 
probable explanation is that returns on investment fell while unemployment in 
New Zealand has not been too heavily affected by the downturn. (The 
Canterbury Earthquakes add to the difficulties of interpreting the short data 
series.)  
20. While the 1972 Royal Commission on Social Security pointed towards a 
notion of relative poverty, official policy since 1991 seems to be concerned with 
absolute poverty only. 
Section 14: Poverty Measurement 
21. Poverty lines based on median incomes are flawed, because poverty can be 
reduced by transferring income from the middle to the top. 
22. A higher proportion of the population experienced relative poverty after 
2000 than in the 1980s. - perhaps 2 to 4 percentage points.  
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23. The majority of the poor are parents with jobs and their children (although 
they may have had only one or two), living in their own home albeit usually 
with a mortgage. The proportion in poverty is higher among solo parents, those 
without jobs, living in rental accommodation and with a brown ethnicity (but 
there are fewer of each category). More women than men are poor. While the 
incidence of poverty is higher among Māori and Pasifika, there are more poor 
who are not of their ethnicity.  
24. The salient conclusion from the research is that over 80 percent of the poor 
are children and their parents (and others in their households) and that 
proportionally more children are in poverty than adults (especially those adults 
who are not parents).  
Section 15: Distribution by Social Groups (Table 7) 
25. Mean Māori equivalised household incomes were 90 percent of average in 
2012 and Pasifika ones were 89 percent. European/Pākehā ones were 107.5 
percent. 
Section 16: The Dynamics of Inequality 
26. Although there is considerable dynamism in the income distribution as some 
people and households shift their relative locations over time, there is also 
considerable inertia.  
27. One study found about half of those below the study's poverty threshold at a 
point in time were in chronic ('permanent') poverty - the figure for children was 
60 percent. The proportions will be higher if a higher poverty threshold is used. 
Section 17: Income and Health (Table 8) 
28. In any given age group, those in the lower income quintiles are in poorer 
health than those in the higher income quintiles. Some infectious diseases seem 
to be associated with poverty. 
Section 18: Wealth 
29. Physical and financial wealth is much more concentrated than personal 
income. While there is a life cycle to wealth holdings (peaking at about the age 
of 60), within each age cohort, wealth is also very unequally distributed. The 
main form of this wealth holding is housing.  
30. The vast majority of the adult population had little physical and financial 
wealth. In 2003/4 6.5 percent had negative net worth, although this may be 
dominated by those with student debt. Conversely 1 percent of adults had 16.4 
percent of total wealth, about the same share as the bottom 70 percent of the 
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population. There is not a lot of gender inequality, but each European/Pākehā 
owns about 2.6 times that of the other ethnic groups. Larger families (with more 
than two children) have less wealth. 
Section 19: Housing 
31. Very little is known systematically about the impact of housing on 
inequality but from what is known differences in housing outgoings tend to 
increase effective income inequality.  
Section 20: Inequality and Growth 
32. While per capita National Income in constant expenditure prices rose at a 
trend rate of 1.7 percent p.a. between 1982 and 2012, Sen's real national income 
- which is more sensitive to distributional change - rose only 1.3 percent p.a. 
because of the rise in income inequality. In effect on Sen's measure the 
additional inequality cost New Zealand economic growth almost a fifth. 
Section 21: Epilogue: Towards Policy Responses 
33. While the focus of the survey is on the facts and related analytics rather than 
policy - on getting things right - there is a preliminary discussion of 
predistribution and redistribution policies.  
34. This survey of economic inequality concludes  
Those who command policy - whether effectively or ineffectively - have to 
decide to what extent reducing (or increasing) economic inequality is a policy 
objective. Is New Zealand satisfied with shifting from a low inequality to a high 
inequality society? What would its founding nineteenth century migrants have 
thought about the fact that, after allowing for each country's size and affluence, 
New Zealand is now more unequal than the countries they left? And what 
would those who invited them here have thought had they known their 
descendants would be firmly in the bottom end of the unequal distributions? 
References 
The bibliography includes over 70 items of New Zealand empirical research 
plus some international ones and some of a more philosophic nature. Readers 
are invited to submit further New Zealand work which has been inadvertently 
overlooked.  
1. Why is Economic Inequality Important? 
Public concern over economic inequality is rising both internationally and in 
New Zealand. It probably reflects four main themes which are inextricably 
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mixed together. 
1. The Equity Argument  
Many people judge that inequality (or, more often, severe inequality) is morally 
wrong per se. Their arguments as to why this is so can be tortuous or simple. 
One of the most sophisticated is that of philosopher John Rawls whose ‘second 
principle of justice’ is that social and economic inequalities should be arranged 
to be of the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society and that 
offices and positions should be open to everyone under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity (Rawls, 1971/1999).3  
          Implicit in this formulation is a belief that some inequality benefits the 
poorest. A simple version of it is that a society with perfect equality would give 
the poorest a lower quality of life than one with some inequality, because there 
would not be the economic incentives to improve oneself, thereby benefiting 
others too, while the costs of enforcing such perfect equality are high.  
          However this does not tell us how much inequality is ideal. Such 
evidence, as there is, indicates that inequality tends to be lower in higher 
income societies, while high inequality societies do not seem to grow any faster. 
These are but correlations; there is not a lot of systematic evidence to explain 
what the underlying causal processes might be. 
          There are two main subsidiaries of the equity argument. The first arises 
from the need for ‘social coherence’ – an unequal society is a divided one. It has 
an efficiency dimension since a divided society is likely to require more public 
spending on justice, policing and corrections and on private security measures.  
          The second argument is that while there is nothing wrong with social 
inequality at a point in time, it has long term consequences in terms of loss of 
opportunity for future generations. Sometimes it is said that the purely ethical 
case against inequality does not carry much weight (in the mind of the 
exponent) but there is a concern that children (in particular) in deprived homes 
will be denied life chances. (Someone who holds such a view may also be 
concerned about the three non-equity arguments which follow.) Note that it also 
has an efficiency dimension, because arguably an unequal society is wasting 
talents.  
 
                                                            
3 There is a caveat. The ‘just savings principle’ requires that justice be maintained through 
time. The first principle is that each person has an equal right to the most extensive basic 
liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others. Sen (2009) presents a critique of the 
Rawlsian Theory of Justice which does not affect this exposition. 
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2. The Plutocracy Argument 
There is a concern that if there is great inequality then those at the top of the 
(income, say) distribution have an unfair influence in the direction of the 
governing of society. While the rich always have more political leverage than 
the poor, the amount varies depending on institutional arrangements and the 
degree of inequality. It is possible that while a political system may have the 
formal appearance of a democracy, it may in practice be a plutocracy in which 
its effective rulers are its rich.  
          Plutocracy undermines the claim of a democratic society. Where the 
economic disparities outweigh the formal structures of democracy, the practical 
operation of the democratic principle suffers – and with it the rights and voice 
of the underprivileged. The unequal distribution of national resources is 
consequently affected and with it the denial of opportunities for the 
disadvantaged sectors of the population. Stiglitz's point about the cumulative 
effects through unequal media and national dialogue is especially relevant. 
          Where a particular system settles on the democracy-plutocracy spectrum 
is partly a matter of institutional arrangements (such as the degree to which 
money can influence elections) but inequality is also relevant because it affects 
how much various groups can afford for influencing purposes. Indeed the 
successful ones may use that influence to bias the institutional arrangements in 
their favour (such as the laws which control contributions to elections). This 
influence is not confined only to elections and the policies of the elected 
governments; it may also affect the media and the national dialogue. (Stiglitz, 
2012; Wade, 2013) 
          The plutocracy issue is sharper in America and Britain, where the top 1 
percent of income recipients have double the share they have in New Zealand. 
In any case any such class analysis in New Zealand has to pay more attention to 
offshore influence.  
3. The Efficiency Argument 
Recently The Spirit Level has argued that unequal societies are more likely to 
have poorer social performance (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). It finds a 
relationship between inequality, on the one hand, and, on the other, various 
variables: drug and alcohol infant mortality, educational performance, 
homicides, imprisonment rates, life expectancy, mental illness, obesity, social 
mobility, suicide, teenage births and trust.  
          Some of the relationships are empirically stronger than others. Thus far, 
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the research provides but a correlation and every scientist knows that correlation 
is not causation – that two events are associated does not prove that one causes 
the other. There are various hypotheses about the mechanisms which might 
cause the social distress, but none are yet proven in a scientific court.4 Any 
inefficiency would mean that a society with higher inequality has to spend more 
– whether publicly or privately does not matter here – on its health and justice 
systems to attain its desired outcomes. 
          A related issue is that the greater the economic inequality, the lower the 
intergenerational mobility. Even if economic inequality at a point in time were 
not to matter, it seems likely to affect life chances over time. A child who 
comes from a deprived background is likely to have poorer health throughout 
the rest of their life, to have less access to educational and vocational 
opportunities and to be more likely to experience social delinquency. The equity 
argument says this is wrong; for efficiency concerns it makes measures to 
correct the effect more expensive.5 
4. The Macroeconomic Argument 
One element of the Global Financial Crisis may have been that the increasing 
incomes among rich Americans were saved and lent to those below for housing 
purchase, which led to the sub-prime loans and the resulting financial instability 
(Stiglitz, 2013). This argument applies to the American economy only, and does 
not seem to apply to New Zealand. It is mentioned here as one part of the main 
issues in the world debate.  
          In summary, there are a number of reasons why we might be concerned 
with economic equality. Aside from moral concerns, there is good reason to 
believe that inequality impacts on the way in which a society functions. If some 
of the impacts are unattractive, reducing inequality may result in some social 
gains. 
2. Measuring Inequality 
There is no unequivocal measure of inequality or changes in inequality. While 
what is happening to inequality is clear when only two individuals are involved 
– either their incomes are closer or further apart – the addition of just one extra 
person can lead to ambiguities. It is only possible to make unequivocal 
                                                            
4 The causal hypothesis Wilkinson and Pickett offer involves psychological phenomenon like 
anxiety and lower self-esteem in higher inequality societies. 
5 Even so, honesty requires acknowledging that a lot of the social expenditure on responding 
to inequality is not very effective. 
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comparisons where the ‘Lorenz’ curves do not cross6 (Atkinson, 1975: Ch 3; 
Easton, 1983: Ch 2).7 
          The core of the problem is that economic distributions are typically 
complex and cannot be characterised by a few parameters. Students are 
introduced to simple statistical distributions; the commonest of which is the 
normal (or Gaussian) distribution which requires but two parameters (a mean 
and standard deviation) which may be compacted for many comparative 
purposes into a single parameter of the coefficient of variation – the ratio of the 
two.8 Commonly there is not a sole parameter to compare two economic 
distributions. That is why there can be no authoritative index of inequality. 
          This is illustrated by the following simple example. Suppose there are 
three people who have incomes of 3, 10 and 17 respectively. If there is a 
transfer of one unit from the middle income person to the bottom and one unit 
to the top the distribution is now 4, 8, 18. 
          Observing the bottom person has had an increase in their income one 
might assume there has been a reduction in inequality. But, paradoxically, 
observing the top person has also had an increase, the conclusion seems to be 
there has been an increase in inequality.  
           A widely used measure is the ‘Gini’ coefficient which measures the 
average difference between the incomes of the individuals in the distribution 
(scaled by the overall average income). It ranges from 1 when there is total 
equality, to 0 when all the income is received by a single individual. 
(Sometimes it is reported as a percentage/out of 100.) 
          Because it is not well understood the Gini coefficient has a mystique. For 
the general user a measure of the ‘width’ of a distribution – such as the 
coefficient of variation – may be more intelligible.9 A CV of 1 is equivalent to 
the standard deviation equalling the mean; of 2, twice the mean; and so on. A 
doubling of the CV is equivalent to a doubling of the width of a distribution. 
                                                            
6 A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative share of people from lowest to highest income on the 
horizontal axis against the cumulative share of income earned on the vertical axis. 
7 There are many other measures than the ones used in this survey – e.g. percentile ratios, 
such as 80 to 20. None resolve the basic problem that no single measure can capture all the 
change in a distribution, while a plethora of partial measures adds to the confusion. 
8 The same applies to the log-normal distribution. A useful first approximation to many 
income distributions is to treat the logarithm of the income as normal. However the 
approximation is usually crude for actual distributions. 
9 The coefficient of variation of the distribution is its standard deviation (a measure of the 
dispersion or width) divided by the mean (so that it is scaled). 
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          Unfortunately it is rare for a research study to provide the CV. However 
there is a simple conversion of a Gini coefficient to a CV when the variable has 
a lognormal distribution – which many economic distributions approximately 
follow.10 To assist understanding the magnitude of the Gini coefficient – and 
even more to assist understanding the meaning of a change in inequality 
between two distributions – whenever the Gini coefficient is reported the CV 
equivalent for the lognormal is also reported.  
          To add to the paradox, the Gini coefficients for the two distributions we 
considered at the beginning of the section are identical (GC = 0 .655; CV = 6.2), 
which might lead one to conclude there has been no change in inequality.  
          So the three measures tell different stories, illustrating the difficulty of 
judging changes of inequality (or comparing them) when the changes are small. 
Fortunately in practice where there have been substantial changes in the income 
distribution, the measures of inequality have been consistent. But when the 
changes in the distribution are small they can contradict one another. 
          The counsel of perfection is to give ‘income shares’. Space means that is 
not always possible and, in any case, much of the public finds the resulting 
tables too complicated.  
          A recent development at the OECD has been the use of disparity indexes 
rather than the Gini Coefficient. Essentially a disparity index is the coefficient 
of variation scaled so that the mean of the group (say of countries) is unity. It is 
the main indicator in the OECD paper discussed at end of Section 7.  
3. The Census Income Distribution 
The Population Census asks respondents to report their incomes for the previous 
year. Until 1981 they asked only for market incomes, but from 1981 they asked 
for total income including social security benefits. (Conveniently in 1981 they 
asked both.) The request is for before tax income but it is likely some 
(especially social security beneficiaries) report their after-tax income. In any 
case their recall is not always accurate.  
          The advantage of the series is its length, although it is less valuable since 
superior series have become available. Census data is also useful for tracing 
social groups such as Māori. The available series is shown in Table 1. (The 
interwar data is discussed in section 11.) 
                                                            
10 A reasonable approximation for the lognormal distribution for GC in the 0.1 to 0.8 range is 
CV = 0.15*exp (9.2*GC) (Easton 1983, ibid.: .22-230, Skeptic’s Play 2013) However few 
distributions are exactly lognormal, certainly not the ones discussed in this survey. 
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Table 1: Income Reported by Adult Deciles in New Zealand Censuses 1945-201311 
Percent of Reported Income 
March 
Year 
Bottom 3 
Deciles 
7th 6th 5th 4th 3rd 2nd Top Gini 
Coeff 
Market Incomes (Non-Māori) 
1926 0.0 0.1 5.1 7.8 13.0 16.9 20.6 35.6 0.62 
1936 0.0 2.2 2.9 7.6 9.5 15.1 22.4 40.3 0.59 
1945 0.0 2.7 4.8 7.9 11.2 15.4 20.0 37.8 0.59 
1951 0.0 .2.5 4.5 9.2 13.4 16.4 20.7 35.7 0.60 
Market Incomes (Total Population) 
1951 0.0 0.1 3.9 8.5 14.0 15.1 20.1 38.5 0.61 
1956 0.0 0.2 3.9 8.9 13.1 15.8 20.2 38.3 0.61 
1961 0.0 0.4 4.7 8.2 13.9 16.0 19.7 37.1 0.60 
1966 0.0 1.2 5.2 9.4 12.6 15.4 18.7 37.5 0.58 
1971 0.1 1.5 5.1 9.9 12.2 16.1 19.5 35.6 0.57 
1976 0.3 1.6 5.8 9.6 12.7 15.7 19.8 34.6 0.56 
1981 0.4 1.4 5.9 9.6 12.7 15.6 19.6 34.9 0.56 
Total Income Including Social Security Benefits 
1981 4.4 4.5 6.6 9.5 11.7 14.2 17.7 31.3 0.48 
1986 6.9 5.5 7.2 9.1 11.3 13.8 17.6 28.7 0.43 
1991 7.5 4.8 6.6 8.6 11.6 13.3 17.4 30.3 0.45 
1996 5.9 5.1 5.9 8.2 10.7 13.7 17.1 33.4 0.48 
2001 5.7 4.8 6.1 8.1 10.6 13.3 17.5 33.9 0.49 
2006 5.8 4.8 6.5 8.7 10.9 13.1 17.7 32.4 0.47 
2013          
(Sources: Statistics New Zealand Population Censuses). 
The inconsistencies of measurement (and inaccuracies of recall) over time mean 
that it is not always easy to identify exactly what is going on. However the 
pattern seems to have been that market income was becoming less unequal in 
the post war era up to 1986 (Easton, 1983). An important factor was increased 
market income to those at the bottom of the distribution. The probable main 
reason is women (especially mothers) entering the paid labour force.  
          The post-1981 series is complicated by the addition of social security to 
market income, so some of the changes are the result of changes in the levels of 
                                                            
11 The 1945 Census was in September 1945. It did not include overseas personnel. This data 
corrects an error in Easton (1996). 
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benefits and the numbers of recipients. Even so, it shows what is a characteristic 
feature of the post-war New Zealand income distribution. There is a very large 
increase in inequality between 1986 and 1996, equivalent to a 50 percent 
increase in the coefficient of variation.12  
          After 1996 the inequality as measured by the Gini Coefficient is 
reasonably constant and may not reflect structural change. We await the 2013 
Census data before drawing any structural conclusions. 
          The income shares reported in this section are before taxes are levied. The 
next section discusses the impact of taxation but this has to be at a household 
level and the data is only from 1981.  
4. Household Income Inequality 
Inequality is a multidimensional phenomenon, including inequality of income, 
or wealth, or inequality of access to health care, justice and educational 
opportunity.  
          Moreover there are sub-dimensions within the categories. Income may 
refer to market income, or to disposable income, in which taxes are deducted 
and government transfers (generally described as ‘benefits’ in this review) are 
added, or it may refer to taxable income, which often adds public transfers to 
market income.13 It may be on the basis of individuals, typically excluding 
children14; or it may be the income of households which include children. The 
population under consideration usually matters.15 Most of the other dimensions 
have similar complications. 
          We shall focus here mainly on the ‘equivalised household income’ data 
base, which is at the centre of New Zealand analysis. The method was 
introduced in 1974 when the first Statistics New Zealand household survey 
                                                            
12 The insertion is actually greater because in 1987 most social security benefits were grossed 
up (NZ superannuation and its predecessors always had been). Insofar as beneficiaries report 
their pre-tax benefit, some of the increase in low incomes between 1986 and 1991 was 
spurious and the inequality increase was even greater. 
13 While taxable income has included most transfer incomes since 1987, inclusion was not as 
comprehensive before then. 
14 Sometimes the data base forces the treatment of trusts as individuals. 
15 In the 1970s it mattered whether the measurement of income inequality covered all adults 
or just taxpayers. The former showed a fall in inequality over the period; the latter a rise. This 
was because women who had not been earning entered the paid labour force. Because they 
generally worked part-time and their pay rates were lower, they were at the bottom of the 
taxpayer distributions which appeared more unequal, yet their additional earnings boosted 
lower adult incomes so that the adult income distribution was less unequal. (Easton, 1983: 
Ch. 4). 
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became available (Easton, 1976). There have been steady improvements over 
the years, including the ability to access data at unit record level, and steady 
improvements in the quality and consistency of the records.  
          The basic procedure is to take the reported (annual) income – which may 
be adjusted for under-reporting – deducting income tax and adding government-
provided benefits (if they are not included in the reported income). The income 
is then adjusted for the household’s composition.16 The result is called 
‘equivalised’ income. The purpose is to treat households of different size and 
composition equivalently. For most purposes the notion may be as if it is ‘per 
capita’. (A variation is to focus on spending rather than on disposable income. 
The income focus arises because dis-saving in one period is likely to lead to 
lower spending in future ones.) 
          The household equivalence scales which are used for the adjustment 
usually allow for the economies of scale for larger household, and often treat 
adults and children differently. There may be adjustments for housing 
circumstances (discussed later) and other differences.  
          The scales are fraught with complications not always appreciated by their 
users (Easton, 2004). Some will mentioned later when they become important 
for interpretation.  
          Since each household has different numbers of individuals and, 
especially, larger households tend to be poorer ones, each person (including any 
children) in a household is assigned the equivalised household income.17 All 
individuals are then ranked by the equivalised incomes of the household they 
belong to into deciles.18 
          Table 2 shows the resulting tabulation for the 2012 year.19 The second 
column shows each decile’s average equivalised income (it may best be treated 
as the income of a couple; in April 2012 their New Zealand Superannuation 
                                                            
16 Among the complications is how to handle households with negative income (typically 
they are those with self-employed occupants) and what to do with households whose 
expenditures far exceed their income. A common practice is to eliminate households with 
negative incomes or to set their incomes at zero. 
17 This assumes that households share their income equally. It may not be true even in 
families (mothers may deny spending on themselves to protect their children). Furthermore 
all households are not families (e.g. a student flat) and have no reason to share income 
equally.  
18 Smaller quantiles (e.g. percentiles) are not generally practical because of the Household 
Survey’s sample size. 
19 The 2012 year refers to the year ending June 2012. From 1998 and earlier the year ends in 
March.  
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would have been at least $25,953 p.a.). The third column shows the decile share 
of total equivalised income.  
           The basic message is that there is considerable income inequality in New 
Zealand, with the top decile receiving about 2.4 times the average income and 
7.5 times as much as the bottom decile. The Gini Coefficient is 0.306, 
equivalent to a Coefficient of Variation of 0.25 and a standard deviation of 
around $9,700. Roughly two-thirds of New Zealanders in 2012 were in 
households with an annual income of between $29,000 and $48,400 per 
(equivalised) person.  
Table 2: Decile Mean of Equivalised Household Income 
DECILE  Average Income  
 $p.a.2012 prices 
Share % 
Top 97300 24.3 
2 60200 15.1 
3 49300 12.3 
4 41700 10.4 
5 35800 9.0 
6 31400 7.8 
7 28000 7.0 
8 23800 6.0 
9 19500 4.9 
Bottom 12900 3.2 
ALL 38700 100 
(Source: Perry, 2013:238; Negative incomes set at zero).  
The income shares can also be constructed for many years since 1982. To 
simplify, Table 3 provides the share of the top 10 percent (decile) of 
households, the Gini coefficient (with CoV) and the bottom 20 percent 
(quintile). The third indicator reflects that estimates of poverty (discussed later) 
usually conclude about a fifth of the population are in poverty. Columns five 
and six are poverty-based estimates to be discussed later. The final column 
gives the average income for a couple measured in 2012 prices. 
Broadly all the indicators show increasing inequality over the three 
decades between 1982 and 2012. The income share of the top decile rises, that 
of the bottom quintile falls, while the Gini coefficient rises. The year-to-year 
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fluctuations are generally small.20 
Table 3: Summary Indicators of Household Inequality 1982-2012 
Year  Top 
Decile 
 Share 
% 
Gini 
Coefficient 
(CoV) 
Bottom 
Quintile  
Share % 
Absolute 
Poverty  
% 
Relative 
Poverty  
%  
Average 
Income 
 (2012 Prices) 
1982 19.9 .268 (.18) 8.9 12 12 30000 
1984 20.2 .270 (.18) 9.0 13 13 29400 
1986 20.3 .265 (.17) 9.2 14 14 28400 
1988 20.1 .262 (.17) 9.1 12 12 28900 
1990 23.1 .300 (.24) 9.0 14 14 30700 
1992 23.3 .311 (.26) 8.1 24 24 27500 
1994 23.8 .318 (.28) 8.1 26 26 27000 
1996 25.0 .325 (.30) 8.1 20 20 29100 
1998 25.0 .327 (.30) 8.0 16 15 31200 
2001 25.4 .334 (.32) 7.5 16 17 32600 
2004 24.5 .329 (.31) 7.7 13 20 34400 
2007 24.6 .328 (.31) 7.8 11 18 36200 
2009 25.8 .331 (.32) 7.9 7 18 39800 
2010 24.6 .318 (.28) 7.9 8 18 39300 
2011 26.7 .343 (.35) 7.6 8 16 39800 
2012 24.3 .317 (.28) 8.1 6 15 40000 
(Source: Perry, 2013, ibid. pp.70, 87, 110, 238). 
 
In particular, on all indicators most of the change in inequality occurred in the 
period between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s. The width of the distribution 
(as measured by the Coefficient of Variation) increased by over a half.  
          The trend after the mid-1990s is more ambiguous. The share of the 
bottom quintile tended to fall, the share of the top decile was roughly stable and 
the Gini coefficient was probably stable, possibly declining. In my view the best 
interpretation is that the income distribution has remained at roughly the same 
                                                            
20 There is a major fluctuation in 2011, due to the impact of the Christchurch earthquakes 
because insurance receipts are treated as income. This limits the ability to assess the effect of 
the macroeconomic turmoil which followed the Global Financial Crisis.  
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level of inequality over the last two decades, although different groups 
experienced gains and losses.  
5. Household Market Incomes  
In the course of examining the impact of fiscal measures on household material 
standards of living, Aziz et al. calculated Gini Coefficients for different 
measures of income for the four years for which they had data (1988, 1998, 
2007, 2010). Their work is reproduced as Table 4. A comparable series from 
Perry (2013) is added. The researcher’s primary interest is the final row of the 
table, which adds to household income the services provided by the government 
(such as education and health) and suggests the government has been less 
supportive to those with low incomes in recent decades.  
 
Table 4: Gini Coefficients for Different Measures of Household Equivalised Income 
 1988 1998 2007 2010 
Market Income 0.42 0.49 0.54 0.52 
Disposable Income (Aziz) 0.3 0.35 0.38 0.36 
Disposable Income (Perry)  0.26 0.33 0.33 0.32 
Final Income. 0.27 0.3 0.35 0.35 
(Source: Aziz et al, 2012, Table 3; Perry, 2013; see Table 3 above).  
 
          Unfortunately the four years come from two data studies which may not 
be exactly aligned. Crawford & Johnston (2004) provide the first two 
observations; Aziz et al (2012) the last two. The consistency problem is 
illustrated by comparing the Aziz household equivalised disposable income 
Gini Coefficients with the Perry calculated ones which are constructed to be 
consistent over time. 
          The concern here is not the different levels – which is both puzzling and 
disappointing – but the different patterns. The Perry series shows a leap 
between 1988 and 1998 and then remaining at roughly the same level; the Aziz 
one has a continuing rise from 1998 to 2007 and then the flattening out. This 
could be reconciled with the Perry pattern if we assume that the Aziz and 
Crawford estimates are not on the same basis. If that it is true for household 
equivalised disposable income it must also be true for household equivalised 
market income. 
          But even if the series are consistent we need to be careful interpreting 
household equivalised market income. Economists are interested in personal 
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market income because it reflects the factors of production held by individuals 
and the (factor) prices that reward them. However equivalised household market 
income is not as interesting from this perspective, because household formation 
is also relevant. 
          If a couple of workers marry that will change the distribution of 
household equivalised market income but not the personal market income. If 
they have a child that again changes the household market equivalised 
distribution even if they continue to work. As we report below Hyslop & Maré 
(2001) observe one of the causes of increase in inequality is changes in 
household structure. 
          Ultimately, it is unclear why we should be interested household 
equivalised market income except as a step on the way from personal market 
income to household disposable income.  
          Is the same true for household disposable income? No, because the 
variable has a meaning as an indicator of the material standard of living of the 
inhabitants of a household. The challenge is to explain what are the 
determinants of that measure. We begin with the determinants of market 
income.  
6. Explaining Changes in the Level of Inequality: Market Influences 
While it is true that income inequality has been increasing over the last three 
decades, almost all the significant change occurred in the first decade. This is 
not a trivial issue. What serious policy needs is an analytic account of what 
determines the inequality, preferably with an indication of the magnitude of 
each effect; getting the right story to analyse is important.  
           Methodologically it is easier to explain changes in the level of inequality 
than to explain the level of inequality itself. The latter usually needs cross-
country comparisons or heavy use of theory with some microeconomic analysis 
(which rarely gives an indication of magnitudes).  
          The available explanations for changes in economic inequality are centred 
on two general economic areas. The first involves changes in the macro-
economic (or market) environment – especially unemployment, remuneration 
and investment income; the second, redistribution policies discussed in the next 
section.  
Unemployment 
Changes in the level of unemployment level affect just about everyone but 
apparently those in the second-to-bottom quintile are affected most (Easton, 
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1995). Unemployment rose to unprecedented post-war heights in the early 
1990s, reflecting the major industry restructuring going on at the time (plus 
some loss of aggregate demand). It may well be half of the labour force was 
unemployed over four years 1988/9 to 1992/3, albeit in most cases for a short 
period as they shifted between jobs, but usually sufficiently long for them to 
register with the employment service of the Department of Labour (Easton, 
1996:110-112). This suggests that part of the rise in inequality in the 1985 to 
1993 period could have been due to the weaker labour market. 
          Unemployment levels fell from the mid-1990s, especially after 2000. The 
effect on income inequality is evident in the falling Gini coefficient (but less so 
in the top decile and bottom quintile which are less affected by unemployment) 
(Perry 2013:56, 163). However the effect is small, at most equivalent to a 20 
percent fall in the width of the distribution (the CoV) between 2001 and 2011. 
(Moreover, some of that fall must be attributed to the introduction of Working 
for Families.) It appears the lift in unemployment between the early 1980s and 
early 1990s cannot have made a major change to income inequality in the 
period.  
          More generally, there is a case that the structural (i.e. cyclically-
corrected) rate of unemployment rose about 2 to 3 percentage points between 
the 1960s and the 1980s (Easton, 2012). This would have added to inequality 
but the shift occurred outside the period of main focus.  
Top Market Incomes  
What happened to top of the income distribution measured before tax? Analysis 
is treacherous because it is based on an administrative data base which changes 
over time as law and administrative practices change. (Additionally it is based 
on income reported for tax purposes which is subject to tax avoidance and 
excludes capital gains.) 
          To reduce some of these complications the analysis is based on all adults 
(over 15) and not just those who are recorded in the tax statistics. The income in 
the denominator is the primary income receivable as reported in the System of 
National Accounts. Four measures from 1981 to 2011 are available: the share of 
the top 0.1 percent, the share of the top 1 percent the share of the top 10 percent 
and the Pareto coefficient. The discussion below is confined to the top 1 
percent. The other indicators are of different magnitudes but show generally the 
same pattern (Easton, 2013T).  
          The top 1 percent’s share of total income was around 6 percent of total 
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income until 1989, or 6 times that of the adult average. It then rose rapidly to 
just over 10 percent by 1993, or 10 times the average. After this jump of 4 
percentage points (or two thirds) the share remains broadly constant.21 Arguably 
the share increased by, say, 0.3 percentage points in the early 2000s; if so it fell 
by roughly the same amount in the following decade. There is no evidence of 
the sharply rising income share at the top since 2000 we see in jurisdictions with 
a more sophisticated financial sector.  
          Why did the share of the incomes at the top rise? Part, perhaps a third, is 
explained by the ending of the double taxation on dividends in 1989 which led 
to more being recorded as taxable income.22 (This would mean that unrecorded 
capital gains probably fell.)  
          The best explanation for the remainder seems to be that margins for 
management and professionals (i.e. over average workers) rose both in the 
public and private sectors. The big shift occurred in the early 1990s (probably as 
a consequence of legislative change and changed private sector attitudes 
following the market reforms); the structural explanation is probably the 
opening up of the global labour market for these skills. 
           Unfortunately, we cannot simply map individual adult market income 
shares onto households. Those with top decile incomes are likely have more 
adults – some of who may, or may not, have incomes in the top decile – and 
they are more likely to be larger and have more dependants. Even so, it seems 
safe that perhaps 2.5 or 4 percentage points of the top decile households 
probably came from higher market receipts in the early 1990s. 
Prices and Wages23 
Little is known about the effect of other changes in relative market prices. Did 
market liberalisation period benefit the rich more than the poor? The short 
answer is that there is little evidence that they had a marked effect.24 There may 
have been some, but it seems to have been minor in comparison to the impact of 
the effects we are about to describe (Easton, 1996). 
                                                            
21 After allowing for a blip up due to some tax avoidance in the 2000 tax year and a recovery 
down phase thereafter. 
22 Once dividends were taxed as a part of the corporation tax regime and then taxed in the 
hands of the dividend recipient. Tax changes in the 1980s had (roughly) the corporation tax 
being treated as a prepayment of income tax.  
23 See also Hyslop and Maré (2003) 
24 It might, however, be worth exploring whether there has been an increase in margins for 
skill and management, which have widened the income distribution. 
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          There is some evidence that the wage distribution became more unequal. 
However its impact on the household distribution is unclear25 (Dixon, 1998). 
7: Explaining Changes in the Level of Inequality: Social Influences 
Dean Hyslop and David Maré (2003) carried out a careful analysis of changes 
in the distribution of Gross Household Income (that is before income taxes are 
deducted).26 They use five indicators of inequality for three periods: 1983-6, 
1989-93, 1995-98. 
          They examined five effects whose change might be expected to impact on 
the level of inequality: household structure, National Superannuation, household 
attributes employment outcomes and economic returns to factors of production. 
Collectively they explain about half the total change.27 Here is (part of) Hyslop 
and Maré’s conclusion:  
Our analysis shows that the changes in the distribution of income 
involved a complex set of factors which are difficult to summarise 
using a single measure of inequality. Examining income inequality 
across all households, we find that the main factors which contributed 
to the change in inequality were changes in family and household 
structure (primarily a pronounced drop in the fraction of two parent 
households and a rise in the fraction of sole parent households), and 
changes in the socio-demographic attributes of households. These 
factors each explain one-sixth of the total increase in the Gini 
coefficient [of Gross income] over the period, and up to one-third and 
one-half (respectively) of other measures of inequality. ... our results 
show that changes in the employment outcomes of households had a 
more modest impact on income inequality. However, within 
household types, we find that employment changes do have a large 
effect on the observed change in income inequality. Finally, we find 
little evidence of any systematic effects of changes in the economic 
returns to socio-demographic attributes on the distribution of 
household income and inequality. (The failure to get purchase from 
                                                            
25 It is true that the employee share in domestic income has fallen but this is in part due to 
shifts between employee status and self-employment and an increasing share going to foreign 
owners of capital (Easton, 2010). Earlier in the 1970s, real wages had risen faster than 
productivity and then stagnated from about 1985 (Easton, 1996). 
26 This caveat is especially important given the social security benefits were ‘grossed up’ in 
1987 – that is increased so they were taxed back to the same net level. This almost certainly 
means that the study did not capture the reductions in the effective levels of benefits as well 
as the reductions in income tax on upper incomes. 
27 Measured by changes in the Gini Coefficient. The levels for the three periods were 1983-6 
= 0.347; 1989-92 = 0.386, 1996-98 = 0.398. They represent a change in the CV of 43percent 
and 12 percent between the two periods.  
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the unemployment variable may be surprising, but may reflect 
timing.) 
8. Explaining Changes in the Level of Inequality: Redistribution 
As it happens, the rise in income inequality between 1985 and 1993 is 
associated with some of the most dramatic changes in redistribution between 
income levels that New Zealand has experienced.28 Top income tax rates were 
cut, while the removal of tax exemptions and the introduction of GST imposed 
more heavily upon those on lower incomes. Additionally there were savage cuts 
in benefit levels in 1991 while union power to maintain and increase real wages 
was weakened. These largely explain the change in inequality in that period.  
          There have been subsequent changes in tax and benefit levels, but none 
apparently dramatic enough to disturb greatly the income distribution. There is 
one exception.  
          It is clear from Table 2 that the relative share of the bottom quintile fell 
from the late 1990s. Their real incomes rose, but more slowly than average 
incomes. There seem to have been three reasons. First, benefits were increased 
in line with prices rather than wages, so beneficiaries did not share in the rising 
real wages. Second, they were not entitled to the working-for-families in work 
tax credit, which benefited those in immediately higher deciles.29 Third, many 
beneficiaries were unable to take advantage of the booming labour market of the 
late 1990s and early 2000 to find jobs. It is true that the level of top income 
taxes fell further, but apparently not enough to markedly change the after-tax 
share of the rich. 
          In summary, we know that the change in redistributional policies had the 
major impact on income inequality, but so did changes in the market income of 
the top 1 percent. Probably they contributed about equally to the rise in the 
share of the top 10 percent of households. Cyclical changes in unemployment 
levels had some smaller but perceptible effect (unfortunately they are most 
important at the very time the biggest changes in redistribution and top income 
rising shares happened, and they may obscure the length of the transition). We 
don’t have a lot of evidence about the effects of market prices including wages.  
                                                            
28 The other candidates for the claim are a series of incremental changes over a longish period 
(the Great Inflation from 1968 to 1990 might be an example) or possibly the introduction of 
social security in 1939. However the latter involved horizontal redistribution more than 
vertical redistribution.  
29 In any case it was an extension of earlier tax credits and partly compensated for their loss 
of value from inflation. 
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9. International Comparisons: 2009  
In recent years the OECD has compiled comparable Gini coefficients for all its 
members, although not for every year.30 Table 5 shows the ranking for the 
average of the 2008 to 2010 years (recall the coefficient is not an ideal measure 
of inequality – none exists).31 (The adjusting is explained and interpreted 
below.)  
          There is a major caveat to the tabulations for they use exactly the same 
equivalence scales for all countries. However true equivalence scales will reflect 
differences in market prices. The differences can be dramatic as I found when I 
valued the same basket of goods and services in New York and New Zealand 
prices. It generates quite different equivalence scales. The most obvious reasons 
for this was the cost of housing with additional rooms (for children) in New 
York being far more expensive than New Zealand, so that the New York scale 
showed weaker economies of scale for household expenditures32 (Easton 
1973N). We do not know what the effect of using country specific equivalence 
scales would be on the rankings in Table 5. 
The third column shows that in about 2009 New Zealand was 14th to 
most unequal among the 34 countries on the OECD list. Thus it is in the top half 
of the list. While the country may appear to be only a little above the average 
Gini coefficient score (0.317 versus 0.313), that amounts to almost an 11 
percent larger coefficient of variation. 
          The ranking in the list is higgledy-piggledy, not least because the level of 
inequality is affected by population size (a population of one has no inequality) 
and affluence (high income economies tend to be more equal than low income 
ones). The fifth column adjusts for this – in effect assuming that all countries 
have the same sized population and GDP per capita.33  
          We can now see a pattern in the column. At the bottom are the five East-
Central economies which had been in the Soviet sphere of influence before
                                                            
30 While Israel is not a member of the OECD, it is included in the data base (and here).  
31 Rankings can be sensitive to the imprecise third decimal place of the Gini coefficient.. 
32 Using the New York priced equivalence scale is the reason that some of my very early 
estimates of poverty in New Zealand were much higher than the refined ones.  
33 The adjustment equation is based on the equilibrium equation (standard errors are shown 
below) that  
the Gini coefficient = 0 .032 Log(Population) - 0.164 Log (GDP per cap) -0.170 
   (0.013)        (0.055)    
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Table 5: Gini Coefficient for Household Income Distribution: 2008-2010 
Rank by Unadjusted Adjusted 
Inequality Country Gini Score Country Gini Score 
Most Chile 0.508 Chile 0.459 
2 Mexico 0.471 Luxembourg 0.392 
3 Turkey 0.411 Mexico 0.389 
4 United States 0.379 Israel 0.369 
5 Israel 0.373 United States  0.362 
6 Portugal 0.345 Australia 0.348 
7 United Kingdom 0.343 Ireland 0.345 
8 Japan 0.336 Iceland 0.336 
9 Australia 0.335 New Zealand  0.336 
10 Greece 0.332 Switzerland 0.333 
11  Spain 0.329 Portugal 0.333 
12 New Zealand 0.317 Turkey 0.333 
13 Canada 0.320 Greece 0.331 
14 Estonia 0.316 United Kingdom 0.329 
15 Italy 0.315 Canada 0.322 
 
16-17 
Average 0.313 Estonia 0.315 
Korea 0.313 Spain 0.315 
Ireland 0.312 Average 0.313 
18 Poland 0.305 Japan 0.306 
19 Switzerland 0.298 Norway 0.303 
20 France 0.296 Netherlands 0.303 
21 Germany 0.287 Italy 0.297 
22 Netherlands 0.286 Austria 0.289 
23 Luxembourg 0.278 Sweden 0.284 
24 Hungary 0.272 Korea 0.284 
25 Iceland 0.270 France 0.281 
26 Sweden 0.266 Finland 0.281 
27 Austria 0.265 Belgium 0.276 
28 Belgium 0.261 Denmark  0.272 
29 Slovak Republic 0.260  Germany 0.272 
30 Finland 0.258 Slovenia 0.260 
31 Czech Republic 0.255 Poland 0.254 
32 Norway 0.248 Slovak Republic 0.250 
33 Denmark 0.244 Hungary 0.246 
Least Slovenia 0.243 Czech Republic 0.245 
(Source: OECD Income Distribution and Poverty http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=IDD)  
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 1991.34 Above them are the remaining continental Europeans with the ‘Club 
Meds’ more unequal. Scattered among them are Japan and Korea. Higher (more 
unequal) are the Anglos – Canada, United Kingdom, New Zealand, Ireland, 
Australia and United States mainly above the average and at the top in 
inequality terms are the Latinos and Middle East.35 In summary: 
 
 MORE UNEQUAL 
 Latinos & Middle East  
 Anglos 
 Club Meds 
 Northern Continental Europeans & North East Asia 
 East-Central Europeans. 
 LESS UNEQUAL 
 
New Zealand is the middle of the Anglos, more unequal than Canada and the 
United Kingdom. In 2009 it was certainly in the top half of the OECD (as it was 
in the unadjusted ranking).  
9. Distributional Measures in a National Account Framework 
A new, and potentially fruitful, development has been the OECD’s Working 
Party on National Accounts developing ‘Distributional Measures Across 
Household Groups in A National Accounts Framework’ published in September 
2013.36  
          A major effort has been to ensure international comparability in income 
and expenditure measure by anchoring them into national accounts concept. 
This involves realigning the numbers reported in household surveys. The 
surveys are known to under-report some items (notoriously alcohol 
consumption).37 National Accounts estimate usually estimate the items 
                                                            
34 Estonia, which had been a part of the USSR, is in the middle of the rankings. The other two 
Baltics are not members of the OECD. The OECD also provides an estimate for the Russian 
Federation of 0.428 unadjusted, placing it third most unequal between Mexico and Turkey. 
Adjusting it for being large and poor its Gini would have been 0.360 or seventh, between the 
United States and Australia. 
35 Not quite fitting into any pattern at the top are Iceland, Switzerland and Luxembourg. Ad 
hoc reasons may be advanced in each case. (Luxembourg GDP per cap is always problematic 
because a substantial part of its workforce resides outsides its boundaries.) Note also that the 
Latinos, the Middle East and North East Asia have only two countries each in the dataset. 
36 STD/CSTAT/WPNA(2013)10/RD 
37 While it is easier to illustrate the point with alcohol consumption, the issue also applies to 
income aggregates which may be more important for distributional purposes. Even so the 
distribution of expenditure aggregates are of interest.  
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independently (say from production, imports and sales in the case of alcoholic 
beverages). They do so based on agreed international standards. In principle 
then the aggregates are more comparable internationally and so would be the 
household distributions following realignment.38 However the adjustments 
probably may not have a lot of impact on domestic comparisons over time, 
although they may affect levels (shares).39  
          The preliminary work involves only eight countries: France, Italy, Korea, 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand and Slovenia (for various years between 
2003 to 2010). This is really too few to make much of an assessment but the 
basic impression is that New Zealand’s ranking is similar to that in Table 5, a 
little above the middle.40 Interestingly, in the small sample New Zealand’s poor 
seem to have relatively high expenditures on health and housing.41 
10. Changes in Inequality Internationally 1985-2009 
Unfortunately there are Gini coefficients for only 17 countries in about 1985 
(Table 6).  New Zealand proves to be below average among these 17 countries 
in about 1985.42 Making the reasonable assumptions that those for which we 
have not got data behave similarly to those for which we have, New Zealand 
income inequality was in the bottom half of the OECD.  
          Perhaps we can be more precise. The likelihood is that New Zealand was 
about 20th out of the current 34 in the mid-1980s. Twenty-five years later it was 
9th.43 It’s Gini coefficient moved from an adjusted 0.294 to 0.336 equivalent to 
a 47 percent increase in the coefficient of variation. The other 16 countries 
moved an average of 31 percent. 
          It is true that on the available data, New Zealand had the greatest increase 
                                                            
38 Not perfectly though, because it is possible that the ratio of under-reporting varies by 
household characteristics.  
39 For an early example of the measurement problem see Easton (2000). SNZ promptly 
addressed it when their attention was drawn to it. 
40 A caution about primary (i.e. market) income. New Zealand has largely a non-contributory 
system so its social security payments are not included in primary income with the result that 
its primary income seems particularly widespread (See Op. Cit. 35).  
41 Op. Cit. 43-4.  
42 The adjusted uses the same equation and variables as for the 1989 period. The population 
and GDP per cap will definitely have changed and the parameters may have (but probably not 
by much). However, given the limited number of data points it was not worthwhile doing the 
re-estimation.  
43As well as New Zealand inequality overtaking that of Canada, Greece, Japan and the United 
Kingdom (which are in the 17), it may also have overtaken Estonia, Portugal, Spain and 
Switzerland.  
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in income inequality in the decade to 1995 (among rich countries for which we 
have data), but it would be foolish to assume that was true over the next two 
decades. Sweden’s coefficient of variation more than doubled over the period, 
but this was from an exceptionally low level in 1983 to a low-to-moderate one 
in 2009 (when Sweden was ranked 23rd on the list, which now included the 
East-Central European economies).44 
 
Table 6: Gini Coefficient for Household Income Distribution: 1983-1987 
Rank by Unadjusted Adjusted 
Inequalit
y 
Country Gini Score Country Gini Score 
Most  Mexico 0.452 Mexico 0.528 
2 Turkey 0.434 Turkey 0.454 
3 Greece 0.345 United States 0.387 
4 United States 0.338 Israel 0.382 
5 Israel 0.326 Greece 0.362 
6 United 
Kingdom 
0.309 Luxembourg 0.325 
7 Japan 0.304 United 
Kingdom 
0.325 
8 Canada 0.294 Canada 0.302 
 Average 0.293 Average 0.301 
9 Italy 0.287 Japan 0.297 
10 Netherlands 0.272 New Zealand 0.294 
11 New Zealand 0.271 Italy 0.271 
12 Germany 0.251 Netherlands 0.262 
13 Luxembourg 0.247 Germany 0.209 
14 Denmark  0.223 Norway 0.212 
15 Norway 0.222 Denmark 0.182 
16 Finland 0.209 Finland 0.177 
Least  Sweden 0.198 Sweden 0.169 
(Source:OECD Income Distribution and Poverty http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=IDD) 
 
                                                            
44 Sweden’s Gini coefficient is so exceptionally low in 1983 that Moser’s Law suggests we 
should be cautious when using it. 
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Indeed as already reported in regard to the 17 countries and confirmed by a 
more detailed OECD study, the general level of income inequality in the OECD 
has been trending (roughly linearly) upward over the period (Perry 2013:171). 
The New Zealand income inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) has 
been broadly steady since the mid-1990s. As a result its level has been 
converging towards the OECD mean (from above) but has yet to reach it. 
          Why the trend increase in OECD mean inequality? Three reasons come 
readily to mind. One is that the increasing political power of the plutocracy has 
resulted in blunting the application of redistributional policies. A second is that 
globalisation has increased the international mobility of (especially) higher paid 
labour and countries have felt compelled to lower top tax rates to discourage 
their movement. Given the middle class hunger for public goods, such as public 
health care, any government spending cuts consequent on the lower tax-take 
result in lower benefits for the poor. Additionally the financial sector boom has 
increased inequality in those countries with a significant international financial 
sector. 
12. What Happened Before 1985? 
We do not know what happened to the household income distribution before 
1982 because there is no suitable data base.45 
          There is more data on the personal income distribution. The census data 
reported in Table 3 suggests there was a tendency for inequality in personal 
market incomes of non-Māori to be stable in the interwar period (at least in the 
handful of years which are available for the story during the Great Depression 
may be different). 
          After 1951 market (and subsequently market plus social security) 
incomes fell through until 1981. The census data is consistent with Easton 
(1983) which explored a wide range of data from various sources, which 
concluded that the evidence points to the personal income distribution 
narrowing in the post-war era to 1981.  
          However, the personal income distribution does not map simply into the 
household distribution. Among the important complications in the post-war era 
are the diminishing size of households as the fertility rate fell, the greater 
variation in household size and composition (including the rising share of single 
adult with children families) and the increasing proportion of mothers in the 
                                                            
45 The handful of spot surveys is not sufficiently consistent to enable comparisons. 
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paid workforce.46 
          An attempt has been made to estimate an indicator of inequality going as 
far back as 1921 based on the shares of income among taxpayers, especially of 
the top 1 percent (Atkinson & Leigh 2007a, 2007b). Unfortunately, the series is 
not consistent over time.47 Not all personal income was taxed (especially before 
1938), while the rising numbers of earning women in the post-war era changes 
the proportion of adults who are taxpayers. 
           Historical narratives based on the series can be very unsatisfactory.48 
However, as Robert Solow observed, addicted gamblers will play a roulette 
wheel they know to be biased because it is the only one available. 
13. What Happened After the Global Financial Crisis?  
Suppose that the data distortions from the Canterbury earthquakes occur only in 
the 2011 year.49 The preliminary indication is that the Global Financial Crisis 
impacted more on top disposable incomes than bottom ones, so that there was 
some reduction in household income inequality. 
          This was despite the post GFC income tax changes being biased towards 
the rich and despite some tightening of benefit entitlements. The probable 
explanation is that returns on investment fell (or alternately that they were over-
elevated before the crisis struck) while unemployment has not been too heavily 
affected by the downturn (in New Zealand, but not everywhere).  
14. Poverty Measurement  
Systematic studies in poverty in New Zealand began in the 1970s with Peter 
Cuttance’s pioneering survey of large families (Cuttance, 1974). A 
comprehensive survey of the state of poverty research would be bigger than this 
survey on economic inequality. This section focuses on the insights the 
measurement of poverty sheds onto economic inequality generally. 
          The proportion of the population in poverty below some (equivalised) 
                                                            
46 Much popular commentary remains, implicitly or explicitly, based on the notion of a 
standard household of a couple with two children. In 2006, however, only 30.8 percent of 
households consisted of a couple and some children. 
47 A clear indication of the unreliability of the series is the dramatic fall in the share of the top 
decile in the late 1930s, when the tax base was extended as a result of the introduction of 
social security tax. For a cleaner series – albeit it over a shorter (post-war) period, see Easton 
(1983) Chapter 10.  
48 E.g. Rashbrooke (2013:25-27).  
49 As already footnoted the Canterbury earthquakes distorted measurement of household 
income inequality because insurance payments are treated as income receipts rather than 
offsets for capital losses. 
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income level can be thought of as a measure of inequality. It is, of course, no 
more definitive than any other indicator and, like each of the others, it reflects 
the purpose for which it is being used. If the concern is the power of the 
plutocracy, a measure such as the share of the top one percent is more useful; if 
the concern is the deprivation of opportunities for future generations, the 
proportion of the young in poverty is more relevant.  
          Defining the poverty threshold has not been easy, in part because of the 
New Zealand tendency to ignore what has gone on before rather than engage in 
a scholarly dialogue of research and analysis.50 A useful foundation for 
discussing poverty is the report of the 1972 Royal Commission on Social 
Security. While it did not directly address a suitable level, its deliberations 
while setting the social security benefit level apply.  
          The Commission argued that the aims of the social security system should 
be: 
(i) First, to enable everyone to sustain life and health; 
(ii) Second, to ensure, within limitations which may be imposed by 
physical or other disabilities, that everyone is able to enjoy a standard 
of living much like that of the rest of the community, and thus is able 
to feel a sense of participation in and belonging to the community 
(Royal Commission, 1972:65, original’s italics.) 51 
 
The first aim is a statement that people should not be in ‘absolute’ poverty. The 
second is that they should not be in ‘relative’ poverty, a version of the moral 
argument that the need for social coherence requires that those at the bottom 
should share in the rising prosperity of the community as a whole.  
          A poverty threshold can be derived from the empathetic but frugal 
Commission’s deliberations, since it would have set the benefit level close to, if 
not on, the threshold. In practice early research used the benefit level for a 
married couple as the benchmark. 
           How to update a relative poverty threshold? Obviously it needs to be 
increased with inflation but what to do about changing living standards? The 
first known attempt to do this argued for increasing the poverty threshold as 
mean incomes increased (Easton, 1980). But for some reason, the median 
                                                            
50 The Expert Advisory Group on Solutions to Child Poverty (2012) is a recent example of 
using a superficial definition with little attention to past scholarship. 
51 There was a third aim: ‘where income maintenance alone is insufficient (for example, for a 
physically disabled person), to improve by other means, and as far as possible, the quality of 
life available.’ 
Easton 
 
49 
income became more popular because – it was claimed – it was more reliable 
when the upper tail of the distribution was poorly measured.52 Unfortunately, 
the resulting poverty threshold is sensitive to redistributional policy, sometimes 
in paradoxical ways.  
          Consider the following income distribution for three individuals: 4,10, 16. 
Suppose the poverty threshold (the proportion in poverty is another measure of 
inequality) is defined as 50 percent of the median. The median income is 10 in 
this case, so the poverty threshold is 5 and one of the three individuals is in 
poverty. 
          Now suppose that 2 units are transferred from the middle individual to the 
top individual; the distribution is now 4, 8, 18. The median income falls to 8, 
the poverty threshold is now 4 and nobody is below it. Paradoxically an increase 
in inequality by transferring income from the middle to the rich eliminates 
poverty according to a definition based on median incomes. 
          This is not just a theoretical possibility. The changes in tax and benefits in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s had exactly this impact so, according to the 
median-based measure, poverty fell – much to the public delight of the 
inegalitarians – despite objective evidence that New Zealand’s poor were 
suffering from greater economic stress as their incomes fell (Easton, 2002).  
          There have been attempts to provide other measures of poverty 
thresholds. One involved asking focus groups (selections of people with chosen 
characteristics) from lower incomes what they thought the thresholds should 
be.53 One would like to report that the conclusion was a level similar to that 
recommended by the Royal Commission. That was true in the case of two adult-
three child households but not for the one adult-two child group. In fact the 
proposed thresholds for the two groups were not rationally coherent (Stephens, 
Waldegrave & Frater, 1995; Easton, 1997). This may explain why subsequently 
the research group seems to have abandoned the focus group approach and used 
a proportion of the median instead. (From the frying pan into the fire.) 
          One other significant attempt to estimate a poverty threshold, albeit 
implicitly, was by a visiting American scholar who used American-based 
methods that had been abandoned by the Royal Commission almost two 
decades earlier. The proposed ‘minimum adequate’ income for benefit levels, 
                                                            
52 The standard error of the estimate of a median is larger than of a mean by about 25 percent 
(for a big sample from a normally-distributed population). 
53 Groups on higher incomes are likely to recommend an even higher level. 
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funded by Treasury, became the foundation for the savage budget cuts of 1991 
(Brashares, 1993; Easton, 1995). 
          The cuts heralded a new way of thinking about benefit levels and hence 
of poverty (or perhaps a reversion to a very old way). In effect the Royal 
Commission’s principle of relative poverty was abandoned to be replaced by 
absolute poverty, sufficient to enable the sustaining of life and health (some 
would argue that even that is not met by current benefit levels) but not sufficient 
to enable people to feel a sense of participation in and belonging to the 
community. Since 1991 the benefit level has been increased with consumer 
prices but not with real incomes.54 Inevitably, as we saw from Table 1, the 
income share of the bottom quintile fell. 
           To analyse this a little more closely we use the poverty threshold in the 
MSD study – 60% of the 1998 median which is constant in real terms over time. 
(Many would think this threshold is too low.55) The estimate is shown in 
column 5 of Table 2 (Perry, 2013). In the 1980s the percentage below the 
threshold was in the low teens. The 1991 benefit cuts almost doubled the 
percentage to the mid-20s, but from the mid-1990s it fell back to below the 
1980s level; in 2012 (the last available year) it was about 6 percent. 
           However this is conceptually an absolute level of poverty; a threshold 
that is fixed in real terms does not allow for the poor sharing in prosperity. 
Column 6 of Table 2 illustrates what happens with a relative poverty threshold 
which parallels changes in average standards of living. In the period from 1982 
to 1997 the mean of equivalised household income was broadly flat albeit with 
some decline to 1994. It is assumed that in such depressed circumstances the 
threshold is not changed, that is, the poor do not share the pressure of a short 
downturn56 (Easton, 1980). After 1997 living standards, as measured by 
equivalised household income, rose steadily through to 2009 (by about 2.4% 
p.a.). A relative poverty level assumes that the poverty threshold rose in 
parallel. Average incomes have been broadly stagnant since 2009 so the 
                                                            
54 This assessment is based upon work being carried out by the author, but not yet publicly 
available for confidentiality reasons. 
55 Because the numbers near the threshold are high, a small change in its level can change 
dramatically the proportions in poverty and the pattern over time. For instance, setting the 
poverty threshold just above rather, than below, the basic New Zealand Superannuation 
benefit level has the numbers leap.  
56 Of course, if overall living standards faced a prolonged decline the relative poverty 
threshold should decline too (to some extent). This does not change markedly the paragraph’s 
overall story.  
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threshold is maintained at its 2009 level.  
           The story of proportions in poverty, told in column 6 of Table 2, remains 
the same until 1997 because the threshold is the same.57 After that the relative 
poverty proportions do not fall as much as in the absolute poverty case, and 
remain in the high (rather than low) teens. One might conclude that on this 
measure there was higher (relative) poverty after 2000 than there was before 
1990. On that measure income inequality also increased.  
          The next step is to ask whether it matters to be in poverty. In what way do 
those on low incomes have life experiences different from those with higher 
incomes? Any answer requires an analysis of the whole of the distribution. Data 
bases which assist answering such questions have only recently come available 
and are yet to be fully exploited (Perry, 2012: Sections K, L). They are likely to 
show that disposable income is a useful indicator of life experiences and 
hardship, but there are other important factors (some of which can be influenced 
by policy) including education, health, household assets, housing and 
urban/rural location. 
15. Distribution by Social Groups 
Social groups are not randomly scattered through the income distribution but 
tend to cluster in particular parts of it. The New Zealand research has focussed 
on who the poor are and on the ethnic distributions.58  
           In addition to drawing attention to the poverty issue and to tracing 
changes in the income distribution over time, a significant analytic use of 
poverty numbers is to identify who are among the poor. The conclusion, first 
identified in the mid-1970s and elaborated since, still has not been entirely 
absorbed by the conventional wisdom. It tends to think of the typical poor as a 
brown solo mother, with many children, living on the benefit in rental 
accommodation.  
          In fact the majority of the poor are couples with jobs, with some – but not 
a lot of – children living in their own home albeit with a mortgage. (Because the 
New Zealand Superannuation benefit level has tended to be above the poverty 
threshold, the stereotype that the New Zealand poor contain a lot of elderly has 
almost disappeared; overseas the minimum public provision for the elderly is 
                                                            
57 The proportion are estimated by the author using a linear interpolation procedure based on 
the numbers in Table F3 of Perry (2013:110). The method is similar to that used in Easton 
(1994). 
58 Perry (2012) has numerous tables which can be used to place a variety of groups in the 
context of the whole distribution. 
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often less generous.59) The proportion in poverty is higher among solo parents, 
those without jobs, living in rental accommodation; the proportion of the poor 
with a brown ethnicity is higher but there are fewer of them. (More women than 
men are poor.) 
          What the conventional wisdom has confused is that while a higher 
proportion of a particular category, say solo mothers, may be in poverty, the 
numbers of poor are this proportion times the total numbers in the category. 
Thus there may be more poor in a group with a lower prevalence but a larger 
total number.  
          The salient conclusion from the research is that over 80 percent of the 
poor are children and their parents (and others in their households) and that 
proportionately more children are in poverty than adults (especially excluding 
parents).60 
          It is well established that the brown ethnicities tend to be over represented 
among the poor.61 Mean Māori equivalised household incomes were 90 percent 
of average incomes in 2012 and Pasifika ones were 89 percent. 
(European/Pākehā ones were 107.5 percent.) However there may well be factors 
other than ethnicity which explain whole or part of the differences. For instance, 
a high proportion of the incarcerated are Māori, but this is in part of due to their 
younger age distribution. Allow for that and the proportion comes down (but is 
still higher than the Pākehā incarceration rate). The same applies to 
unemployment, which like incarceration is more concentrated among young 
adults.62 Part, but not all, of the lower incomes of those with brown ethnicity 
may be due to the population being younger and having more children. This is 
rarely investigated.  
          There is a curious feature of income trends over time, summarised in 
Table 5. Apparently over the 24 years the median income of each group has 
risen faster that the median for all ethnic groups. This may be a peculiarity of 
                                                            
59 Because New Zealand superannuation is indexed to average wages and more adults are 
working, superannuitants may not share in prosperity arising from increasing labour force 
participation. As a result their benefit level may decline below the poverty threshold because 
it is set on average household incomes not average worker incomes. 
60 The effect of the working for families tax credit has yet to be assessed. 
61 This survey does not cover the ‘other’ (none of European/Pākehā, Māori or Pasifika) group 
which is very heterogeneous. Often the sample size is small and the estimates subject to a 
large standard error. 
62 Educational attainment (say PISA scores) also illustrates the point. It is affected by 
socioeconomic status. That Māori have a lower SES than Pākehā explains about one third of 
the difference between their educational attainment levels (Easton 2013E). 
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medians. But it also may reflect the changing shares of the categories if, say, the 
brown share of the population had risen relative to the Pākehā one.63 
 
Table 7: Equivalised Median Household Income by Ethnicity 
 $2012 prices  
Ethnicity 1988  2012 Change 
European/Pākehā 28000 35800 27.9% 
Māori 23200 30000 29.3% 
Pasifika 22700 29800 31.3% 
ALL 26700 33300 24.7% 
(Source: Perry op cit, p.80). 
 
          Discussions on ethnic inequality are disappointing.64 They tend to draw 
attention to some aspects of the inter-ethnic inequality but do little deeper 
analysis.65 
          A particular problem for analysts arises from changes in pricing. To 
illustrate suppose free schooling for children was withdrawn but families were 
given exactly the same allowance as an income grant. They would not be 
markedly better off, but their disposable income would seem to have risen. 
Their equivalised income should not.66  
          Over time, the household equivalence scales should be regularly updated. 
They are not (Easton, 2006). An even trickier problem arises when the 
government subsidises the service for some groups rather than others (e.g. free 
visits to general practitioners for the young). Ad hoc attempts to assess their 
                                                            
63 Ethnic identity is self-categorization, which may change over time (and is also affected by 
the way the statistician aggregates the various responses). If some households were to 
categorize themselves as Pākehā in 1988 and Māori in 2012 the medians of both groups could 
go up. 
64 I have looked at income inequality within Māori, finding that it was less (say measured by 
the coefficient of variation) than for the population as a whole. The reason seems to be that 
social security benefit levels for Māori are higher relative to the mean than for the non-Māori 
(because benefits levels do not ethnically discriminate), thereby pushing up the bottom of the 
distribution.  
65 Recent examples are Chapters 6 (by K. Mila) and 10 (by E. T. Poata-Smith) in M. 
Rashbrooke (2013). Incidentally Figure 6.1 on page 97 is mislabeled. The Pasifika 
unemployment rate is certainly not a third of the overall rate. 
66 The impact of the student tertiary funding in the early 1990s probably undermines 
comparisons of their standards of living over time using the methods described here (unless 
there is a specific adjustment). Rising school fees have a similar effect, but they have not 
been as big.  
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overall impact suggest the effect is not great although they matter a lot to those 
in need67 (Easton, 1996; 1999). 
16. The Dynamics of Inequality  
Income inequality would not matter so much if for each period one was 
randomly assigned to an income level so that, for instance, those in the bottom 
decile had as good a chance as anyone else of being in the top one next time. In 
reality a major determinant of income in one period is the past record of 
income. But to what extent is this the case? 
          A study by John Creedy (1997b) based on personal income tax data came 
to the conclusion that ‘the present value, over the age 20 to age 65, displays less 
inequality than in any single year’. One would be surprised if this was not true, 
although it is well to be reminded. However the result arises from simulation – 
the data base is for only three years – whereas it is possible – if unable to be 
tested – that the auto-correlations of incomes involve much longer lags. So the 
specific quantitative results are not decisive.  
          Also using income tax data, Harry Smith and Robert Templeton (1990) 
found that 25 percent of those in the bottom quintile were in a higher quintile a 
year later, while seven years later some 45 percent were. Note, however, this 
includes shifts from being a low-paid student to full-time well-paid 
employment. It also includes those who moved from the very top of the bottom 
quintile to the very bottom of the second bottom quintile. The relative income 
gains may be trivial.  
          The Survey of Family, Income and Employment (SoFIE) followed a 
sample of households over seven ‘waves’ (years), so it is possible to track the 
change in relative income over the period.  
          Kirstie Carter and Fiona Imlach Gunasekara (2012: Table 5) measure the 
shifts between quintiles. Some 45 percent of those in the bottom quintile remain 
there six years later. Over 80 percent were below the median income. In 
contrast 54 percent of those in the top were still there, and 84 percent of them 
were above the median income six years later. Whether this is a high or low 
level of immobility is a value judgement but, given all the potential life events 
that can occur in six years which might have the potential to disturb an 
(equivalised) household income, one is inclined to think there is considerable 
inertia.  
                                                            
67 Housing is particularly tricky. Housing grants are included in income but not cheap 
housing for state tenants. There is a separate section on housing below. 
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          Bryan Perry (2013:194-197) points out the New Zealand experience is not 
greatly different from that of other rich countries. His calculations suggest that 
about two-thirds of the change occurs in the first year, and shifts over the 
following years are much smaller. This may suggest that while some households 
temporarily change quintiles to revert the following year, longer term change is 
not great, and often the result of a life event.  
          Perry distinguishes those in ‘current’ poverty from those in ‘chronic’ 
poverty with average annual income over the seven waves being below the 
poverty line. He concludes there is considerable persistence: 
- in any wave, around half are in both chronic poverty and current 
poverty, the other half being only in current poverty (i.e. more 
temporary or transient poverty); 
- the people in this more transient group change a lot over seven 
waves, which is why it turns out that the number in low income at 
least once in seven waves is more than double the number in low 
income at any one time; 
- in addition to those identified as being in current poverty in a wave 
there is another one in five (i.e. 3% of the whole population (20% of 
15%)) who are in chronic but not current poverty;  
- for children, 60% of those in current poverty are also in chronic 
poverty, and there are another one in five in chronic but not current 
poverty at each wave; 
- very similar findings have been produced for the UK and Australia 
(Perry, 2013:199-201). 
 
If a higher poverty threshold than the 50 percent of median equivalised income 
is used here (60 percent is preferred by some commentators), the proportions 
quoted here will be on the low side. 
          The issue of intergenerational dynamics is hardly explored. We know that 
children from homes with lower incomes are likely to be sicker and get inferior 
education and training than those from homes with higher incomes. The 
quantitative extent to which this translates into inferior life opportunities is not 
known.  
17. Income and Health 
Suzie Ballantyne (Carson) and the author found an association between health 
status and income, illustrated by Table 8. The general pattern is that in any 
given age group, those in the lower income quintiles are in poorer health than 
those in the higher income quintiles.  
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          Note that as age increases health status deteriorates, and that after the age 
of 15 women tend to report being in poorer health than do men. This generates 
an apparent anomaly in the aggregate pattern, with those in a household in the 
second to bottom and middle quartiles prone to poorer health than those at the 
bottom. 
 
Table 8: Proportions in Quintiles Who Rate Themselves as ‘Fair’ or ‘Poor’ Health 
 Household Quintiles  
ALL 
Age Group Bottom  2 Middle 4 Top  
15 Under 
Female 
7.4 3.6 2.9 3.1 1.2 4.5 
Under 15 Male 5.8 5.8 3.4 3.0 3.1 4.7 
15-64 Female 10.7 11.0 8.7 7.2 3.9 7.9 
15-64 Male  10.2 8.3 7.4 4.2 3.8 6.2 
Over 65 Female 42.5 29.4 27.5 22.3 21.2 26.5 
Over 65 Male 40.2 29.8 25.2 21.3 19.4 25.5 
ALL  9.3 11.0 11.0 7.0 4.8 8.6 
(Source: Easton & Ballantyne 2002, Chapter 9).  
This is because the age groups are not equally distributed through the quintiles. 
Because the elderly are concentrated more in the second and middle quintiles, 
and because they are more likely to be sick, those quintiles report the highest 
incidence of sickness for the population as a whole. 
          That there is an association does not prove causation. Indeed it is possible 
that the causation is in either direction. A history of poor health may reduce 
current income. On the other hand low income may cause poor health via 
inadequate spending on food and other health-promoting but standard consumer 
products (especially inadequate housing) or on health care. This data does not 
tell us which mechanism is working – probably both are.  
          Research at the University of Otago’s Wellington School of Medicine has 
observed that the incidence of tuberculosis, other infection diseases and acute 
rheumatic fever and TB is higher in areas (Census Area Unit) with lower 
incomes. (Baker et al., 2008; Baker et al., 2012; Jaine et al., 2004). 
18. Wealth 
Wealth is the stock which generates the flow of income. The focus tends to be 
on physical assets (such as housing) and financial assets (such as shares and 
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bank deposits). Additionally there is human capital which generates labour 
market income; there may also be state entitlements such as eligibility for social 
security and New Zealand superannuation, which also generate a flow of 
income for some.68 
          Measuring the distribution of wealth is not easy; once more it depends on 
the data sources. An early attempt to measure physical and financial wealth 
used returns of estates reported for death duties, treating the wealth of those 
who have died as a random sample of the living. Since wealth varies over the 
life cycle it is necessary to treat each age group separately; ideally there needs 
also to be an adjustment for those with wealth having a lower mortality than 
those without, although that has not been practical. In any case the growing 
practice of exempting the joint family home wrecked the method, since it meant 
the reported dead person was not representative of the living whenever there 
was a surviving spouse. 
          The estimates which may be least criticised give the following general 
conclusions for 1956 and 1966: 
 - physical and financial wealth is much more concentrated than 
personal income; 
 - there is a life cycle to wealth holdings, but even within each age 
cohort, wealth is very unequally distributed; 
 - the main form of this wealth holding is housing.  
None of these conclusions are particularly surprising (Easton 1983: Ch. 7). 69 
          A more recent and refined estimate came from SoFIE which in 2003/04 
asked individuals the value of their assets, liabilities and net worth70 (Cheung 
2007). 
          Again it found that the vast majority of the adult population had little 
physical and financial wealth – about 6.5 percent of them had negative net 
worth, although this may be dominated by student debt. Conversely 1 percent of 
adults had 16.4 percent of total wealth, the same as about 70 percent of the 
                                                            
68 None of the estimates reported below include private (including GSF) pension 
entitlements.  
69 It was not possible to provide estimates for later dates because of the increasing importance 
of joint family homes. 
70Another source of data is the Statistics New Zealand 2001 Household Savings Survey. 
There is a publicly available synthetic unit-record file of 300 unit records which is not about 
real people, but was generated using statistical techniques to have similar characteristics as 
respondents to the survey. 
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population.71 Again the study shows a marked life cycle in net worth, peaking at 
about the age of 60.  
          There is not a lot of gender inequality, but each Pākehā owns about 2.6 
times that of the other ethnic groups. One of the report’s curious findings is that 
Auckland wealth levels are markedly below those of the rest of the country; we 
do not know the extent to which age and ethnic factors drag them down. The 
report illustrates that a lot of material is available at the unit record level, but 
alas it has not been exploited, so we cannot be sure the extent to which other 
variables mask the true correlations.72 
          A subsequent publication adds to the earlier report (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2008). While a couple with two dependent children has higher median 
net worth than a family with one dependent child, those with three or more 
children have less than those with two. The same applies for one parent 
families. Because of the way the data is presented it is not possible to make an 
exact comparison but a family with two parents certainly averages more than 
twice as much net worth as a single adult family – probably four times as much 
(SNZ, 2008: Tables 2 & 3, pp.7 & 8). The pattern for the mean (average) is not 
quite as regular. However there may be intervening variables. 
19. Housing 
While owner-occupied housing is a part of total wealth, it is unusual because it 
does not generate cash income for the owner (and hence it’s income effect is not 
directly measured). Instead it saves expenditure. Thus two otherwise identical 
households with the same cash income may have very different standards of 
living if one is servicing a crushingly heavy mortgage while the other is 
mortgage free. How to allow for this? 
          A common adjustment is to deduct housing costs from the income. Since 
one element constitutes expenditure and the other constitutes income, this must 
be conceptually confused. Moreover the same household equivalent scale is 
applied whether the measure is before or after housing costs. That is surely 
                                                            
71 Inferred from Cheung (2007: Figure 2). The comparable figures for the 1966 adult 
distribution were 19 percent and about 75 percent; this might suggest the wealth distribution 
had become more equal over the 38 years, but the difference may reflect definitional 
differences and measurement errors. 
72 For instance a simple correlation between income categories and their average wealth 
suggests that an extra $1000 of the former (before tax) is associated with an extra $3700 of 
the latter (the correlation is high but not linear). However, the retired may be high in wealth 
and low in income, so there is a need to control for age.  
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nonsensical since the main reason for economies of scale that the household 
equivalence scale is adjusting for is housing; a larger family does not need 
proportionally as much housing – double its size and one does not double the 
number of kitchens, laundries and so on.  
          Suzie Ballantyne and the author suggested an alternative conceptually 
robust procedure in which an income was imputed to a household reflecting the 
difference between average household outlays (based on household 
characteristics) and actual outlays. We concluded:  
... adjusting for housing circumstance reinforces the inequalities in 
household type, benefiting the groups who are generally better off. 
This is not surprising. Because of the taxation advantages – the return 
on capital invested in owner-occupied housing is not taxed to the 
extent of other investments, including rental housing – the wealthy 
are likely to invest in their own accommodation. Additionally, there is 
a life cycle effect. Households with children owning a house are 
likely to have higher outlays than if they were renting because they 
are still paying off a mortgage. The households benefit later in life on 
the lower outlays of freehold owner-occupier housing (by which time 
the children will have probably left) (Easton & Ballantyne, 2002: Chs. 
3,7). 
While this approach has not been generally taken up, neither have the 
conceptual inadequacies of ignoring differences in housing circumstances or of 
deducting housing expenditure for income been addressed.  
          Housing well illustrates the lamppost problem. There is considerable 
anxiety about house ownership, the proportion of which has been falling. 
Despite it being obvious that there is a home ownership life cycle, until recently 
there was no data. Too often researchers and commentators have been left with 
the lamppost of the aggregate proportion across the life cycle. 
          The historical experience has been that since the Great Depression, 
proportionally more homes have been owned (with and without mortgage) by 
their occupiers (Schrader, 2013). However the proportion has been falling off 
since the 1986 census. It is too easy to attribute this to the rising income 
inequality. However there has been demographic change and there may well 
have been a shift to people owning a home in one location but living elsewhere 
while renting. There has also been social change. The impression is that the 
younger generation is generally settling down later than their parents and 
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grandparents, more often in their thirties.73 That probably means they prefer 
renting to ownership in their twenties. We do not know how much this (and the 
changing accommodation choices of the elderly74) explain the falling proportion 
of ownership.75 
20. Inequality and Growth  
It is conventional to interpret per capita constant price GDP (or better still 
national income) in welfare terms, ignoring the distributional impact of any 
gains (or losses) of output. Thus there is exactly the same outcome if all the 
gains go to the very rich as if the gains are shared equally among everybody. 
Sen suggested an alternative measure which he called 'real national income', 
which takes into account the distributional impact of changes (Sen, 1976; 1979). 
Ultimately it deducts from national income a share, measured by the Gini 
coefficient, to reflect the degree of inequality. 
          Thus while per capita National Income in constant prices (adjusted for the 
additional spending power arising from improving terms of trade) rose at a trend 
rate of 1.66 percent p.a. between 1982 and 2012, Sen’s real national income 
rose only 1.34 percent p.a. because of the rise in income inequality. In effect the 
additional inequality cost New Zealand almost a fifth on Sen’s measure (Easton, 
2013c). 
          More generally, there is little evidence that inequality generates faster 
growth (on the conventional measure of output or GDP). High per capita 
economies tend to have lower inequality although the causal processes and 
directions are not well understood.  
21. Epilogue: Towards Policy Responses 
Those who were not there may find the extremism of the New Zealand 
government’s economic and social policy in the 1980s almost unbelievable. It 
had many aspects to it but relevant to this article was a seminal shift away from 
the egalitarianism of the post-war era as the basis for policy to downgrading 
fairness and hence accepting considerably higher levels of inequality. It is 
unclear how conscious this abandonment was. 
                                                            
73 Between 1986 and 2006 the (media and mean) age of first nuptial birth rose 4 years. There 
is not comparable data for ex-nuptial births.  
74 In 2006 home ownership peaked at near 80 percent in the 60 to 74 age group (the 
proportion for the entire population is 53 percent) and then fell off to 59 percent for those 
over 85. The percentages do not cover the institutionalised.  
75 Instead the aggregate ownership and far-from-rigorous measures of housing affordability 
are used by policy rhetoricians to draw conclusions about accessibility to home ownership.  
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          The New Zealand way tends to be policy without analysis. As André 
Siegfried (1992:54) said a century ago:  
New Zealanders’ outlook, not too carefully reasoned, and no doubtful 
scornful of scientific thought, makes them incapable of self-distrust. 
Like almost all men of action they have a contempt for theories: yet 
they are often captured by the first theory that turns up, if it is 
demonstrated to them with an appearance of logic sufficient to impose 
upon them. In most cases they do not seem to see difficulties, and 
they propose simple solutions for the most complex problems with 
astonishing audacity.  
Too often the simple solution fails, but by that time the proponent has retired, 
been promoted or moved on to another complex problem so that no one is ever 
held to account for the failure (especially given that retrospective evaluation of 
policy is rare, so policy makers cannot learn from failure). 
          Rather than propose some simple solutions to poorly formulated 
problems, this epilogue draws attention to two classes of policy responses if 
excessive economic inequality is judged to be requiring attention.  
          The classical policy response is redistribution, that is, the use of taxation, 
transfers and subsidies to move resources from those with more to those with 
less. Since the rise in inequality a quarter of a century ago can be mainly 
attributed to regressive changes in distributional policy, the simple policy is to 
reverse those changes. It is, of course more complex than that. 
          The second policy response is predistribution, which is the notion that the 
state should try to prevent inequalities in market incomes occurring in the first 
place rather than ameliorate inequalities through redistribution (Hacker, 2011). 
Although the term has only come into prominence recently, the idea is a long 
held one, insofar as numerous traditional interventions in education, health care, 
housing and training, can be seen as precursors. It can be extended to wages, as 
British Labour leader Ed Miliband has recently proposed; it could be applied to 
the current government’s proposals to shift beneficiaries into the labour force. 
Indeed, the term is so loose it may be used for just about any policy with 
distributional implications, effective or otherwise (and therefore is an ideal 
notion for New Zealand policy pragmatists). 
          However, we have seen that there is not a simple relationship between 
personal market incomes and household market incomes. The relationship is so 
complex that it is not impossible that reducing inequality in personal incomes 
could increase inequality in household incomes partly because children may not 
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be a beneficiary and partly because higher incomes for supplementary earners 
which would add to already well off households.  
          Nevertheless, predistribution focuses on the options when distributional 
policy has been fine tuned as much as practicalities allow. Over the last quarter 
century we have become more alert to the disincentive and perverse incentive 
effects of redistribution (which seem to have been magnified by globalisation – 
the greater international mobility of capital and skilled labour). Other measures 
which shift social inequality in the desired direction should not be ignored. 
          But predistributional policies need to work with effective distributional 
polices not replace them, especially as they often have an investment element 
which makes them fiscally expensive in the short run. 
          Prior to that, those who command policy – whether effectively or 
ineffectively – have to decide to what extent reducing (or increasing) economic 
inequality is a policy objective. Is New Zealand satisfied with shifting from a 
low inequality to a high inequality society? What would its founding nineteenth 
century migrants have thought about the fact that, after allowing for each 
country’s size and affluence, New Zealand is now more unequal than the 
countries they left? And what would those who invited them here have thought 
had they known their descendants would be firmly at the bottom end of the 
unequal distributions? 
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Introduction 
Recent years have seen an explosion of academic work exploring the increase in 
economic inequality in western, developed countries over the last thirty years. 
This work gives accounts of the extent of this increase (Atkinson & Leigh, 
2005; OECD, 2011; Perry, 2013), its possible causes (Autor, Katz & Kearney, 
2006; OECD, 2008) and its various consequences. Accounts of these 
consequences may be divided (somewhat arbitrarily) into those that focus on 
broadly-experienced social consequences (Wilkinson, 1996; Jencks, 2002; 
Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005); political consequences (OECD, 2011; Bartels, 
2008) and economic consequences (Persson & Tabellini, 1994; Piketty & Saez, 
2003). Other work takes a more explicitly normative approach, or a focus on 
public attitudes towards rising inequality (Humpage, 2008; Bamfield and 
Horton 2009; Jost & Major, 2001). Academic work on inequality is thus a 
massive and massively complex field, even without mentioning work by such 
important authors as Bernd Wegener, Martin Gilens, Alberto Allesina, Peter 
Taylor-Gooby, Morton Deutsch, Christopher Jencks or David Miller). One 
might also note the increasing concern about inequality expressed by politicians 
and media sources. A non-exhaustive list would include figures hardly 
associated with the political left, such as David Cameron, the World Economic 
Forum, the Financial Times, and the Economist. 
          One thing that might be noted about the strictly academic literature in this 
area is that it has been strikingly unsuccessful (thus far, at least) in effecting 
policy change, or even attitudinal change. In this context it is understandable 
and – in my view – admirable that many of the academics listed above have 
sought to engage a broader audience. My interest here is on this specific sub-
genre of the recent inequality literature: books on the issue written by academics 
but written for an audience beyond academia. Perhaps the best-known example 
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of this type is Wilkinson and Pickett’s The Spirit Level from 2009. Since then, 
we might add Stewart Lansley’s 2011 The Cost of Inequality, Jacob Hacker and 
Paul Pierson’s 2010 Winner-Take-All Politics, Andrew Leigh’s Billionaires and 
Battlers from 2012, Joseph Stiglitz’s The Price of Inequality from 2012 and 
Max Rashbrooke’s edited volume Inequality: a New Zealand Crisis.1 All of 
these works seek to bring together academic analysis with a committed, 
polemical intent that, for the most part, is made explicit from their title onwards. 
          To keep this review within reasonable bounds, I focus here on Stiglitz’s 
The Price of Inequality (a popular treatment of the issue by an esteemed, Nobel 
Prize-winning academic) and Rashbrooke’s Inequality: a New Zealand Crisis 
(for its obvious local relevance). It is a guiding principle in this review that it is 
not reasonable to critique books for failing to be or do what they do not set out 
to do. I do, however, seek to understand and evaluate the nature of what it is 
that they set out to do. In assessing the “by academics, for non-academics” 
genre, I consider the problems that inevitably confront popular treatments of 
contentious issues, including the tension between analysis and advocacy. 
 
Two brief reviews 
Inequality: A New Zealand Crisis 
Rashbrooke’s edited volume spreads its net wide: it features fifteen different 
chapters from seventeen different contributors, with fourteen “viewpoints” from 
a range of non-academic voices interspersed between those chapters. As a 
result, it brings together a variety of aspects of contemporary inequality 
(housing, education, political influence, skills training, and workplace relations, 
for example) that are more often viewed in isolation. This range of coverage is 
one of the book’s great strengths although – as I will argue later – more could 
perhaps have been done to engage with the divergences and convergences 
between the various contributions. 
          Being an edited collection also constrains the editor to set the scene and 
cover some necessary background rather quickly. Within the book’s first, 
introductory section, Rashbrooke authors two chapters in which he defends the 
book’s central thesis that ‘inequality is a crisis that affects us all’ (back cover), 
                                                            
1 It’s reasonable, I think, to classify A New Zealand Crisis in this way. While Rashbrooke is 
from a journalistic rather than an academic background, the bulk of the chapters are authored 
by academics. At the same time, it is clearly designed to be accessible to a broader audience. 
The chapters are short (10-15 pages, typically under 5000 words) and are more propositional 
than a typical journal article. 
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notes and rejects prominent counter-arguments to the effect that inequality is 
not a pressing problem, and explores the extent and causes of inequality in New 
Zealand. In setting out the case for viewing current levels of inequality as a 
national crisis, he focuses on the negative social consequences associated with 
such high levels, and on the growing divergence between the super-rich and ‘the 
struggling middle’. This introductory task is done within 32 pages. In my 
judgment, it is done well. In covering such a large field, it skirts - by necessity - 
over much of the nuance and debate within the literature it surveys. Certainly 
there were moments of frustration where particular aspects were skated over or 
left alone. For instance: the book’s emphasis on income rather than wealth 
inequality was not really explained, finer points of the implications of various 
metrics not explored, and criticisms of The Spirit Level set aside. But to 
summarise the literature comprehensively would take an entire book, or more.  
          The book’s second section (Issues and Debates) contains a classic PPE 
combination of chapters by Robert Wade, Ganesh Nana and Jonathon Boston. 
Wade focuses heavily on what Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson (2010) term the 
‘hyper-concentration’ of wealth and income, and the capacity of the very rich to 
translate their economic power into political influence, both directly (through 
their contributions to politicians and political parties) and indirectly (through the 
normalisation of preferred values as “common-sense”). Nana offers a slightly 
puzzled mea culpa on behalf of the economics profession, arguing that the 
mainstream of the discipline has subordinated its historical focus on people and 
their well-being to ‘narrow financial analysis focused … [only on] monetary 
gains’ (p. 56). He advocates, instead, for inequality to be assessed in terms of its 
inefficiencies and to be viewed as an instance of market failure and – therefore - 
as a central concern of economics. Boston takes a philosophical approach that 
discusses the different sorts of things (liberties, opportunities, outcomes, etc.) 
that might be equalised, and the practical and normative limits on pursuing each 
kind of equality. 
         For me, the third section (Consequences) offers the best example of the 
productive bringing together of diverse aspects of the broad issue of inequality. 
The chapters on inequality and housing (Philippe Howden-Chapman, Sara 
Bierre and Chris Cunningham), inequality, crime and imprisonment (Kim 
Workman and Tracey McIntosh) and inequality and education (Cathy Wylie) 
demonstrate the ways in which inequalities in one sphere have flow-on effects 
into others. In the absence of meaningful housing assistance policies, for 
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example, economic disadvantage is easily translated into sub-optimal housing 
outcomes. These outcomes, in turn, might manifest as health problems and/or as 
a high level of housing transience, both of which strongly effect educational 
outcomes. Housing and educational inequalities, in turn, are related to crime 
statistics, with imprisonment figures also having strong connections to the 
ethnic dimensions of inequality explored by Karlo Mila (with respect to Pasifika 
peoples) and Evan Poata-Smith (within Māori communities). 
          The fourth and final section (Looking Ahead) contains chapters by Paul 
Barber (which, in its setting out of the case for reducing inequality and some of 
the arguments against that case tended to repeat earlier sections of the book), 
Paul Dalziel (on the need to better align the skills and industry training 
infrastructure with the labour market and with social goals), Nigel Haworth (on 
improving the efficiency and distributional aspects of workplaces through 
greater workplace democracy and greater worker empowerment), Mike O’Brien 
(on designing a more redistributive tax and welfare system) and Linda Tuhiwai 
Smith (on the need to think carefully about the power effects of language use, 
and of attending to what counts as “truth” in a given context). Designating this 
as the ‘looking ahead’ section is somewhat arbitrary, in that many of the other 
authors (especially Wade, Howden-Chapman et al. and Wylie) had offered 
policy proposals to address inequality, and in that some of the authors here are 
also dealing with the consequences of inequality. More deeply, the different 
(although probably not contradictory) ways forward offered in this section (and 
throughout the book) are not explicitly evaluated, compared or contrasted, and 
the book does not offer a clear sense of conclusion at its end. 
          The strengths of the book include its coverage of a wide range of issues 
and its accessibility to a wide readership. By bringing together issues such as 
housing, education and employment relations, the reader can see common 
themes emerging: most obviously, in the post-1980s New Zealand context, the 
effects of a laissez-faire approach to policy-making and regulation or, put 
otherwise, a bias against central co-ordination in the pursuit of socially-
desirable goals. Ironically, the book itself suffers from a slightly laissez-faire 
approach. Moments of convergence between the different contributions that 
might have been profitably explored were left as separate insights. For example, 
Michael Walzer’s notion of complex equality – the proposition that advantage 
in one sphere of social life (such as market performance) should not be 
translatable into advantage into another (access to healthcare, say) – is 
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introduced by Boston and could have offered a useful lens in better 
understanding the trends outlined by, for example, Wade or Wylie. In a similar 
vein, the neo-pluralism implicit in Wade’s account of the disproportionate 
political influence of the wealthy might have helped to account for the policy 
changes noted elsewhere. It might also have been used to highlight the obstacles 
likely to confront the proposals offered in other chapters. 
          Similarly, there were some moments of divergence between the 
contributors. This is not necessarily a problem. It would have been impractical 
and intellectually dishonest to impose a uniformity of voice upon the authors 
represented here, who are united only by a ‘shared concern’ about the issues 
raised in the book and a ‘desire to see [them] properly debated.’ And the book is 
explicit from the outset that it has made ‘no attempt to frame the discussion 
within a single unified philosophical approach or advocate an agreed set of 
conclusions’ (p. xi). This – to my mind – is perfectly valid. But it might have 
added more to the ongoing conversation about inequality in New Zealand if an 
attempt had been made to be more explicit about these points of tension. For 
example: Nana sees the New Zealand Treasury’s inclusion of ‘equity’ within its 
Living Standards Framework as an ‘encouraging development’ (p. 58): 
Rashbrooke (2013; in his blog rather than in the book) is rather more sceptical, 
describing Treasury’s approach as ‘very weak, and in places incoherent.’ 
Howden-Chapman et al. and Wylie call for public policy to be based on 
evidence-based best practice; Smith sounds a note of caution about the 
hegemony of ‘evidence-based public policy’ (p. 228). Poata-Smith wonders 
whether the activities of tribal elites are exacerbating inequality within  Māori 
communities; former CEO of Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu Anake Goodall (in a 
‘viewpoint’ immediately following Poata-Smith’s chapter) offers a more 
positive (albeit nuanced) account of the work of tribal organisations. 
          What are the implications of these points of divergence and tension? Do 
they constitute a problem? The book offers little guidance, as it does not have a 
structural mechanism to acknowledge them, let alone address them. I wondered 
whether a short Introduction to each of the book’s four sections, or a separate 
Conclusion, might have helped to translate the book’s diversity of views into a 
more productive and engaging dialogue.  
 
The Price of Inequality 
The most obvious thing to say about Stiglitz’s book is that it is the work of a 
single author. Compared to Rashbrooke, who gives himself 32 pages to cover 
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the necessary background and context before handing over to a wide range of 
authors, Stieglitz has 423 pages (if you include the 107 pages of endnotes that 
include a fair bit of commentary and argumentation, and the 26 page preface) to 
develop his own argument. As such, his book is a more elegant presentation of a 
more coherent thesis. Equally obviously, his single viewpoint cannot offer the 
diversity of perspectives and the range of expertise of an edited collection. 
          Indeed, Stiglitz’s thesis is simple enough and, naturally, one that 
emphasises the economic causes and the economic consequences of current 
high levels of inequality. His argument builds on a re-statement of economic 
theory. Markets fail, he reminds us, in predictable ways under certain 
conditions. They will allocate resources in socially sub-optimal ways in the 
presence of monopoly conditions, asymmetries of information, externalities and 
public goods. Unfettered markets, then, are not conducive to efficient or 
equitable outcomes. Worse still is the situation where markets are further 
distorted by malign interference: when rent-seeking behaviour is allowed, 
encouraged or facilitated by the state, for example.  
          Like Ganesh Nana, Stiglitz views high levels of inequality as the result in 
part - of the inefficient operation of markets and he sees such levels of 
inequality as perpetuating further market failure, insofar as they mean that many 
members of society are not contributing to the extent that they could. Like 
Robert Wade, Stiglitz views high levels of inequality as the result of a captured 
political system and argues in turn that such levels will perpetuate further 
market failure as they deliver yet more political power to those at the top of the 
economic distribution. Like Rashbrooke, Stiglitz also sees high levels of 
inequality as a moral issue, both on consequentialist grounds and on the basis 
that much inequality is not the just result of differential effort or contribution. 
Stiglitz vigorously rejects the notion that one’s “earned desert” based on market 
performance reflects one’s social contribution. Compared to the modest rewards 
that went to many of those who made major contributions to human progress. 
          A closer look at the successes of those at the top of the wealth distribution 
shows that more than a small part of their genius resides in devising better ways 
of exploiting better ways of exploiting market power and other market 
imperfections – and, in many cases, finding better ways of ensuring that politics 
works for them rather than for society more generally (p. 41).2 
                                                            
2 This part of Stiglitz’s argument might be read alongside Rashbrooke’s (2013: 10) summary 
of the disconnect between remuneration and social value. 
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          Stiglitz begins (as Rashbrooke does) by defending the basic proposition 
that high levels of inequality are a pressing problem, and by countering (a 
similar list of) arguments against this proposition. Having more space to 
conduct these tasks, Stiglitz can be more thorough in his treatment of the 
relationship between wealth and income inequalities, of issues of measurement, 
and of the links between inequalities of outcome and of opportunity. He can 
take longer, also, to set out and counter the arguments commonly raised against 
his position. It is in this section, however, that the reader gets the first and 
clearest idea of Stiglitz’s polemical intent. His approach is not so much to 
discuss the various arguments as to demolish the opposing side (see Finegold 
Catalán, 2012). 
          On the relationship between markets and politics, Stiglitz observes that 
one’s market performance is based – in part – on one’s ability to acquire skills 
and training (c.f. here Dalziel’s chapter in A New Zealand Crisis) and on the 
way in which the ‘rewards of work’ are distributed (c.f. Haworth’s). This latter 
distribution is dependant in part on the legal status of unions, on the laws 
surrounding corporate governance and compensation committees, on political 
decisions around the tax code, and on the ways in which government chooses to 
support business. Stiglitz elaborates this last point at length, to highlight what he 
sees as the hypocrisy of those who argue that individuals should be left to rise 
or fall according to their own merit. He notes the many ways in which this logic 
is not applied to government’s treatment of business interests. Beyond the 
standard list of things provided by government that allow business to operate 
(physical infrastructure, a legal system, a healthy and educated citizenry) 
Stiglitz notes effective subsidies for business embedded in – inter alia – patent 
law, financial deregulation, agricultural support, arrangements with private 
defence contractors, and limitations on the state’s ability to negotiate with 
pharmaceutical companies. 
          The myth of the heroic, individual wealth-creator is, Stiglitz insists, 
precisely that: a myth, and a poor foundation on which to build public policy. 
He rejects the small government mantra espoused by the American economic 
right from Milton Friedman to Paul Ryan. Tax cuts for the rich, in Stiglitz’s 
argument, exacerbate inequality not only in the short term but also in the long 
term, by constraining the sort of productive long-term investments that the state 
has historically made in research, education and healthcare. Inequality, here, is 
seen as self-reinforcing:  
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The more divided a society becomes in terms of wealth, the more 
reluctant the wealthy are to spend money on common needs… The 
wealthy also worry about a strong government – one that could use its 
power to adjust the imbalances in our society by taking some of their 
wealth and devoting it to public investment that would contribute to 
the common good or that would help those at the bottom.’ (93-94, see 
also p. 82) 
Elsewhere, Stiglitz elaborates on (1) his quarrel with the proposition that society 
ought to pursue equality opportunities rather than equal outcomes (this idea, he 
says, mistakenly implies both that society is currently providing equality of 
opportunity, and that progressive voices are actually calling for equality of 
outcome); (2) the corrosive effect of extreme wealth concentration on the 
prospects for meaningfully democratic government and (3) the ways in which 
the battle for ideas is conducted through careful control of how things are 
named and described (elements of extremely high compensation packages for 
top executives are couched in the more acceptable terms of “performance” or 
“incentive” pay; estate taxes are presented as “death duties”, for example). 
          There is, in short, very little that will come as news to those who are 
familiar with earlier debates around the issue of inequality, or with Stiglitz’s 
prior work. His style here is urgent and passionate. In his preface he traces his 
concern for inequality, discrimination and inequity to his childhood in ‘the 
heartland of industrial American’ and to the values cherished by his family (p. 
xxv). The book is partisan and has been criticised (see Finegold Catalán, 2012) 
as such.3 His treatment of divergent views is, at times, cursory and dismissive. 
Stiglitz is relying on his personal credibility developed over his decades as a 
high-profile and respected economist, and in his years acting in political roles 
within Bill Clinton’s administration and at the World Bank. He is, in effect, 
saying “trust me” rather than setting out an objective account of competing 
theories to facilitate a rigorous evaluation. Considering, for example, different 
theories as to the cause of inequality Stiglitz (p. 80) concludes thus: ‘To me, 
much of this debate is beside the point. The point is that inequality in America 
… has grown to where it can no longer be ignored.’ Addressing a problem 
without a sophisticated understanding of that problem’s causes might not be the 
most intellectually satisfactory approach. Stiglitz’s contention is that it is 
                                                            
3 By contrast, Rashbrooke’s book is not so overtly partisan, partly because it is an edited 
collection with a range of views that, as we have seen, does not ‘advocate an agreed set of 
conclusions’. 
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nonetheless necessary. Refusing to act until a complete theoretical 
understanding had been achieved, he suggests, would be morally wrong. 
         The book’s policy agenda (curbing the financial sector, strengthening 
competition laws, improving corporate governance, ending corporate welfare, a 
more progressive tax system, improving access to healthcare and education, 
tempering globalisation, pursuing full employment, supporting collective action, 
public investment for sustainable growth) is defended and promoted. As with 
his list of seven steps by which we could ‘easily raise trillions of dollars’ to help 
balance the budget (p. 215), however, little detail is given. Still, the policy 
prescriptions (along with an acknowledgment of the political challenges that 
will inevitably confront them) presented in the final chapter bring the book to a 
natural conclusion. Whether readers find the conclusion satisfying will depend – 
I suspect - very much on their political leanings and their capacity to trust the 
credibility of the author. 
 
Assessing analysis and activism: genre and ‘communicative purpose’ 
Traditional theories conceptualise genre according to the characteristics of the 
thing to be classified. Typically, relevant characteristics have been taken to 
include substance or form, but sometimes also the strategies employed or the 
intended audience. The ‘new genre’ movement (see Martin, 1985, Miller, 1984, 
Swales, 1990), however, has focussed on the idea of ‘communicative purpose’ 
(Askehave & Swales, 2001). In determining how to assess and evaluate the two 
books reviewed here, it’s useful to employ the characteristics of purpose, 
audience and strategy. If we take – as does the new genre school – the 
communicative purpose of a text as primary, we would expect this purpose to 
strongly determine the other characteristics of the text, including its content, its 
intended audience and its rhetorical strategies. 
         The communicative purpose of the ‘by academics, for non-academics’ 
genre is twofold.  It is not simply – as might be the case for a standard piece of 
academic work – to convince a reader through rational means. Rather, it is also 
to motivate that reader to action. Accordingly, these two books    seek to 
communicate their message to a broad interested-but-non-specialist audience. 
More specifically, they might be expected to focus their message at the 
uncommitted reader, analogous to the undecided voter or the wavering 
consumer (no book is likely to convince a reader strongly opposed to the book’s 
thesis; no book is necessary to convince a reader strongly sympathetic to it). 
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Their books’ strategies include deploying (rather than developing or debating) 
empirical evidence and theoretical arguments: evidence and arguments that are 
selected for their expected resonance with this imagined broad audience. I have 
noted above instances in both books where divergent perspectives are 
summarily dismissed, and nuances of argument ignored. In a purely academic 
work, this would provide ground for censure. For reasons of space and for 
clarity of message (highly salient considerations, given the books’ purpose and 
intended audience) it might well be acceptable in the context of a ‘by 
academics, for non-academics’ work to gloss over divergence and detail.  
        That said, it is not enough to simply describe the conventions of certain 
genres. Certain standards of evaluation can – and must - be applied. Clearly, 
there should be no blatant falsehoods (certain frustrations in Rashbrooke’s book 
- around the definitions of decile rankings on p.98, and a slippage between 
income and wealth on p. 20 - seem more like oversights than confusions than 
anything more serious). Important opposing viewpoints should be 
acknowledged, and not wilfully misrepresented. (This criterion is admittedly 
vague. Both books engage directly with opposing viewpoints. Given that the 
books are more-or-less explicit about their own positions (and, perhaps, given 
my own sympathy for these positions) I did not construe the treatment these 
dissenting views received as wilful misrepresentation, although it should be 
allowed that they were structurally set up as straw people to be accounted for). 
A mechanism should be deployed to direct interested readers to primary 
material, and to provide qualifications to the arguments presented in the main 
text. (Both works have a lot of endnotes, though Stiglitz’s are used chiefly to 
further develop his argument, and the primary sources he cites are almost 
always those that support his thesis. Rashbrooke, in his opening chapters, goes 
slightly further and offers qualifications and notes on measures used, and – on 
occasion – references to work that contests his thesis). 
         For some readers, this will not be sufficient. Still, given the broad intended 
audience of these works, and their (to varying degrees) activist purpose, it is 
hard to know what more they could have done. It is best, perhaps, to think of 
these books not as definitive documents, but as strategic interventions in 
ongoing conversations. Stiglitz’s book grew out of a Vanity Fair article 
(Stiglitz, 2011)4 and is part of his ongoing attempt to influence public debates 
                                                            
4 Entitled ‘Of the 1%, for the 1%, by the 1%’, of which title I could never work out what the 
clause ‘of the 1%’ was doing, since the central claim of the article was that precious little 
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on important policy issues in the United States. Rashbrooke’s book can also be 
seen as one move in a wider public dialogue. The book was presaged by public 
events at Te Papa, accompanied by well-attended book launches and a speaking 
tour by Robert Wade, and reinforced by a one-day symposium in Wellington, 
and by a blog: Inequality: A New Zealand Conversation. The book also 
continues to serve as a starting point for Rashbrooke’s ongoing attempts to 
develop public dialogue about inequality through a series of public meetings. It 
thus takes its place alongside Bryan Bruce’s recent television documentary 
Mind the Gap, and the ongoing work of the Child Poverty Action Group, Living 
Wage Aotearoa and others in what I take to be an increasingly vibrant national 
conversation. 
          Certain conventions of the ‘by academics, for non-academics’ genre end 
up generating some tensions. Basic principles of psychology dictate that to 
achieve their motivational purpose, the books (or, in the case of A New Zealand 
Crisis, the various chapters) need to conclude on at least a tentatively optimistic 
note. A pessimistic or fatalistic conclusion - invoking an intractable problem or 
an insurmountable obstacle – is simply not in keeping with their motivational 
intent. This presents a problem, because most major social problems are not 
easily solved, and optimistic conclusions run the risk of seeming naïve or 
unrealistic (consider here the unsatisfactory endings to (generally 
commendable) advocacy-type documentaries such as Food, Inc. (‘you can save 
the world, one bite at a time’) and Inside Job (Matt Damon intoning that ‘some 
things are worth fighting for’ over a sweeping aerial shot of the Statue of 
Liberty). Both of these closing statements reduce complex issues (that have 
been shown to have deep structural causes) to a question of the simple choices 
of individual consumers and voters.  Likewise, the two books considered here, 
having noted the ways in which politics and power are implicated in the 
increase in inequality over the last thirty years, struggle to show how public 
opinion can effect policy change. (Although, to be fair, I cannot think of a 
recent academic treatment that convincingly addresses this point.) 
          Both books, that is to say, offer little on the question of political strategy. 
In the case of A New Zealand Crisis, this follows from the initial rejection of a 
shared set of prescriptions. Stiglitz gets as far as suggesting that either (a) the 
99% will need to cast of the shackles of the myth that the interests of the 1% are 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
governing of the 1% was going on. That clause is missing from the title of Chapter 9 in the 
book. 
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also their interests and/or (b) the 1% will need to re-apprehend the idea of ‘self-
interest properly understood’ (p. 288): that their fate is inextricably linked with 
that of the rest of society. His engagement with strategy ends up as probably the 
more disappointing, if only because he promises more. Devoting an entire 
chapter to ‘the battle of ideas’, Stiglitz doesn’t move much beyond noting that 
(variously) ‘they’, ‘the right’ and ‘the 1%’ have been successful at framing the 
debate on their terms, having taken on board key lessons from the practice of 
advertising. Here, again, the conventions of the genre are limiting. The pursuit 
of a broad interested-but-non-specialist audience means that complex and 
unsettling ideas don’t get much of an airing. If, however, as Linda Tuhiwai 
Smith asserts, ‘the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house’ (p. 
231, citing Audre Lorde), then some new and unsettling concepts might be 
necessary. 
          Of course, many potentially unsettling and useful concepts are quite old. 
It is hardly new to suggest that one element of social power is the capacity to 
convince the dominated that their domination is in their own interests (see 
Lukes, 2005). Or that people only prefer the ‘market justice’ of earned desert 
over the ‘political justice’ of need and equality because they misunderstand how 
markets and governments contribute to society’s wellbeing (see Lane, 1986). It 
is hardly new to note the dangers inherent in allowing land and money to 
become commodities to be traded and exchanged for profit (see Polanyi, 1949, 
and Jesson, 1999). Or that a meaningful policy response to inequality might not 
be compatible with the continuation of free markets. A proper treatment of these 
and other claims may sit uneasily with the demands of the genre. But if we 
accept the constitutive power of elite discourse, then they might well contribute 
something useful to a fuller discussion of how a hegemonic common-sense has 
been constructed, and how it might be contested. (Or, if we leave questions of 
discourse and concepts to one side, it might still have been interesting to 
evaluate the relative merits of major political parties, minor parties, community 
coalitions, advocacy groups and direct action as potential vehicles for change). 
          In this more practical vein, both Stiglitz and (in the Rashbrooke volume) 
Wade call for greater control over the financing of politicians and political 
parties. But it is worth recalling that the last attempt in New Zealand to regulate 
political party electoral financing resulted in a media outcry, led by the New 
Zealand Herald’s ‘Democracy under Attack’ campaign (New Zealand Herald, 
2007). (It is also worth noting that the democratic deficit caused by high levels 
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of inequality has not provoked a similar campaign). To me, more might have 
been said of the role and the control of the media in the context of democratic 
debate within the public sphere. Doing so would have reiterated the ways in 
which the disproportionate political influence of the rich makes it difficult to 
maintain a healthy and democratic public sphere, while also reminding us of 
Neil Postman’s (1985: 8) maxim that ‘[t]he clearest way to see through a culture 
is to attend to its tools for conversation’. Some sort of consideration of the 
political economy of mass communication (or of the implications of social 
media networks) might have added something useful on the challenges of 
developing a public consensus to address inequality.  
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Comparing Cultures of Decline? Class Perceptions among 
English Migrants in New Zealand1 
 
David Pearson 
       Abstract 
There has been very little research on English migrants in New 
Zealand, especially over the last few decades, and even less attention 
to their class perceptions. Drawing upon in-depth interview data, this 
article makes a contribution to both research lacunae. It outlines some 
key background issues relating to class and national narratives, within 
and between England and New Zealand, and describes the research 
design of this study. It then draws on selected migrant accounts to 
illustrate the views of English persons on class relations, or the lack 
of them, in their countries of origin and destination, and the changes, 
if any, they discern in both contexts since settling in New Zealand. 
Finally, it analyses the links between the life trajectories of different 
categories of migrants and, if and how, their sentiments about social 
hierarchy relate to what has been called a ‘culture of decline’ in 
England; and to what extent a comparable phenomenon might be 
observable locally. 
 
Introduction 
There is considerable agreement among social historians on both sides of the 
Tasman that most English and other British migrants arriving in New Zealand 
and Australia in the nineteenth and early twentieth century saw themselves 
migrating to overseas ‘Better Britains’ (Belich, 2009; Phillips & Hearn, 2008; 
Ward, 2001; Phillips, 2012). In both countries, the ambitions of achieving 
material improvement and an enhanced life style were frequently described by 
settlers as being more easily achieved ‘Down Under’ than within the stratified 
constraints of the country they were leaving. As a result, it is argued, new ideals 
of ‘classlessness’ and ‘mateship’ were directly contrasted to perceived class 
divisions and linked status distinctions experienced within Britain (Kapferer, 
1986; Olssen, et al, 2011; Phillips, 1996). Such differences did not undermine a 
general sense of transnational connectedness; given most British migrants saw 
themselves moving from one home to another, rather than into foreign 
                                                            
1 I should like to thank Charles Crothers, Steve Fenton, Robin Mann and Charles Sedgwick 
for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. 
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territories. These perceptions are seen as continuing well into the twentieth 
century (see Belich, 2009; Ward, 2007), but whether such ‘home thoughts’ 
remain influential in more recent times is hard to evaluate given the very limited 
empirical research on English migrants to New Zealand per se (Bueltmann, 
Gleeson & Macraild, 2012; Fraser & McCarthy, 2012; Hutchings, 1999), and an 
even more marked absence of studies of their class awareness.2 
 The findings reported on in this article contribute to both research lacunae 
by drawing on the comparative sentiments of migrants from England arriving in 
New Zealand since the 1960s, and also, in many cases, their observations from 
visits back to Britain. The article is organised as follows. Firstly, it briefly 
outlines some key background issues relating to class and national narratives 
within and between England and New Zealand. Secondly, it describes the 
qualitative research design of this study. The third section then draws on 
selected migrant accounts to illustrate the sentiments of English persons on 
class relations, or the lack of them, in their countries of origin and destination, 
and the changes, if any, they discern in both contexts since settling in New 
Zealand. Contrasts are highlighted between the accounts of older, earlier 
arrivals, who mainly represent state-assisted migrant workers of the 1960s and 
1970s, and younger, more recent, often managerial and professional arrivals, 
who often landed under their own steam after the 1980s. Finally, a concluding 
discussion analyses the linkages between the life trajectories of different 
categories of migrants and the extent to which varying forms and degrees of 
class and status sentiments relate to what has been called a ‘culture of decline’ 
in England (Fenton, 2008). It also considers whether a comparable phenomenon 
is discernible in New Zealand.  
National class narratives         
New senses of Britishness were created in places like New Zealand through the 
processes of what Belich (2009) calls settlerism. In his view, this set of ideals 
and mentalitiés underpinned a distinct pattern of colonisation in which Britain’s 
far-flung dominions actively sought to clone many of their public institutions 
using metropolitan templates (Belich, 2010). While simultaneously seeking to 
stamp their own ‘unforced dependent’ (Denoon, 1983) imprint on nation-
building. Another aspect of settlerism, barely mentioned by Belich in his most 
                                                            
2 The New Zealand research is almost exclusively historical, pre-1970s. There is a more 
recent, but still limited Australian literature; see, for example, Hammerton & Thompson 
(2006) and Hammerton (2011). 
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recent work,3 is the extent to which relatively classless narratives were a key 
component of the dynamics of state/nation making and remaking; since they 
served a crucial role in inventing and reinventing distinctive imaginings of 
comparative national similarity and difference (Smith, 1991; Pearson, 2001). 
The neo-Weberian and neo-Marxist inspired perspectives that have tended to 
dominate local sociological analyses4 have critiqued these elite and mass settler 
ideologies and national mythologising. Both approaches stress that New 
Zealand, like all capitalist settler states, was stratified from its inception, by 
virtue of being driven by competitive economic forces within which different 
ranks of people had distinct interests, resources and rewards. Hence class 
relations in classic abstract terms were inevitable. Nonetheless, in both 
approaches, the degree to which objective analytic differences between 
classes/strata shaped the day to day subjective perceptions and relations of 
persons within these hierarchical categories is seen as problematic. Glossing 
over disagreements within as well as between standpoints, this mismatch is 
primarily viewed, in Marxist parlance, as attributable to the distorting effects of 
hegemonic influences on class perceptions; whereas, in Weberian informed 
terms, status (life style) divisions are seen as complicating views on stratified 
life chances. This archetypal lack of congruence between what Atkinson 
(2011:160) calls theoretical and constructed classes is hardly peculiar to settler 
societies, but several factors contribute to an argument about distinctive 
differences between Old and New World constructs of class, status and 
hierarchy. Firstly, one can point to historical evidence of perceived comparative 
differences between England and New Zealand being supported, albeit 
regionally and temporally unevenly, by evidence of higher rates of social 
mobility, lower levels of residential and occupational segregation, and relatively 
less inequitable distributions of material wealth and income in the Antipodes 
(Pearson & Thorns, 1983; Olssen et al, 2011). Secondly, such trends were 
reinforced by earlier state intervention to ameliorate the worst excesses of 
inequalities perceived in the “Old’ country (Martin, 2010). Thirdly, the greater 
prominence of local ethnic and gender differences are seen as reducing the 
primacy of class divisions in everyday settler lives (James & Saville-Smith, 
1994). Finally, notwithstanding debates about the historical intensity of 
                                                            
3 There is lengthier discussion of class in Belich (1996). 
4 See, for example, Bedggood, 1980; Pearson, 1980; Pearson & Thorns, 1983; Jones & Davis, 
1986; Wilkes, 1994; Hayes, 2005; Roper, 2005; Ongley, 2011. 
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perceptions of class differences in England (see Joyce, 1991; Cannadine, 1999), 
a consistent influx of British migrants and the parallel influence of English class 
representations in various forms of media are seen as ‘carriers’ of comparative 
hierarchical images that highlighted locally perceived relative classless 
narratives in New Zealand (Phillips, 2012). But can we assume this received 
wisdom among many social historians and sociologists about past developments 
is still relevant, given the major sociocultural, economic and political changes 
over recent decades evident in both England and New Zealand?  
          On the one hand, the general significance of class divisions in late or 
postmodern capitalist times has been widely critiqued in Europe, America and 
Australia (Bottero, 2005; Lareau & Dalton, 2008; Pakulski & Waters, 1996). 
For example, as Savage has recently noted, there appears to be widespread 
acceptance that class identities have changed in recent decades as the result of 
the cultural fragmentation linked with individualization and the decline of 
‘sunset’ industries, like mining and shipbuilding, traditionally associated with 
solidaristic class communities (Savage, 2007: 3). Nevertheless, as he stresses, 
calls for the complete abandonment of the concept (see Pakulski & Waters, 
1996; Clark & Lipset, 1991) seemed excessive given several, primarily 
Bourdieusian-inspired, English studies of the persistence of economic 
discourses and interaction relating to social ranking and visible inequality 
(Atkinson, 2011; Savage, 2010; Bottero, 2009). Such, predominantly qualitative 
research, suggests that linkages between the abstract forces of class location and 
personal sociocultural identifications have not been severed; they have become 
attenuated and, often subtly, realigned. This becomes particularly evident when 
examining the fluid uses of class labels; the tendency for people to ‘disidentify’ 
with class associations (Bottero, 2005; 2009); or their penchant for placing 
themselves within vague middle range strata (Evans and Kelley, 2004).5. With 
these trends being further complicated by the way class was seen as intersecting 
with gender, age and ethnic divisions (see Anthias, 2013; Devine, 2004); as a 
result, as Bottero emphasises, in Britain:  
Class’ in the 21st century presents us with a very complex picture of 
the continuity of inequality in the face of widespread social change. 
But this story – of relative degrees of inequality, uneven chances of 
success, and different rates of movement – is a very hard story to sell 
(Bottero, 2009:12, original emphases). 
                                                            
5 This research, using recent cross-national ISSP survey data, found a high level of 
convergence across ‘Anglo-Celtic’ countries, including England and New Zealand.  
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An interesting comparative counterpoint is illustrated by a marked upsurge in 
social inequality in New Zealand since the 1970s, which has raised questions 
about the resilience of historical egalitarian traditions. For example, in 
Rashbrooke’s (2013) recent book on inequality the gaps between rich and poor 
are seen as reaching ‘crisis point’. But whether these more visible distinctions 
should be viewed in class terms remains contentious. Widening disparities in 
income, employment, housing and health, for example, tend to be discussed in 
socioeconomic status terms or ‘class’ is used as an ill-defined descriptor (see 
Ibid; and Ministry of Social Development, 2010), even though the same data 
continue to bolster the claims of, mainly Marxist, class adherents (Hayes, 2005; 
Roper, 2005; Ongley, 2011). An increase in popular media commentaries using 
‘class’ language is also noticeable (Caldwell & Brown, 2007; Black, 2005). Yet 
the degree to which this marks a substantive change in the actions and 
perceptions of New Zealanders in general is uncertain. Questions are left 
begging because of a lack of recent historical and sociological research on local 
class imagery and relations (McAloon, 2004) and a conspicuous absence of 
comparative research on Britain and Australasia. So, for example, any 
relationship between an arguable perceived decline in England’s historical 
‘classed’ reputation and parallel signs of more observable flaws in New 
Zealand’s ‘classless’ character remains unexamined. Study of recent English 
migrants to New Zealand provides a useful avenue for starting to explore these 
intriguing questions since it allows us to ask, if and how, cross-societal class 
and stratification differences were, and remain, meaningful in the everyday lives 
of persons who have moved between the two countries. Not only by analysing 
the accounts of the comparative experiences of such persons since their arrival 
in New Zealand over the last few decades, but also, in many cases, recording 
their observations from visits back to England over this period. Before doing so, 
let us turn to a description of the research design of the study from which my 
findings are drawn.   
The research study 
The research reported here forms part of a larger project examining the 
experiences of English migrants who arrived in New Zealand before and after 
the 1980s. The study was designed to produce two cohorts who would reflect 
the potential effects of the major alterations in immigration legislation 
introduced in 1986 (Farmer, 1996). These changes, echoing those introduced 
earlier in Canada and Australia, abolished longstanding national origin policies 
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favouring ‘European’ migrants and replaced them with criteria more in keeping 
with the market-led neo-liberal economic policies and labour market 
imperatives that were vigorously adopted by the New Zealand state in 1984 
(Roper, 2005). Consequently, at least formally, British migrants no longer 
received preferential treatment and had to compete with well qualified 
applicants from other sources.6 This major change in the make-up of historical 
immigration flows from England was fully illustrated in the ‘samples’ of 
research subjects. Thus, many migrants in the earlier cohort of arrivals were 
apocryphal ‘ten pound poms’,7 comprising mainly skilled workers who came to 
New Zealand through British state-assisted passage programmes in place until 
1974 (see Hutchings, 1999). In contrast, the post-1980s English migrants, with 
the exception of those still being assisted by the private companies or state 
employers who recruited them, were predominantly qualified, professional 
persons who, like most family reunion retirees, paid their own way to New 
Zealand (Masgoret et al., 2009).8  
          Interviewees were selected through a variety of occupational and 
recreational sites, including workplaces, pubs, soccer clubs and voluntary 
associations, including Morris Dancers, and then ‘snowballing’ from these 
initial contact points.  Eighty six interviews of approximately 1 to 2 hours were 
completed between 2009 and 2011 with migrants who were at least 18 years of 
age on arrival. The ages of interviewees ranged from 22 to 93 years, the 
majority being in their 30s to 60s, with an almost equal gender balance: 42 
males and 44 females. Two thirds of the interviews were conducted by the 
author and the remainder by a very experienced research assistant (Charles 
Sedgwick), both of whom are British migrants. They were mainly conducted in 
the homes of research subjects and interview recordings were professionally 
transcribed. Interviewees were currently residing in the Wellington (43) and 
Auckland (28) regions in the North Island, the remainder being drawn from 
                                                            
6 The language, education and skills requirements in recent immigration legislation still gave 
British migrants an advantage over many other nationalities, but there is clear evidence of a 
diversification of immigration flows over the past few decades, see Spoonley and Bedford 
(2012). 
7 For comparable Australian studies, see Hammerton and Thompson (2006). 
8 Many studies generally refer to British or United Kingdom migrants (including Hutchings 
1999; and Masgoret et al., 2009), so to what degree their findings relate particularly to 
English persons hidden within these labels is problematic. Neither of these studies, moreover, 
analysed migrant class perceptions.  
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smaller towns in the north of the South Island (15); although many had been 
geographically mobile within New Zealand. They were asked a range of 
questions about their experiences in, and comparative sentiments about, 
England and New Zealand, before and after arrival; and, for the majority, after 
revisits to Britain. In all bar five cases, both parents were English, with the 
exceptions having one parent of Scottish, Irish, or ‘Asian’ background 
respectively. Only three migrants described themselves as ‘non-white’. 
Interviews followed a topic guide and were as conversational as possible.9 
Interviewees were not asked questions about class directly since it was not 
assumed a priori that interviewees would necessarily express class sentiments. 
But, in fact, the word was frequently used by subjects when questions were 
asked about any perceived differences between their countries of origin and 
settlement; including what changes they may have discerned since arriving in 
New Zealand and, in many cases, on return journeys to England. As one can see 
from the illustrative quotes below, the majority of migrants, unprompted, 
readily described their impressions of New Zealand in comparative class terms, 
although this was most evident among those who arrived prior to the 1980s. 
 
Pre 1980s migrant class comparisons 
Frank, a retired teacher in his 70s, who first arrived in New Zealand in 1972, 
was atypical in having a clearly articulated definition of class when asked to 
compare his experiences in England and his current place of settlement. The 
bookshelves in the room where he was interviewed contained lots of political 
and social historical studies, including E. P. Thompson’s seminal work on the 
English working class, and he confirmed his views on class grew out of his 
interest in political economic questions and wide reading, plus his own East End 
of London childhood. Nodding at his books, he remarked, pithily:  
Yeah, well, class is an attitude and a way of life. People with money 
have a way of life but they don’t necessarily have the attitude. 
Few migrants explicitly drew on academic theoretical ideas about class to 
underline their own constructions of what this concept might mean to them. But, 
Frank’s thoughts, when asked to expand on the above comment, were very 
much in keeping with many of the sentiments of other English migrants who 
arrived in this time period – most of whom had similar class upbringings, if 
different regional origins and current occupations. Frank observed:   
                                                            
9 The interviews were primarily seen as ‘situated conversations’ in Condor’s (2012) terms. 
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I think there is far more upward mobility [in New Zealand] than in the 
UK. Where you call the boss Fred and where you call the boss sir, 
there is a whole different sort of perception. Britain still seems to 
have a thing about knowing your place and accepting your position in 
life… I suppose if you live in a crowded society you’ve got to have 
rules like that…New Zealanders don’t have to, I mean some of them 
do, but they don’t have to… 
Some of his feelings were shared by Joan, a secretary in her sixties from 
Lancashire, who arrived in New Zealand a couple of years after Frank. She too 
mentioned money and mobility, but Joan also stressed the importance of her 
accent and northern working class roots: 
Here I think class is based on money, but it’s probably true that here 
it’s fairly easy to move. You don’t have the whole thing about accent. 
Now there are accents. I mean, everyone has an accent. But, you 
know, if I go to, you know, immediately I talk to someone from the 
Home Counties in England, they know I come from a different 
background, because of the way that I speak. Whereas here it doesn’t 
matter, you see. 
Although, as she noted later in our conversation, echoing the views of virtually 
all the migrants interviewed, her accent did matter in marking her out as English 
in New Zealand, since the moment she opened her mouth her migrant origins 
were openly displayed (see Pearson & Sedgwick, 2010).10 Yet, from her 
perspective, the way she spoke had a different resonance in her birthplace than 
New Zealand. There she was ‘a working class Northerner’, here she was a 
‘Pom’ or ‘Brit’, and class only ever came into the conversational equation if it 
was connected to some news issue or TV programme – like an English trade 
unionist’s utterances or the latest scandal on ‘Coro Street’ or ‘Eastenders’. The 
language of class was also used, more directly, to draw contrasts between 
English and New Zealand social mores by Tim, an electrician now in his sixties, 
who came out from Cornwall in 1977. For him: 
I pretty much felt it (New Zealand) was classless. When I went back 
in ‘84 and I worked in a company doing similar work to what I had 
here I noticed it. I mean over here you’d go on a shop floor or an 
office, you talked to anybody and you called them by their first name 
probably. And there were no barriers. Over there it was very much 
you could only talk to somebody at your level…I hadn’t noticed so 
                                                            
10 Accent has often been noted as one of the key markers of national difference between the 
‘English’ and others in, for example, Australia, Scotland and Wales: see Hammerton & 
Thompson (2006); Bond et al (2010); and Day et al (2010), respectively.  
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much when I lived there earlier. I suppose I just thought it was 
natural. 
The above quotes are illustrative glimpses of the widespread tendency for 
migrants who arrived prior to the 1980s to observe contrasting class differences 
between England and New Zealand. This was particularly evident to them in the 
early years of settling into their new surroundings, although the degree of 
difference varied according to their own class and regional backgrounds. Those 
from self-perceived close-knit working class communities in England being 
particularly struck on arrival by a variety of subtle and less subtle indications 
that New Zealand was, in some ways, socially as well as geographically distant 
from their homeland. As Fred, a carpenter from Yorkshire in his sixties, 
recounted: 
I immediately couldn’t get over how casual everyone was. They 
hardly bothered to check my bags in Auckland and everyone called 
me mate. I remember going to speak to a bank manager about my 
finances soon after and this bloke was wearing shorts and was on first 
names within minutes. I was quite taken aback really, it wasn’t what I 
was used to at home…mind you he did have a tie on… 
The marked informality of dress and use of Christian or nicknames by both the 
“educated classes” and “ordinary folk” in New Zealand, as Fred described them, 
were frequently remarked on by migrants, especially in terms of situations 
where they usually expected more formality – at work, in church, dealing with 
“professional” people, and when politicians and other public figures were 
named in everyday conversation and in the media. This apparent lack of status 
barriers was cemented by the common experiences of the social intermixing of 
different occupational groups in a variety of residential and social settings. 
Some “pluty’’ and “poorer” housing areas were visible, as several migrants 
noted, but there was a general sense of less obvious perceived contrasts between 
strata than were noticeable in a more classed England where norms of social 
and residential distance were far more strictly adhered to. As Don, a fitter in his 
sixties, who arrived in 1976, remarked: 
Oh yes. That was something I couldn’t get over when I first came to 
New Zealand. The girlfriend got a job in a law firm and we got 
invited to after hour functions. We were mixing with QCs. You’d 
never do that in England, wouldn’t be allowed. There they’ve got 
clear ideas about why we are going to invite these people, we’re up 
here and they are beneath us. There must be a class system (in New 
Zealand) as you’ve still got the haves and have nots, but it’s not as 
obvious here as it is in England. Mind you it took some getting used 
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to, I wasn’t really comfortable in these kinds of situations for some 
time. 
Paradoxically, as the above comment illustrates, ‘softer’ hierarchical lines in 
New Zealand, posed challenges for many migrants about coming to terms with 
new expectations and what to think and do in everyday places. A lack of firm 
boundaries could, at one and the same time, be liberating and disconcerting. 
Positive levels of acceptance or disinterest in national or class origins often 
meant a sense of independence from the stratified controls of being ‘put in your 
place’ in England. Yet this freedom often belied the hazards or fears of how 
different English accents, subtle conventions, and cultural differences could be 
misinterpreted. As several subjects commented, and this was not confined to 
pre-1980s arrivals or age and gender differences, some New Zealanders were 
seen as very sensitive to any implied criticism of ‘their country’ or openly 
negative about, what was seen, stereotypically, as ‘English whinging’ and/or 
being ‘stuck up’, depending on which lower or high status bracket was assigned 
to you. Frequent allusions to how ‘Poms’ or ‘Brits’ were portrayed on TV, 
especially in class and regional terms, were also frequently raised by 
interviewees as a source of irritation and/or amusement insofar as the media 
images of England were often used (by New Zealanders) as yardsticks for 
categorising themselves as well as English migrants in general. As Colin, a 
factory manager in his 50s, from the Midlands, who arrived in 1997, noted: 
I suppose it’s mainly at the level of joshing and to be expected, but 
you get kind of tired of being taken as if you’ve just come straight out 
of Coronation Street or Eastenders or some other bloody soap or 
whatever… the laugh is all the locals watch these programmes but I 
never do…    
Nonetheless, the very same programmes were often used by other, often older 
working class migrants, to illustrate a nostalgic and possibly romanticised loss 
of a feeling of class community in England that suburban New Zealand could 
not provide. Memories of nearby pubs, the corner shop, neighbourliness, and 
the work camaraderie of mates and kin depicted in these programmes, were 
readily drawn upon to maintain and revive reminiscences of the solidarities and 
benefits of shared class backgrounds. Such recollections were rarely evoked by 
younger migrants who arrived since the 1980s, although they occasionally 
attributed them to their parents; but, they too, unprompted, often noticed 
comparative class differences.      
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Post 1980s migrants 
Mary, in her 30s, who arrived from East Anglia in 2006, and employed as a 
graphics designer, remarked: 
I don’t know...I don’t get the sense of people trying to think of me 
here in those terms. My sense is if I was in Britain, they might 
position me as middle class. I suppose the… the kind of things I talk 
about, the kind of job I have, the paper I read, they’re all markers. 
You see here most people read the same local paper, so it wouldn’t 
mark you. In Britain if you read the Guardian you are probably 
bleeding heart liberal…those values have never been quite that 
important to me, although they still are to my parents, who are solid 
working class and always take the Mirror (laugh)…and there is still a 
lot of them in me despite the kind of work I do now. 
In a similar vein, Jonathan, a surveyor from Lancashire who arrived in 2004, 
also in his 30s, mused: 
I suppose it’s a bit hard here to really categorise yourself. I don’t 
know if that should be based on money or upbringing or what. I was 
probably working to maybe middle, at home, but here I don’t know… 
I just feel like you are aware that there are people with a bit more 
money here and some less. But it’s definitely less noticeable, so I 
don’t think I feel as if I am in a class here really, no… 
Nicholas, a market researcher who had lived in Auckland since arriving from 
London in 2007, expressed comparable sentiments about his lack of class 
awareness, although with some ambivalence: 
We probably… look we live in quite a nice area and we own our own 
house and we both have professional jobs. However, I don’t think that 
makes us middle class here because I think your class is defined by 
the circles you mix in…and you know we’re going for swimming 
lessons later with friends, and she’s a secretary and he’s a warehouse 
manager. I think our friends are so varied that we, you know, we tend 
not… we don’t restrict ourselves to people who are like us. And I 
think that is one of the nice things about New Zealand that there is 
none of the pretension that, you know, you get in the UK, which is 
limiting…so, I think, no, I don’t think personally we’re middle class, 
although some might say we are because of where we live.   
While, Ben, another Londoner, again in his thirties, and employed as a 
community college lecturer, touched on another aspect of difference that many 
subjects mentioned:  
There is an equivalent of class here, but dare I say fixed upon racial 
lines…which I was used to back home of course. I wouldn’t say it 
[New Zealand] was completely classless, there is a bit of 
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snobbishness with the, you know, clear differences between someone 
from South Auckland and those on the North Shore. There are 
different social groups, but it’s more based around race than old 
school class that I’m used to in the UK. It isn’t something I think 
about day to day. It doesn’t really affect me... 
The above sentiments were mainly expressed by younger (in their 30s and 40s) 
more recently arrived migrants who, as noted earlier, were usually better 
qualified than previous generations of migrants. Most had degrees and/or 
professional qualifications instead of the apprenticeships and technical 
certificates obtained by their predecessors. Several of these post-1980s migrants 
had working class parents and often made comments about remembering an 
upbringing whose lifestyles gelled with the class sentiments of earlier arrived 
migrants of the same generation. Some of them saw these early years as 
instilling certain social and political values that remained important to them, so 
they occasionally espoused working class identifications, despite a self-
acknowledgement that their current standard of living and occupations might 
indicate a higher stratum. But more commonly, as the above post 1980s 
accounts convey, most migrants in this cohort saw themselves as middle class, 
or expressed little interest in class position or differences. For these migrants, 
New Zealand was generally still seen as less classless than England, but there 
was little sense of drawing strong contrasts between the two countries, despite 
acknowledging worsening economic conditions in both settings. And very few 
saw their migration as a major factor in promoting career mobility or improving 
their standards of living. Far more evident, and in keeping with other research 
on recent migrants to New Zealand, British and otherwise (Masgoret et al., 
2009), lifestyle factors were seen as outweighing employment opportunities and 
economic conditions as key reasons for moving to NZ, and possibly staying.  
Such sentiments were even more evident among recent arrivals in their 20s 
or early 30s who rarely used the ‘class’ word spontaneously nor gave it any 
prominence as a self-identification or meaningful aspect of their lives to date, 
when prompted to do so. Much like their sentiments when asked about their 
national orientations (see Pearson & Sedgwick, 2011), and echoing English 
research findings on this age group (see Fenton, 2007), a common reply was – 
‘I’m just me’ or ‘I don’t have much interest in that sort of thing’. For example, 
when asked if she thought there were any class differences between England 
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and New Zealand, Sharon, a web developer from Buckinghamshire, in her 20s, 
who arrived in 2007, replied, hesitantly: 
I dunno… I’m not sure…the people I mixed with in London didn’t 
really care about it…I don’t think it’s all that relevant to me here, is 
it…   
 
Changes in class and inequality  
Not surprisingly, many younger recent migrants also had far less to say when 
asked whether they thought the country had changed since their arrival just a 
few years ago – ‘I’ve not really lived here long enough to say much about that’ 
– was a common response. But older, long settled subjects, with thirty or forty 
years New Zealand residence to reflect on, consistently remarked on differences 
experienced in recent decades, with varying thoughts on class and inequality. 
Maude, from Cheshire, in her 70s and retired from her job as a secretary, 
commented: 
I think if anything I have noticed the gap between the haves and have 
nots has widened. Before it was kind of flat if you like when we 
came, so you might say that everybody was on an even keel and 
nobody was really outstanding and nobody was, you know, really 
down here – and now it is different. So whether that is a bad thing or 
not, I don’t know… 
Ray, in his 60s, from the Midlands, and still employed as a public servant, was 
similarly philosophical: 
The lack of class was relatively obvious to me when I first came here. 
I would say it is gradually changing and I suppose that’s how 
societies develop or mature, I don’t know what the right word is. So I 
would say it is less egalitarian now than when I first came here…and 
I am part of it, because I was very reluctant when it was suggested my 
daughter go to a private school. I don’t like private schools, but that’s 
me, that’s my history where I’ve come from and who I was and where 
I was…but I want the best for my daughter… I bit my tongue and it 
was good for her. 
In contrast, Eric, a carpenter from Yorkshire, in his 60s, was typical of those 
migrants who were far less sanguine and more forthright about perceived 
changes in both countries. He recalled his initial experiences in Wellington and 
the pleasing contrast between old and new locales and the opportunities for self-
employment that had opened up for him since migrating. But he was fearful that 
his adopted country was showing signs of following the same downward path 
that he observed in the one he had been born and brought up in: 
New Zealand Sociology Volume 28 Issue 3 2013 
 
94 
I’ve been back several times in the past couple of decades and I just 
couldn’t believe how far my neighbourhood had gone backwards. It’s 
been overrun by all kinds of people and everyone I knew is just 
waiting to die or retire and guarding their own patch. The tragedy is I 
can see this place going the same way in lots of ways. The amount of 
money you see people spraying around in Wellington now and lots of 
them keep to themselves…not like the old days, and you see people 
begging on the streets, which was unheard of when we first came 
here… I still love the place but it seems to have lost the, how do you 
say…a lot of …the things that I like here …. 
Discussion and conclusion 
Eric’s comments above are not only illustrative of the sentiments of many 
persons from similar class backgrounds who arrived in New Zealand, mainly 
prior to the 1980s, but they also appear reminiscent of the opinions voiced by 
some of his class and generation contemporaries remaining in England (see, for 
example, Bottero, 2009; Fenton, 2008; Ware, 2008). These parallels underscore 
the importance of on-going links between working class communities in 
England with kin and friends overseas, including in New Zealand. The effects 
of recent immigration trends on the majority’s perceptions of changes to ‘their 
nation’, especially the white working class, are well documented (see Modood 
& Salt, 2011), but there is a less prominent, but growing interest in the effects of 
English emigration on discursive narratives of change, inequality and decline 
among different strata in Britain and British migrants abroad (McGlynn et al., 
2011). Recent calls, for example, from Rogaly and Taylor (2009) for greater 
awareness of what they describe as the ‘moving histories’ of the white working 
class in and beyond England, and Mann’s (2012) plea for more comparative 
attention to the English/British diaspora in less ranked societies overseas are 
illustrative of this so far ill-developed comparative literature. As Rogaly & 
Taylor’s (2009: chap. 5) ethnography shows, transnational emigration plays a 
crucial role in shaping how constituent and holistic senses of 
‘Britishness/Englishness’ are made and remade at home and abroad; as 
awareness of national difference becomes more visible among those who move 
outside their borders (Pearson, 2013) and this is communicated back to their kin 
and friends who remain in situ. Mann (2012) and Fenton’s (2012) research 
findings, both individually and jointly (see, for example, Fenton & Mann, 
2011), also offer insights that merit close attention for New Zealand-based 
Pearson 
 
95 
researchers.11 Fenton, for example, describing a ‘culture of decline’ observable, 
to varying degrees, in the accounts of the ‘white majority’ persons interviewed 
(Fenton, 2012:479), distinguishes between two distinct types of national 
orientation that reflect the contrasting views of many working and middle class 
research subjects in his study. The former, displaying what he calls ‘resentful’ 
sentiments, voiced their concerns about what they perceive as the waning 
fortunes of persons living in declining neighbourhoods and regions in England. 
Their experiences of being ‘stuck’, ‘left out’ and feeling impotent in the face of 
fateful adversity, contrast with the more ‘liberal or moderate’ responses of 
professional, middle class persons, who see themselves as challenged by events 
and ‘others’ (including the resentful), but still retain some control over more 
chosen life pathways.  
To a degree, these attitudes are observable in the above accounts of 
English migrants in New Zealand reflecting on their impressions of England, 
particularly on recent return visits to their origins. But, in many cases, moving 
to New Zealand had altered their perspectives on individual and collective life 
and class trajectories in varying ways, at least partly dependent on their class 
backgrounds prior to and after migration. This equates with forms of perceived 
achieved social mobility and enhanced life style (status) that often deflects the 
insecurity or resentment that might have been experienced had working class 
migrants remained in their country of origin. Conversely, these processes 
cement an already accomplished material and sociocultural middle class 
position that might have been endangered by staying in England. But this is to 
ignore many subjects’ accounts of the difficulties of acquiring standards and 
styles of living that were not necessarily easily achieved, the common negative 
experiences of migrant isolation from family and friends in Britain and other 
places, and ambivalence about perceived widening inequalities in New Zealand; 
all of which tempered potentially rose coloured views of their past and present 
situations. One should also be alert to the dangers of over-stressing the 
differences between our cohorts of earlier and later arriving English migrants to 
New Zealand, despite a general trend of them illustrating different class 
backgrounds. Three themes can be re-emphasised here, which sound a 
cautionary note about the need for sensitivity to the complex interdependence of 
the changing lived experiences of persons in at least two countries and their 
                                                            
11 There was collaboration between this study and Fenton and Mann’s research in England, 
including the use of some identical items relating to perceptions of class divisions.   
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varying degrees of awareness of the theoretical and constructed processes, class, 
status and otherwise, alluded to above, which impact on their sentiments about 
social and geographical places – ranked and unranked.  
Firstly, being and remaining working class was a meaningful concept to 
most English migrants who arrived in New Zealand prior to the 1980s (then 
aged in their 20s and 30s), and several older migrants who entered since 1990 
with similar backgrounds. This generation, now in their 60s and 70s, readily 
responded to indirect questions about ‘getting on’ and ‘comparing countries’ in 
these terms. In short, notions of class, or its perceived absence, were freely 
drawn upon as a ‘tool for making sense of one’s ‘place’ vis-à-vis 
others’(Atkinson: 2011:185), with the locus of comparison becoming 
transnational. Thus, for pre ‘80s migrants, sentiments of difference had explicit 
geographical and temporal dimensions within and across their societies of origin 
and destination. Usage of class not only located oneself within England, as 
belonging to part of a city, town or region distinct from elsewhere, for example, 
as a Geordie or Cockney across a marked northern/southern divide, but also 
continued to provide a means of drawing comparisons with New Zealand and 
the area currently resided within.  
These assessments of changing localities were closely linked to life and 
status trajectories, often with contradictory and ambivalent overtones. For 
example, an achieved better standard of living since migration – “New Zealand 
has been good to me” - was frequently contrasted with a perceived erosion of 
the local ‘classlessness’ they once clearly associated with their own success; for 
most, still within working class parameters. Yet visible local signs of widening 
inequalities were often still offset by views of changing circumstances in 
England/Britain. With these images becoming far more immediate to them from 
now affordable, more frequent return trips ‘home’, and various forms of 
increasingly accessible English media coverage. Many of these sentiments were 
echoed by older, more recent post-1980s migrants, particularly those who came 
to New Zealand under family reunion immigration provisions as retirees. 
Understandably, however, they lacked the historical depth of memories of 
nostalgia and loss of ‘earlier times’ in the Antipodes that previous generations 
of migrant had experienced. They therefore did not share any sense of a recent 
culture of decline in New Zealand that many earlier arrivals saw matching some 
aspects of parallel changes in England. This complex mix of class and status 
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sentiments defies neat linkages between ages, times of arrival and varied senses 
of place across our cohorts, in shaping types of class and national orientations.  
A second theme relates to the class orientations voiced by many younger 
(40s to 50s) post ‘80s migrants, whose accounts had some points of similarity 
with the perceptions of their longer resident, older counterparts described above. 
They too, frequently observed class differences between England and New 
Zealand and several noted the contrasts between their own class circumstances 
and those of their working class parents. But many of these migrants saw 
themselves as middle class, in keeping with their current educational and 
employment statuses, and/or their relatively advantaged past circumstances in 
England. As noted earlier, these migrants had either commonly experienced 
intergenerational class mobility prior to their arrival, or they and their parents 
already came from higher strata. Consequently, they exhibited different sets of 
class memories and senses of accomplishment to their migrant predecessors, 
even if the latter saw themselves achieving material betterment in New Zealand.  
A third, and equally striking theme, was sentiments of class indifference or 
rejection among the youngest post-80s migrants. Few recent arrivals in their 20s 
or early 30s used the ‘class’ word spontaneously, and rarely gave it any 
prominence as a self-identification or meaningful aspect of their lives to date; 
even when prompted to do so. Which suggests that feelings of class 
disidentification in England (Bottero, 2009) noted earlier, are echoed among 
this latest and youngest generation of movers, who no longer see their migration 
as a shift from ‘home to home’, nor an escape from traditional class divisions 
like their predecessors; although there is an observable continuity in a common 
pursuit of enhanced life style and sense of adventure that mirrors the 
motivations of earlier English arrivals (see Pearson, 2012). Thus, there is still 
some similarity in viewing one’s migration as circumventing forms of constraint 
that stimulated histories of movement across lives and places for their 
predecessors, but status rather than class divisions are clearly discursively 
predominant.  
The research findings reported and discussed above contribute to wider 
debates about the relationship between class and national sentiments in England 
and a British World that is fast receding, if not completely gone, as well as 
beginning to fill specific research gaps relating to English migrant persons in 
New Zealand. Their experiences of social mobility, or its absence, across still 
linked places, and the various ways this affects diverse class and national 
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sentiments, widen our understanding of how major recent changes, in and 
between both countries, are seen by ‘ordinary people’ in their everyday lives. 
But there are still major omissions in our knowledge about, if and how, recent 
transformations in inequality have affected the day to day perceptions and 
relations of people in New Zealand in general. Several key issues therefore 
remain unexamined or require further exploration. Firstly, building on the 
tentative conclusions of this study, is there any wider sense of a local ‘culture of 
decline’ observable in New Zealand that partly resembles its British 
counterpart; bearing in mind each society has its own distinctive socio-historical 
trajectories? Secondly, if so, in what ways, if any, has this ‘culture’ 
demonstrably strengthened or newly cultivated perceptions of social distance 
and hierarchical relations among immigrants (English/British or otherwise) and 
local born persons? Finally, these wide-ranging queries, relate back to a specific 
central theme of this article: namely, whether class distinctions have become a 
more salient mode of social expression and means of organising private and 
public lives in societies like New Zealand? Whatever the answers, sociologists 
ought to be fully engaged in researching and debating these questions. 
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Pathways to economic outcomes at age 30: Income and living 
standards in a New Zealand birth cohort 
 
Joseph M. Boden; David M. Fergusson and L John Horwood 
 
Abstract 
The present study examined linkages between income and living 
standards in adulthood and a series of childhood and adult factors and 
family circumstances using data from the Christchurch Health and 
Development Study, a longitudinal cohort studied from birth to age 
30.  Results showed that while the cohort was relatively advantaged, 
there was still considerable economic inequality at age 30.  Analyses 
suggested that factors influencing income at age 30 included 
household characteristics related to earning power, educational 
achievement/cognitive ability, and childhood living standards, while 
living standards were influenced by income, earning power, mental 
health and substance use, and childhood living standards. 
 
Introduction 
In recent decades there has been increasing interest and concern regarding 
inequality in economic outcomes.  A range of research has examined the issue 
of economic inequality, with a growing consensus that economic inequality (the 
“rich-poor divide”) in Western industrialised economies has been increasing for 
the past 30 years or so (DeBacker, Heim, Panousi & Vidangos, 2012; OECD, 
2011a; Wang & Caminada, 2011).  This concern is reflected in New Zealand, 
with commentary from a variety of quarters suggesting that increasing levels of 
economic inequality may pose significant difficulties for the prosperity and 
wellbeing of New Zealanders (Barber, 2011; Ministry of Social Development, 
2013; Rashbrooke, 2013). 
 While numerous studies have examined the factors leading to economic 
inequality in macroeconomic terms (Bertola, Foellmi & Zweimüller, 2005; 
Jäntti & Jenkins, 2010; Lim & McNelis, 2012; Yamada, 2012), relatively few 
studies have examined the social, individual and personal factors that contribute 
to differences in economic outcomes at the individual or household level .  It 
could be argued that there are a range of household, family and individual 
factors across the life span from childhood to adulthood that play a key role in 
influencing economic outcomes in adulthood (OECD, 2011c).  Furthermore, it 
could also be argued that, because economic conditions vary even amongst 
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industrialised Western countries, local data concerning the linkages between 
predictors and economic outcomes is of critical importance (OECD, 2013).  The 
purpose of the present investigation is to use data from a New Zealand 
longitudinal birth cohort studied to age 30 to examine the role of family 
background and individual factors, education/cognitive ability, mental health 
and substance use, and family/household characteristics in predicting economic 
outcomes – net disposable income and living standards – in early adulthood 
(age 30).  The study will examine patterns of associations between predictors 
and each economic outcome, and the pathways via which economic outcomes 
are influenced. 
Household and family characteristics 
Research has suggested that one important class of predictors of economic 
outcomes include demographic characteristics and household composition, 
which generally reflect the overall earning power available in a household.  One 
important predictor is the number of earners in the household (Lee, Lee & 
Chang, 2011; New Zealand Parliament, 2011; OECD, 2011b; Thomas & 
Sawhill, 2005b; White & Rogers, 2000).   For example, the US Census bureau 
estimated that, amongst those household in the top 5% of income distribution, 
75% of households had two or more earners, whereas only 5% of households in 
the bottom 20% of income distribution had at least two earners (Lee, et al., 
2011; U.S. Census Bureau, 2006).   
          Another key characteristic is the presence of dependent children.  Several 
studies suggest that having children reduces the earning power of a household, 
generally by reducing the number of hours one parent (usually the mother) is 
able or willing to devote to paid employment (Gibb, Fergusson, Horwood & 
Boden, 2013b; Joshi, Paci & Waldfogel, 1999; Thomas & Sawhill, 2005b; 
Waldfogel, 1998). A study by Evers and Sieverding (2013) using data from a 
highly-educated German sample found that career interruptions were related to 
lower salary levels, and in turn the number of dependent children was positively 
related to career interruptions for women in the sample.   
          An additional factor related to the presence of dependent children is early 
parenthood.  A number of studies have shown that earlier parenthood is 
associated with lower levels of educational attainment and lower wages as 
compared to those individuals who did not become parents at an early age 
(Boden, Fergusson & Horwood, 2008; Swann, Bowe, McCormick & Kosmin, 
2003; Teti & Lamb, 1989; Thomas & Sawhill, 2005a).   
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          Similarly, single parenthood has also been identified as an important 
indicator of economic outcomes (Amato, 2005; Cherlin, 2005; Thomas & 
Sawhill, 2005a).  For example, a recent report on social conditions in New 
Zealand (Statistics New Zealand, 2012b) found that single-parent families were 
more likely to be in the higher categories of risk, with economic hardship being 
one of the primary risk indicators.  
          Finally, from the perspective of a New Zealand-based study, international 
comparisons suggest an international wealth disparity, in that that overall levels 
of income and wealth are lower in New Zealand than in other English-language 
nations such as Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, or the United States 
(OECD, 2011d).  Given that a substantial minority of New Zealanders spend at 
least part of their lives living and working in these nations (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2012a), it may be particularly important to estimate the magnitude of 
the effect of overseas residence on economic outcomes. 
 
Educational achievement 
A second key predictor is educational achievement, which is thought to reflect 
an important effect of human capital on economic outcomes (Hanushek, in 
press).  A wide range of research has established linkages between educational 
achievement/cognitive skills development and improved economic outcomes 
both at the national level and the individual level (Campbell, Haveman, 
Sandefur & Wolfe, 2005; Greenstone, Looney & Shevlin, 2011; Hanushek & 
Woessmann, 2008; Khatiwada, McLaughlin, Sum & Palma, 2007; OECD, 
2010).  For example, Khatiwada et al. , using data from economic surveys in the 
United States, suggested that rates of employment in the year 2005 for 
individuals without secondary school qualifications was approximately 45%, as 
compared with 30% for individuals with only secondary school qualifications, 
and 16% for those with postgraduate qualifications.  Furthermore, they reported 
that average earnings for individuals with secondary school qualifications only 
were USD$23,300 as compared with USD$50, 700 for those with a university 
degree. 
 
Mental health 
Another factor that may contribute to economic outcomes is the extent to which 
the mental health and wellbeing of individuals contributes to their ability to 
participate fully in gainful employment.  A number of findings have emerged 
from the mental health literature demonstrating that common mental disorders 
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such as depression, anxiety disorder and suicidal behaviour can severely impair 
an individual’s functioning, reducing their productivity and effectiveness at 
work, and making it difficult for individuals who are out of work to find 
employment (Barrera & Norton, 2009; Dewa, Goering, Lin & Paterson, 2002; 
Gilmour & Patten, 2007; Henning, Turk, Mennin, Fresco & Heimberg, 2007; 
Lam, Michalak, & Yatham, 2009; Lim, Jacobs, Ohinmaa, Schopflocher & 
Dewa, 2008; Norberg, Diefenbach & Tolin, 2008; Sobocki, Jonsson, Angst & 
Rehnberg, 2006; Stewart, Ricci, Chee, Hahn & Morganstein, 2003).  For 
example, Dewa et al (Dewa, et al., 2002), using national employment and 
disability data from Canada, found that 25% of short-term disability claims 
were related to mental disorders, with the majority of these being related to 
work.  Furthermore, individuals in the youngest age group (< 26 years) were 
significantly less likely to return to work after a disability claim due to mental 
health problems.  A less common mental disorder, anti-social personality 
disorder, has also been implicated in reducing the individual’s fitness for work, 
as individuals with the disorder may be generally less reliable as employees, 
and may be prone to violence both in the workplace and out (Lang & Hellweg, 
2006; Sansone & Sansone, 2010).   
 
Substance use 
Similarly to mental health, substance use disorders may play a critical role in 
influencing an individual’s ability to obtain and maintain gainful employment.  
Alcohol use disorders have been linked to decreased task and job performance, 
absenteeism, legal problems that reduce employment opportunities, and 
unemployment (Bauld et al., 2013; Booth & Feng, 2002; Bray, Zarkin, Dennis 
& French, 2000; Claussen, 1999; Rehm & Gmel, 1999; Upmark, Lundberg, 
Sadigh, Allebeck & Bigert, 1999).    Cannabis use disorders have also been 
shown to be related to increased risk of unemployment and financial instability 
(Brook, Lee, Finch, Seltzer & Brook, 2013; Fergusson & Boden, 2008; Teesson 
et al., 2012).  Other illicit drug use disorders have also been shown to play a 
role in decreasing reliability and increasing the risk of unemployment, or 
termination of employment in cases where individuals are subject to drug 
testing at work (Alexandre & French, 2004; Desimone, 2002; French, Roebuck 
& Alexandre, 2001; Richardson, Wood, Li, & Kerr, 2010).  In addition, the use 
of cannabis and other illicit drugs may result in arrest and conviction, reducing 
the individual’s ability to obtain and maintain gainful employment (Pedersen, 
2011). 
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Individual background and family of origin factors 
It is also clear that individual factors such as gender and minority ethnicity, and 
family background factors in childhood play a role in determining adult 
economic outcomes.  There is abundant research showing that, despite some 
convergence in recent years, females currently have lower levels of earning 
power as compared to males, even when employed in equivalent positions and 
with similar skill sets (Arulampalam, Alison & Bryan, 2007; Castilla, 2012; 
England, 2005; Manning & Swaffield, 2008; O'Neill & O'Neill, 2006; Preston, 
2003; Prokos & Padavic, 2005).  Ethnic minority status is also associated with 
less favourable employment and economic outcomes (Barth, Bratsberg & 
Raaum, 2012; Brynin & Güveli, 2012; Castilla, 2012; Hou & Coulombe, 2010; 
Pendakur & Woodcock, 2010).  While this has been observed across numerous 
countries, this has also been demonstrated consistently in data from New 
Zealand, where Māori  have significantly lower levels of income and living 
standards than non-Māori  (Chapple, 2000; Ministry of Health, 2010; Statistics 
New Zealand, 2007; Tobias, Bhattacharya & White, 2008). 
 Childhood socioeconomic status, family income and family living 
standards are also related to adult economic outcomes (Ganzach, 2011; Harding, 
Jencks, Lopoo & Mayer, 2004; Mazumder, 2005; Strenze, 2007).  A number of 
studies have examined the intergenerational nature of poverty, demonstrating 
that growing up in an impoverished household significantly increases the risk of 
adult poverty (Musick & Mare, 2004; Serbin & Karp, 2004; Wagmiller & 
Adelman, 2009; Whelan, Nolan & Maître, 2012).  Additional factors related to 
adult economic outcomes are maternal and paternal education (Dubow, Boxer 
& Huesmann, 2009; Dubow, Huesmann, Boxer, Pulkkinen & Kokko, 2006; 
Pettit, Yu, Dodge, & Bates, 2009).  Because parental education is related to the 
overall socioeconomic standing of the family of origin (Davis-Kean, 2005), it 
seems clear that this may also play a role in determining economic outcomes for 
individuals. 
 
The present investigation 
As noted above, there are a wide range of factors that influence economic 
outcomes.  Some of these are proximal and relate directly to earning power, 
including the number of earners in a household, geographic location, and 
responsibilities such as childcare that may reduce or restrict access to 
employment.  Other factors are related to human capital including education and 
skill development, with better educated and prepared individuals having greater 
access to both employment and advancement at work.  Additional factors 
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include barriers to being effective at work or in the job market, including mental 
health disorders and substance use disorders.  Finally, individual factors such as 
gender and ethnicity, and childhood family background factors may influence 
later employment opportunities.    
 One critical issue in understanding the role of these factors in determining 
economic outcomes is that many of these factors are strongly correlated.  This 
inter-correlation between predictors demonstrates the importance of using 
multivariate regression and path modelling to identify the key pathways linking 
predictors to economic outcomes.  A second important issue is the varying 
nature of economic outcomes themselves.  It is clear that while both income and 
living standards may be regarded as economic outcomes, they are not 
necessarily equivalent (Perry, 2002), and the same set of predictors may not be 
related to both outcomes.  Furthermore, it is clear that while income plays a 
strong role in contributing to relative material wellbeing as measured by  living 
standards, income is not the sole determinant of overall living standards (Perry, 
2002; Ringen, 1991).  These considerations suggest that path analysis may be a 
particularly useful tool in understanding the relationships between predictors 
and outcomes, and between the two economic outcomes. 
 Against this background, the present study examines the relationships 
between the predictors identified above and both income and living standards in 
early adulthood (age 30), using data from a study of a large New Zealand 
longitudinal birth cohort (the Christchurch Health and Development Study).  
The availability of prospectively-collected data from childhood onward, as well 
as extensive measurement of mental health, substance use, family and 
household circumstances and related outcomes in adulthood allow for the use of 
multivariate regression and path analytic techniques to identify the specific role 
of a range of predictors in determining economic outcomes.  The general aims 
of this analysis are to: 
1. Describe the distribution of economic outcomes (income; 
living standards) in the CHDS cohort at age 30; 
2. Examine the pattern of correlations between predictors and 
each economic outcome; 
3. Use multivariate regression models to examine the associations 
between predictors and each economic outcome; 
4. Employ path modelling techniques to show the linkages 
between predictors and outcomes, and between the two 
economic outcomes. 
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Methods 
Participants 
The data were gathered during the course of the Christchurch Health and 
Development Study (CHDS). In this study a birth cohort of 1265 children (635 
males, 630 females) born in the Christchurch (New Zealand) urban region in 
mid-1977 has been studied at birth, 4 months, 1 year and annually to age 16 
years, and again at ages 18, 21, 25 and 30 years (Fergusson & Horwood, 2001; 
Fergusson, Horwood, Shannon, & Lawton, 1989).  The age 30 assessment was 
conducted in the year 2007.  All study information was collected on the basis of 
signed consent from study participants and all information is fully confidential.  
All aspects of the study have been approved by the Canterbury (NZ) Ethics 
Committee.   
 The sample consisted of the 987 respondents who completed the age 30 
assessment, representing 80% of the surviving members of the original cohort 
(n = 1265).  Of these individuals, 21 were unwilling or unable to provide full 
information regarding income, reducing the effective sample size for the 
analyses involving equivalised net family income to n = 966. 
 
Measures of socioeconomic outcomes (age 30) 
Equivalised disposable (net) family income (age 30).  At the interview at age 
30, participants were asked to provide information concerning their personal 
income and the income of their relationship partner (if applicable).  The net 
(after-tax) income from all sources for both the cohort member and partner were 
summed to create a measure of total net family income at age 30.  Incomes 
reported in currencies other than New Zealand dollars were converted to New 
Zealand dollars using Purchasing Power Parities (OECD, 2007). Following this, 
incomes were truncated to a maximum of $150,000 to avoid the influence of 
outliers.  This estimate was then equivalised for household size and composition 
using the method described by Jensen (Jensen, 1988).  The mean equivalised net 
family income for the CHDS cohort at age 30 was $40,690 (sd = $24600). 
 For the purposes of the present investigation, the measure of equivalised 
net family income was used to create a dichotomous measure representing 
whether family income level was below or above the poverty line, defined as 
being 60% or less of the median equivalised net family income for New 
Zealand for the year 2007 (the year of the age 30 observations).  The median 
equivalised net family income for New Zealand for that year was $26,500 
(Perry, 2008), resulting in a poverty line demarcation of $15,900.   
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Living standards (age 30).  As part of the interview at age 30, participants 
completed the Economic Living Standards Index Short Form (Jensen, Spittal, & 
Krishnan, 2005), which measures the material aspects of well-being that are 
reflected in a person’s consumption and personal possessions. Higher scores on 
this index indicate higher economic living standards. The mean score was 24.9 
(sd = 5.2). 
 For the purposes of the present investigation, participants were 
categorised into seven levels, as indicated by the ELSI Short Form scoring 
manual, according to their total scores on the ELSI scale.  This information was 
used to create a dichotomous classification representing hardship.  Those 
participants whose households fell into one of the lowest three categories (some 
hardship; significant hardship; severe hardship) were classified as being 
exposed to at least some hardship at age 30, while those cohort members whose 
household living standards placed them in the upper four categories were 
classified as not being exposed to hardship at age 30.   
 
Predictors of economic outcomes at age 30.  A number of predictors of 
economic outcomes at age 30 were abstracted from the study database and 
considered for inclusion in the analyses.  In addition to the predictors identified 
below, a range of predictors pertaining to: adult criminal offending; and 
childhood behaviour disorders; were employed in preliminary data analyses.  
Below are described only those predictors which were featured in the analyses 
reported in the Results section of the manuscript. 
 
Family/household characteristics (at age 30) 
          Number of earners.  As part of the interview at age 30, cohort members 
were asked a series of questions about their employment and the employment of 
their partner (if applicable).  This information was used to create a three-level 
variable representing the number of persons earning via paid employment in the 
household (0 = no earners; 1 = single earner; 2 = two earners). 
 Number of dependent children.  Cohort members were questioned as to 
the nature and composition of their household at age 30, including the number 
of dependent children.  This information was used to create a count measure of 
the number of dependent children living in the household. 
 Parent prior to age 20.  Information from the CHDS database that had 
been collected at earlier assessments was used to create a dichotomous variable 
indicating whether cohort members had become parents prior to age 20. 
New Zealand Sociology Volume 28 Issue 3 2013 
 
110 
 Single parenthood.  The information concerning household composition 
was used to create a dichotomous measure indicating single parenthood at age 
30.  Cohort members who indicated living in a household with dependent 
children, but who did not have a partner, were classified as single parents. 
 Welfare dependence.  A dichotomous measure of welfare dependence at 
age 30 was created using responses to questions concerning the cohort member 
and partner’s receipt of welfare benefits at the time of assessment.  These 
benefits included unemployment benefit, domestic purposes benefit, and 
sickness/invalid benefit.   Cohort members who reported receipt of one or more 
types of welfare benefit were classified as being welfare dependent at age 30. 
 Living in New Zealand.  Cohort members were questioned at age 30 as to 
their usual country of residence.  This information was used to classify cohort 
members using a dichotomous variable indicating New Zealand residence. 
 
Educational achievement 
 Educational qualifications.  As part of assessments at ages 18, 21, 25, and 
30, cohort members were questioned as to their attainment of educational 
qualifications.  For the purposes of this investigation, this information was used 
to create a three-level variable representing educational achievement (0 = no 
qualifications; 1 = secondary school qualifications/tertiary qualifications below 
degree level; 2 = university degree). 
 
Mental health (ages 25-30) 
 Major depression/anxiety disorder.  At age 30 years participants were 
questioned regarding symptoms of major depression and a range of anxiety 
disorders (including generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder, agoraphobia, 
social phobia, and specific phobia) using CIDI (World Health Organization, 
1993) items and DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) diagnostic 
criteria. Sample members who met DSM diagnostic criteria for a major 
depressive episode or one or more anxiety disorders at any time during since the 
previous assessment at age 25 were classified using a pair of dichotomous 
measures as having major depression or anxiety disorder during that period. 
Suicidal ideation.  Suicidal behaviour since the previous assessment at 
age 25 was assessed via self-report by asking sample members whether they had 
ever thought about killing themselves or had attempted suicide during the 
period since the previous assessment.  Participants were classified using a 
dichotomous measure as having suicidal ideation during these years if they had 
reported at least one instance of thinking about killing themselves.   
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Anti-social personality disorder.  At age 30, participants were 
interviewed using custom-written survey items to assess DSM-IV  (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994) diagnostic criteria for anti-social personality 
disorder during the period since the previous assessment at age 25. For the 
purposes of the present analysis, sample members who met diagnostic criteria 
for anti-social personality disorder during the period 25-30 years were classified 
as having the disorder (1.3% of the sample). 
          Count measure of mental disorders (ages 25-30 years).  For the purposes 
of the present analyses, the four dichotomous mental health measures described 
above were used to create a count measure of the number of mental disorders 
experienced by the cohort member during the period 25-30 years. 
 
Substance use (ages 25-30) 
          Alcohol use disorder/cannabis dependence/other illicit drug use disorder.  
At the assessment at age 30, study participants were interviewed concerning 
alcohol use and the use of illicit substances (cannabis and a range of other illicit 
substances) using both custom-written survey items to assess substance use, and 
components of the Composite International Diagnostic Interview (CIDI)(World 
Health Organization, 1993) to assess DSM-IV (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994) symptom criteria for alcohol abuse/dependence (AAD), 
cannabis abuse/dependence, and other illicit substance abuse/dependence during 
each year since the previous assessment.  Those individuals who met criteria for 
AAD during any given year were classified using a dichotomous measure as 
having AAD during the period 25-30 years.  Those who met criteria for 
cannabis abuse/dependence were classified using a dichotomous measure as 
having cannabis abuse/dependence during that period.  Finally, those 
participants who met criteria for other illicit substance abuse/dependence since 
the previous assessment were classified using a dichotomous measure as having 
illicit substance abuse/dependence during that period.   
 Partner alcohol problems/illicit drug problems.  As part of the 
questioning at age 30, cohort members were asked a series of questions 
regarding the behaviour of their relationship partner.  As part of this 
questioning, cohort members were asked to indicate whether their partner had 
(in the cohort member’s estimation) a problem with: a) alcohol; and b) illicit 
drugs (including cannabis).  This information was used to create a pair of 
dichotomous measures indicating whether the cohort member’s partner had 
alcohol problems or illicit drug problems when the cohort member was aged 30. 
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 Summary measure of substance use problems.  For the purposes of the 
present investigation, a summary measure of substance use problems was 
created by combining the cohort member and partner information described 
above.  This information was used to create a three-level variable indicating 
exposure to substance use problems during the period 25-30 years (0 = neither 
partner nor cohort member had substance use problems/met criteria for disorder; 
1 = either partner or cohort member had substance use problems/met criteria for 
disorder; 2 = partner had substance use problems and cohort member met 
criteria for at least one substance use disorder). 
 
Individual background and family of origin factors 
 Gender.  Measured at birth (scored as 1 = male; 2 = female). 
 Family socio-economic status (at birth). This was assessed at the time of 
the survey child’s birth using the Elley-Irving  (Elley & Irving, 1976) scale of 
socioeconomic status for New Zealand. This scale classifies SES into 6 levels 
on the basis of paternal occupation ranging from 1 = professional occupations to 
6 = unskilled occupations. For the purposes of the present analysis scores were 
reversed so that higher scores represented higher SES levels. 
Average family living standards (ages 0-10).  At each year a global 
assessment of the material living standards of the family was obtained by means 
of an interviewer rating.  Ratings were made on a five point scale that ranged 
from 1 = “very good” to 5 = “very poor”.  These ratings were summed over the 
10 year period and divided by 10 to give a measure of typical family living 
standards during this period.  For the purposes of the present analysis scores 
were reversed so that higher scores represented more favourable living 
standards.  
Averaged family income rank.  At each assessment from when the survey 
child was aged 1 to age 10 years estimates were obtained of the family’s gross 
annual income from all sources for the previous 12 month period. This 
information was used to derive measures reflecting the average income level 
available to the family during childhood.  For each period 1 to 10 years the 
gross income estimates were first classified into deciles of family income, and 
the resulting decile levels were then averaged over the period to obtain an 
averaged income decile rank for the family during the period. 
Maternal and paternal education.  Maternal and paternal education level 
was assessed at the time of the survey child’s birth using a three point scale 
which reflected the highest level of educational achievement attained.  This 
scale was: 1 = parent lacked formal educational qualifications (had not 
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graduated from high school); 2 = parent had secondary level educational 
qualifications (had graduated from high school); 3 = parent had tertiary level 
qualifications (had obtained a university degree or tertiary technical 
qualification).   
Māori ethnicity.  Participants were classified as either Māori or non-
Māori on the basis of self-reported ethnic identification obtained at age 21 
years. 
 
Statistical analyses 
 Regression analyses.  The data described above were used to fit two 
ordinary least squares multiple regression analyses.  These analyses were of the 
form: 
 Yi  = B0 + Σ  Bi Xi + Ui       
 (EQ1) 
where Yi represented either equivalised net family income at age 30, or ELSI 
score at age 30, Xi was the individual’s score for each particular predictor and 
Ui was the model disturbance.  In order to simplify the regression models, terms 
representing: a) a count measure of mental health disorders; and b) and a 
summary measure of substance use problems; were used in the analyses in place 
of the four individual measures of mental health disorders and five individual 
measures of substance use problems.  These models were then refined using 
forwards and backwards methods of variable substitution to arrive at the set of 
statistically significant predictors for both equivalised net family income and 
ELSI score at age 30.  In addition, for the regression model using ELSI score as 
the outcome, equivalised family income at age 30 was used as a predictor.  Both 
models were then extended to include terms representing gender x predictor 
interactions.  Regression models were fitted using SAS v9.3. 
 Path analysis.  In the next step of the analyses, the outcome variables and 
those predictors which were found to be statistically significant in the ordinary 
least squares regression analyses described above were entered into a recursive 
path analysis model.  In this model, equivalised net family income and ELSI 
score served as the dependent variables, while the independent variables which 
included the seven statistically significant predictors identified in the ordinary 
least squares regression models (see Results), were treated as correlated 
exogenous variables.  In addition, the path model included a path from 
equivalised net family income to ELSI score, as in the least squares regression 
model described above.  Standardised model parameters were estimated using 
maximum likelihood methods.  The path model was fitted using Mplus v7.11. 
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 Supplementary analyses.  In order to examine further the applicability of 
the results to a New Zealand context, the above regression analyses were 
repeated (omitting the variable pertaining to New Zealand residence) using only 
those sample members resident in New Zealand at age 30 (n = 759). 
 
Results  
Economic outcomes in the CHDS cohort households at age 30 
Table 1 reports on two measures of economic outcomes in the CHDS cohort at 
the age of 30. The first measure is a measure of equivalised disposable (net) 
income using the weighting procedure suggested by Jensen (Jensen, 1988).   
The equivalised income measure provides a measure of income that takes into 
account family size and composition.  The second measure is a measure of the 
families’ material living standards using a short form of the ELSI (Jensen, et al., 
2005) measure (see Methods). 
For each outcome a measure of relative poverty is provided. For the 
equivalised income measure this was based on the conventional measure of 
60% of the median net income for the year 2007 in New Zealand 
(NZD$26,500).  For the ELSI scale the measure of relative poverty was the 
fraction of families reporting at least “some hardship”.  The Table shows that on 
the basis of the equivalised income measure, 10.3% of  families fell below the 
poverty line (NZD$15,900) whereas using the ELSI measure only 8% of 
families fell below the poverty level. 
         These findings suggest that levels of poverty in the CHDS cohort were 
lower than rates that have been reported for similar populations. For example, 
population estimates suggest that 18% of NZ households with adults in the 29-
45 age range fell below the equivalised income poverty line in the year 2007 
(Perry, 2008), compared with 10.3% in the CHDS sample.  Examination of the 
distribution of the ELSI score showed that 8% of the cohort fell into the more 
disadvantaged categories of the ELSI. This rate is lower than would be expected 
from population estimates. For example population data from 2008 showed that 
25% of adults aged 25-44 years were living in household subject to this degree 
of deprivation (Perry, 2009).  There appear to be several reasons for the rates of 
poverty defined by income and ELSI being lower in the CHDS cohort. 
  1. First, the cohort was at a stage of the life cycle at which rates of 
poverty were likely to be low since the majority (64.3%) of the cohort did not 
have children and a substantial proportion (32.3%) were living in two 
income families with a partner and no children. Further examination revealed 
that rates of poverty varied marked with household type with households having 
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one income and dependent children having rates of ELSI hardship of 17.8% 
compared to 2.2% for two income households with no children.  Similarly, rates 
of below poverty level income were 15.2% for households with one income and 
dependent children, while there were no households in the CHDS cohort that 
had two incomes that were below the income poverty threshold.  In addition, it 
should be noted that rates of welfare dependence in the cohort (8.4%) were 
slightly  lower than estimates of the population rate of welfare dependence in 
New Zealand in 2007 (10.1%) (Ministry of Social Development, 2007), though 
the latter figure includes a somewhat wider variety of benefit than assessed in 
the CHDS cohort.  
2. Second, the ELSI scale figures reported for the New Zealand 
population in 2008 applied to New Zealand residents, whereas 23.1% of the 
CHDS cohort were living overseas at age 30. Those living overseas had lower 
levels of deprivation on the ELSI measure (2.6%) than those living in New 
Zealand (9.6%; X2 (1) = 11.6, p < .001). Similarly, those cohort members who 
lived overseas were significantly less likely to have an income below the New 
Zealand poverty level (3.2%) than those cohort members who resided in New 
Zealand (12.3%; X2 (1) = 15.5, p < .0001).  
In summary the low rate of relative poverty found in the CHDS using the 
ELSI score and income is likely to reflect the net effects of: a) household 
composition; and b) country of residence. 
A further statistic of interest concerns the rate of poverty amongst New 
Zealand-based households in the CHDS with dependent children. On the basis 
of equivalised income estimates 14.1% of New Zealand-based families with 
dependent children fell below the poverty line, compared to 11.2% of 
households without dependent children.  On the basis of ELSI score, 15.5% of 
families with dependent children were in hardship compared to 5.7% of 
households with no dependent children. 
 
Associations between economic circumstances (at age 30) and predictors 
Table 2 shows the Pearson product-moment correlations between the measures 
of economic circumstances at age 30 (equivalised family income; ELSI score) 
and a series of predictors spanning a range of areas pertaining both to the cohort 
member and to the family/household that the cohort member resided with.  
These predictors included: family/household characteristics; cohort member’s 
educational achievement; cohort member’s mental health; cohort member’s and 
partner substance use problems; and individual/family background factors for 
the cohort member.   
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Table 1. Indicators of economic circumstances amongst the CHDS cohort at age 30. 
a) Equivalised family disposable income bracket % of sample 
$100,000+ 1.2 
$80,000-$99,999 7.6 
$60,000-$79,999 9.8 
$40,000-$59,999 22.9 
$20,000-$39,999 39.4 
$15,901-$19,999 8.8 
$0-$15,900 (under poverty threshold) 10.3 
Mean equivalised disposable family income = 40687.44; SD = 24604.07 
 
b) ELSI living standards brackets 
Score Level % of sample 
29-31 Very good 24.4 
25-28 Good 41.2 
21-24 Comfortable 18.3 
17-20 Fairly comfortable 8.1 
13-16 Some hardship 4.2 
9-12 Significant hardship 2.5 
0-8 Severe hardship 1.3 
Mean ELSI score = 24.9; SD = 5.2   
 
In summary the low rate of relative poverty found in the CHDS using the ELSI 
score and income is likely to reflect the net effects of: a) household 
composition; and b) country of residence. 
A further statistic of interest concerns the rate of poverty amongst New 
Zealand-based households in the CHDS with dependent children. On the basis 
of equivalised income estimates 14.1% of New Zealand-based families with 
dependent children fell below the poverty line, compared to 11.2% of 
households without dependent children.  On the basis of ELSI score, 15.5% of 
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families with dependent children were in hardship compared to 5.7% of 
households with no dependent children. 
 
Associations between economic circumstances (at age 30) and predictors 
Table 2 shows the Pearson product-moment correlations between the measures 
of economic circumstances at age 30 (equivalised family income; ELSI score) 
and a series of predictors spanning a range of areas pertaining both to the cohort 
member and to the family/household that the cohort member resided with.  
These predictors included: family/household characteristics; cohort member’s 
educational achievement; cohort member’s mental health; cohort member’s and 
partner substance use problems; and individual/family background factors for 
the cohort member.  The Table also shows the correlation between the measure 
of equivalised income and ELSI score (r = .47).  The Table shows: 
 
1. Both the measure of equivalised income and ELSI score had 
strong and statistically significant (p < .0001) correlations with the 
predictors related to family/household characteristics.  Absolute 
values for the correlations ranged from .19 to .46, with a median value 
of .28. 
2. Both economic measures were also strongly and significantly 
correlated (p < .0001) with the cohort member’s education level, with 
correlations of .24 for income and .36 for ELSI score. 
3. The predictors related to the cohort member’s mental health 
outcomes (25-30 years) were strongly and significantly correlated (p 
< .0001) with the measure of equivalised family income, ranging in 
absolute value from .20 to .25.  However, the correlations between 
mental health outcomes and ELSI score were weaker, though 
statistically significant (p < .05), ranging from .08 to .11. 
4. Both economic measures were modestly correlated with the 
majority of measures of the cohort member’s and partner’s problems 
with substance use (during the period 25-30 years).  Two correlations 
failed to reach statistical significance with the ELSI measure: cohort 
member’s alcohol use disorder; and cohort member’s other illicit drug 
use disorder.  Absolute values for the correlations ranged from .01 to 
.19, with a median value of .09. 
5.    The two economic outcome measures were moderately 
correlated (all p values < .001) with the majority of predictors related 
to the cohort member’s family background and individual factors.  
The one exception to this was the correlation between gender and 
income (-.03, p > .30).  Absolute values for these correlations ranged 
from .03 to .29, with a median value of .15. 
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Table 2. Correlations between predictors and measures of economic outcomes at age 30. 
 Economic outcomes measure 
 Equivalised family income  ELSI score 
Predictors r p  r p 
Family/household characteristics (at age 30)      
Equivalised family income -- --  .47 <.0001 
Number of earners .29 <.0001  .42 <.0001 
Number of dependent children -.38 <.0001  -.26 <.0001 
Becoming a parent <age 20 -.19 <.0001  -.20 <.0001 
Single parent -.28 <.0001  -.23 <.0001 
Welfare dependent -.32 <.0001  -.41 <.0001 
New Zealand residence -.46 <.0001  -.26 <.0001 
Educational achievement      
Qualifications (none/secondary/tertiary) .24 <.0001  .36 <.0001 
Mental health (ages 25-30)      
Major depression -.25 <.0001  -.11 <.001 
Anxiety disorder -.25 <.0001  -.08 <.05 
Suicidal ideation -.20 <.0001  -.09 <.01 
Antisocial personality disorder -.20 <.0001  -.10 <.01 
Substance use disorders (ages 25-30)      
Alcohol use disorder -.09 <.01  -.01 >.70 
Cannabis use disorder -.14 <.0001  -.14 <.0001 
Other illicit drug use disorder -.08 <.05  -.05 <.10 
Partner alcohol problems (age 29-30) -.07 <.05  -.17 <.0001 
Partner cannabis/other drug problems (age 29-30) -.07 <.05  -.19 <.0001 
Individual background and family of origin factors     
Female gender -.03 >.30  -.08 <.05 
Family socioeconomic status at birth .16 <.0001  .20 <.0001 
Family living standards (ages 0-10) .27 <.0001  .29 <.0001 
Family income (ages 0-10) .21 <.0001  .22 <.0001 
Maternal education level .14 <.0001  .19 <.0001 
Paternal education level .11 <.001  .11 <.001 
Māori ethnicity (at age 21) .10 <.001  .11 <.001 
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The results of these analyses suggest that both income and living standards are 
associated with a wide variety of indicators measured in both adulthood and 
childhood, and pertaining not only to the individual (in this case the cohort 
member), but also to the cohort member’s partner and family unit in general. 
 
Multivariate regression models of the associations between measures of 
economic circumstances (at age 30) and predictors 
In the next step of the analyses, the predictors noted in Table 2 above were 
entered into multivariate ordinary least squares regression models using: 
equivalised family income; and ELSI score as the outcome measures.  For the 
model of the association between ELSI and predictors, equivalised family 
income was used as a predictor.  Also, as noted in Methods, in order to simplify 
these models the measures of cohort member’s mental health outcomes were 
transformed into a single variable, representing the total burden of mental health 
disorders when the cohort member was aged 25-30 years.  Also, the measure of 
cohort member’s and partner’s substance use problems were transformed into a 
single variable, representing the total household burden of substance use 
problems.  Finally, because of the strong collinearity between the variables of 
welfare benefit receipt and number of earners, the measure of welfare benefit 
receipt was dropped from the multivariate regression analyses.  In conducting 
these analyses, forward and backward methods of variable selection were used 
to arrive at a set of stable and parsimonious models.  As a result of this process, 
several predictors were found to be no longer statistically significantly (p < .05) 
associated with either equivalised income or ELSI score.  These predictors 
included: becoming a parent < age 20; single parent; gender; family 
socioeconomic status at birth; family income (ages 0-10); maternal and paternal 
education level; and Māori ethnicity. 
The results of these analyses are given in Table 3, which shows the 
standardised regression coefficients and tests of significance for each predictor, 
for those predictors that were statistically significant in one or both analyses.  
The Table also displays the estimates of R2 for each model.  The Table shows: 
1. The measure of equivalised income was strongly and 
significantly (p <.0001) associated with three measures of 
family/household characteristics, including: number of earners; 
number of dependent children; and living in New Zealand.  
Standardised coefficients ranged in absolute value from .25 to .37.  
On the other hand, the associations between the measure of 
equivalised income and education and family living standards were 
more modest, with standardised coefficients ranging from .09 to .15.   
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2. The results of this analysis suggested that income was largely a 
function of earning power (number of earners; New Zealand 
residence) and family commitments (number of children), with 
education and family living standards in childhood playing a 
relatively modest role.  Together these variables accounted for 
approximately 50% of the variance in equivalised net family income 
at age 30.  
3. The ELSI measure showed a somewhat different pattern of 
statistically significant (p < .01) associations with predictors after 
model fitting.  The association between ELSI and equivalised family 
income was strong (β = .27), whereas the other family/household 
characteristics measures were more weakly associated with ELSI 
score, ranging in absolute value from .09 to .10.  In addition, there 
was a strong association (β = -.22) between the mental health disorder 
score and ELSI score, and a moderate association between substance 
use disorders score and ELSI score (β = -.15).  The measure of family 
living standards was relatively weakly associated with ELSI score (β 
=-.12).  The results of this analysis suggested that while a large 
component of living standards was accounted for by income, living 
standards were also predicted by family characteristics, mental and 
behavioural disorders, and living standards in childhood.  Together 
these variables accounted for approximately 34% of the variance in 
living standards scores at age 30.  
As noted in Methods, the models described above were extended to include 
terms representing gender x predictor interactions, to examine whether the 
strength of associations between predictors and economic outcomes differed 
according to gender.  Of the 11 interaction terms tested (five for the model of 
equivalised family income, six for the model of living standards) only a single 
interaction term (for the interaction between gender and New Zealand residence 
for the model of equivalised income) was found to be statistically significant (p 
< .05).  However, the use of a Sidak-corrected p-value (p = .025) to account for 
multiple tests of significance resulted in the interaction term being reduced to 
statistical non-significance. 
 
Path modelling of the associations between measures of economic 
circumstances at age 30 and predictors 
Finally, in order to examine in more detail the potential causal pathways 
predicting income and living standards, the predictors identified in Table 3 were 
entered into a recursive path model equation using MPlus, in which the 
significant predictor variables were treated as correlated exogenous variables  
which influence both equivalised income and ELSI score.    
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Table 3. Multivariate regression models for the associations between predictors and 
measures of economic outcomes at age 30. 
 Economic outcomes measure 
 Equivalised family income  ELSI Score 
Predictors 
Standardised 
regression 
parameter (β) p  
Standardised 
regression 
parameter (β) p 
Family/household characteristics (at age 30)     
Equivalised family income -- --  .27 <.0001 
Number of earners .37 <.0001  .09 <.01 
Number of dependent children -.25 <.0001  -.10 <.001 
New Zealand residence -.37 <.0001  -.10 <.001 
Education/IQ      
Qualifications (none/secondary/tertiary) .15 <.0001  -- -- 
Mental health (ages 25-30)      
Total mental health disorders score -- --  -.22 <.0001 
Substance use (ages 25-30)      
Total substance use disorders score -- --  -.15 <.0001 
Individual and family background factors      
Family living standards (ages 0-10) .09 <.01  .12 <.0001 
Model R2 .50 <.0001  .34 <.0001 
 
In addition, the model included a pathway from equivalised income to ELSI 
(see Methods).  A representation of the model is shown in Figure 1, which 
depicts the common pathways to both outcomes from: number of earners; 
number of dependent children; living in New Zealand; and family living 
standards (ages 0-10).  The model also includes specific pathways to 
equivalised income from educational qualifications, and specific pathways to 
ELSI score from mental health disorders, substance use disorders, and 
equivalised income.  The Figure also displays the standardised parameter 
estimates for each path, and tests of statistical significance.  The results of the 
path model showed: 
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1. Several variables had a direct effect on the measure of 
equivalised income, including: number of earners (β = .36); number 
of dependent children (β = -.26); New Zealand residence (β =- .37); 
education qualification level (β = .15); and childhood family living 
standards (β = .10).   
2. A number of variables also had a direct effect on the ELSI 
measure of living standards, including: net equivalised income (β = 
.27); number of earners (β = .09); number of dependent children (β = 
-.09); New Zealand residence (β = -.09); overall burden of mental 
disorders (β = -.23); substance use problems (β = -.15); and 
childhood family living standards (β = .13). 
3. One variable, education qualification level, was not directly 
related to ELSI score at age 30 but had an indirect influence (β = .04; 
not shown) via its association with net equivalised income.  Several 
other variables had both a direct effect on ELSI score, and an 
indirect effect on ELSI that was mediated via equivalised income, 
including: number of earners (indirect effect β = .10; not shown); 
number of dependent children (indirect effect β = -.07; not shown); 
New Zealand residence (indirect effect β =- .10; not shown); and 
childhood family living standards (indirect effect β = .03; not 
shown).  
4. Two variables, mental health disorders and substance use 
problems, had specific effects on ELSI scores but were unrelated to 
equivalised net income. 
 
Supplementary analyses 
In order to examine whether the results reported above varied as a function of 
New Zealand residence, the regression analyses above were repeated using only 
that portion of the cohort (n = 759) who were resident in New Zealand at age 30 
(New Zealand residence was therefore omitted from the models; see Methods).  
The pattern of results for these analyses was largely congruent with those 
reported above, with the resultant R2 estimates for the multivariate regression 
models being 0.39 for equivalised income and 0.33 for ELSI score.  These 
results suggested that the linkages between predictors and economic outcomes 
did not differ as a function of New Zealand residence. 
 
Discussion 
In this article we have used data gathered over the course of 30-year study of a 
New Zealand birth cohort to examine the linkages between a range of predictors 
and economic outcomes (income and living standards) at age 30.  The results of 
these analyses have led to several general conclusions. 
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Economic inequality in the CHDS cohort 
One of the unexpected findings of this study was the relatively low level of 
poverty in this cohort. One the basis of existing evidence we 
expected approximately 20-25% of the cohort to be in relative poverty using 
existing measures based on equivalised income (Perry, 2008) and the ELSI 
scale (Perry, 2009).  In fact, in the region of 8% to 10% of the cohort were 
classified as being in relative poverty. This raises important issues about the 
reasons for the CHDS cohort findings being discrepant with existing estimates. 
We are of the view that three factors may explain the lower than expected level 
of poverty within the cohort. 
 
1. The first and probably the most important factor is the life 
stage of the cohort in which a substantial fraction (32.3%) of the 
cohort were in two income households with no dependent children. 
These households had high income as a result of two incomes, with 
household gross incomes ranging (in unadjusted New Zealand 
dollars) from $26,900 to $240,000 with a median of $105,000.  The 
large proportion of two income households with no children is 
probably the reflection of two population trends which have resulted 
in placing a substantial number of young adult households in a 
position of relative economic advantage. The first trend has been an 
increase in the age of first parenthood in New Zealand.  In 1993 the 
age of first pregnancy for women was 28.4 years, whereas in 2009 the 
age of first pregnancy for women was 30.5 (Statistics New Zealand, 
2010). This trend has also been accompanied by increases in female 
workforce participation (Johnston, 2005). In combination these trends 
appear to have had a substantial impact on the earnings of the young 
adult population and a consequent reduction in risks of poverty. 
2. A second explanation is that the rate of poverty in the cohort 
was reduced by the fact that over 1 in 5 cohort members lived outside 
New Zealand and rates of poverty were lower for overseas residents.  
When rates of poverty were recalculated for the sample resident in 
New Zealand it was found that > 12% were below the poverty line 
using the equivalised income measure and 9.6% below the poverty 
line using the ELSI scale.   
3          A further consideration that applies to the ELSI scale is that 
the scale may be becoming increasingly out of date as a result of 
changes in population level living standards and ownership patterns. 
In particular, since the standardisation of ELSI in 2000 it is likely 
there have been substantial changes in population levels of ownership 
of such consumer durables as personal computers and cellular phones, 
which is an issue noted by the authors of the original report 
(Krishnan, Jensen, & Ballantyne, 2002).  These changes may have 
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reduced the discriminating power of the scale and led to an 
underestimation of the rate of hardship within the CHDS cohort. 
           
Irrespective of issues of comparison with New Zealand population estimates, 
however, there remained evidence of substantial economic inequality in the 
CHDS cohort.  Those cohort members in the highest decile for equivalised 
income had mean equivalised incomes that were 2.75 times greater than the 
mean equivalised income for cohort members in the nine other income deciles 
(NZD$95170 for the highest decile, as compared to NZD$34,610 for all others). 
 
The predictors of economic inequality 
The next stage of the analysis examined the extent to which variations in 
equivalised income and ELSI scores at age 30 could be predicted from the 
family, social and individual factors.  Bivariate analyses (see Table 2) showed 
that variations in measures of economic outcomes were significantly associated 
with a wide range of factors including: number of earners (p < .0001); welfare 
dependence (p < .0001); number of dependent children (p < .0001); becoming a 
parent before age 20 years (p < .0001); single parenthood (p < .0001); New 
Zealand residence (p < .0001); education qualification level (p < .0001); mental 
health problems including major depression, anxiety disorder; suicidal ideation; 
anti-social personality disorder (p < .05); substance use problems including 
alcohol use disorder, cannabis use disorder, other illicit drug use disorder, 
partner alcohol problems, and partner illicit drug problems (p < .05); gender (p 
< .05 for ELSI); family socioeconomic status at birth (p < .0001); childhood 
family living standards (p < .0001); childhood family income (p < .0001); 
maternal and paternal education (p < .001); and Māori ethnicity (p < .001). This 
is in general agreement with a range of research suggesting that economic 
outcomes are at least in part determined not only by earning power (Gibb, et al., 
2013b; OECD, 2011b; Thomas & Sawhill, 2005b; White & Rogers, 2000), but 
also preparation for the workforce via education (Hanushek & Woessmann, 
2008; Khatiwada, et al., 2007; OECD, 2010) , reliability and dependability as 
influenced by levels of mental health and substance use disorders (Barrera & 
Norton, 2009; Bray, et al., 2000; Lim, et al., 2008; Rehm & Gmel, 1999; 
Sansone & Sansone, 2010; Stewart, et al., 2003), and family background and 
individual factors that influence both the choice of work undertaken and 
expectations regarding adequate living standards (Castilla, 2012; Chapple, 
2000; Manning & Swaffield, 2008; Wagmiller & Adelman, 2009).
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These variables were then entered into a two-stage multivariate analysis. 
In the first stage single regression equations were fitted to the measures of 
economic outcomes. These analyses were then extended to fitting a recursive 
path model in which the significant predictor variables were treated as 
correlated exogenous variables that influenced both equivalised income and 
ELSI score, with equivalised income having a direct effect on ELSI. This 
analysis led to the following conclusions: 
1. The variables having a direct influence on equivalised income 
included: number of earners; number of dependent children; New 
Zealand residence; educational qualification level; and childhood 
family living standards; with absolute values of estimates of β ranging 
from .10 to .37.   Together these variables explained 50% of the 
variance in equivalised income at age 30. 
2. The variables having a direct influence on ELSI score 
included: equivalised income; number of earners; number of 
dependent children; New Zealand residence; mental disorders; 
substance use problems; and childhood family living standards with 
absolute values of estimates of β ranging from .09 to .27.   Together 
these variables explained 34% of the variance in ELSI scores at age 
30. 
3. One variable (educational qualification level) was not directly 
related to ELSI scores but nonetheless had indirect influence via its 
association with equivalised income. 
4. Two variables had specific effects on ELSI scores but were 
unrelated to equivalised income. These measures included mental 
health disorders and substance use problems. 
A number of implications of these findings are considered below.  
 
Evidence for an intergenerational transmission of inequality 
An interesting finding was that independently of other factors in the regression 
models (earning power; education; mental health; substance use), exposure to 
socioeconomic disadvantage during childhood, as measured by average family 
living standards, was a predictor of economic inequality at age 30. These 
findings clearly hint at processes of intergenerational transmission in which, 
independently of other factors, the individual’s level of exposure to economic 
advantage/disadvantage during childhood carries over into adult life (Musick & 
Mare, 2004; Serbin & Karp, 2004; Wagmiller & Adelman, 2009; Whelan, et al., 
2012).  These findings hint at the presence of a series of non-observed 
socialisation processes in which advantage begets advantage and disadvantage 
begets disadvantage. The nature of these processes is unknown but it can be 
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conjectured that childhood family economic conditions are associated with a 
range of factors including exposure to parental role models, the development of 
life course expectations and aspiration which lead to an intergenerational 
transmission of economic advantage and disadvantage. 
 
Issues of geographic location 
Also of interest was the finding that New Zealand-based cohort members were 
relatively less advantaged than their overseas counterparts, and that New 
Zealand residence was strongly predictive of lower income at age 30, and also 
associated with lower living standards at age 30 in the final fitted models.  
There may be a number of reasons for this particular pattern of findings.  First, 
it may be the case that individuals who were relatively advantaged in childhood, 
or who had higher levels of educational achievement were more likely to have 
travelled or moved overseas for the purposes of education or work, suggesting 
the possibility of a self-selection process (Milne, Poulton, Caspi, & Moffitt, 
2001).  Second, as has been noted previously, wages and living standards in 
New Zealand are thought to be somewhat lower than in countries to which the 
majority of those cohort members who emigrated overseas had gone, such as 
Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States (OECD, 2011d).  
Indeed, it is likely that both possibilities are true for the present cohort, but it is 
unclear the extent to which either contributes specifically to the strength of the 
associations between New Zealand residence and income and living standards at 
age 30. 
 
Implications for Māori 
As would be expected from previous research (Chapple, 2000; Ministry of 
Health, 2010; Statistics New Zealand, 2007; Tobias, et al., 2008), families of 
Māori cohort members had lower living standards  as measured by both 
equivalised income and ELSI than families of non- Māori cohort members .  
Supplementary analyses showed that, for example, on the basis of equivalised 
income scores, 21.6% of families of Māori cohort members were classified as 
being in poverty compared 8.8% of non-Māori (p < .0001). However in the final 
fitted model Māori ethnicity was not a predictor of economic wellbeing. The 
reason for this was that Māori ethnicity was correlated with a number of factors 
that were predictive of living standards. For example, Māori respondents: a) 
more often lived in household with dependent children (49.5% for Māori, 
33.8% for non- Māori; p < .01); and b) had greater exposure to socioeconomic 
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disadvantage in childhood (Māori M = 2.8, SD = 0.5; non- Māori M = 3.1, SD = 
0.4; p < .0001). These factors (dependent children; childhood social 
disadvantage) appear to have combined to place Māori at greater disadvantage. 
 
Implications for the CHDS cohort 
The observed demographic characteristics of the CHDS cohort (largely 
childless; more likely to be living in partnership and have two incomes) lead to 
the general conclusion that the sample is relatively advantaged.  However, it is 
quite likely that a larger proportion of the cohort will become (or have become) 
parents in the five to ten years following the age 30 assessment.  The findings of 
the present study, as well as earlier studies of the present cohort (Gibb, 
Fergusson, & Boden, 2013a), suggest that this increase in parenthood will likely 
have the effect of reducing the overall economic standing of the cohort, perhaps 
bringing it more in line with the profile of the New Zealand population for this 
age group.  Future analyses will examine changes in the economic 
circumstances in the cohort in order to illustrate the pathways by which 
economic circumstances change over the life course.   
 
Economic inequality and policy implications 
The present findings have a number of implications for issues of economic 
inequality.  Unsurprisingly, higher living standards in childhood, education and 
ability emerge as important contributors to economic outcomes at age 30, with 
education being the malleable factor of this particular set of predictors.  These 
findings suggest that wider access to educational opportunities will assist in 
improving economic outcomes in adulthood, particularly with regard to income 
(OECD, 2010).  Also, efforts to improve population mental health and reduce 
substance use disorders will likely have at least a modest effect on increasing 
living standards as well (Dewa, et al., 2002; French, et al., 2001).   
More importantly, however, the present findings suggest that a number of 
factors that exist contemporaneously with economic outcomes play a key role in 
determining economic outcomes.  Those cohort members who were more 
economically advantaged at age 30 were those who: a) had two incomes in their 
household; and b) were childless.  While these findings highlight the potential 
value of delayed parenthood and stable partnerships in increasing economic 
outcomes (Sonfield, Hasstedt, Kavanaugh & Anderson, 2013), the findings also 
suggest that efforts should be made to increase economic equality and 
opportunities to participate in the workforce for those individuals who have a 
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larger number of children or who were parents at a younger age (Welfare 
Working Group, 2011).  These goals may perhaps be achieved through schemes 
such as increasing access to paid parental leave, flexible and family-friendly 
working hours, an extension of tax credit schemes to account for family 
circumstances, or other related initiatives (James, 2009).   
 
Limitations and conclusions 
While the present study has a number of strengths, such as a large sample size 
and prospectively-collected data to age 30, there are a number of limitations to 
the study that should be acknowledged.  First, because data were largely self-
reported, they may be subject to the usual errors and biases inherent in self-
report data.  Second, the study used data pertaining to both cohort members and 
their partners (including income and substance use), and the measures of 
economic outcomes were household-based rather than individual-based.  
However, no information was available concerning the childhood family 
background and mental health status of relationship partners.  Consequently, 
while these factors undoubtedly played some role in the economic outcomes of 
the household when cohort members were aged 30, it was not possible to 
quantify the role these factors played.  Finally, it should also be noted that the 
findings pertain to this particular cohort at a particular time and location, and 
the findings may be of only limited generalisability.   
 Notwithstanding these limitations, the present study suggests that 
economic outcomes are strongly linked to earning power, educational 
achievement, mental health and substance use disorders, and the lingering 
influence of family living standards in childhood.  Approaches to addressing 
economic inequality in New Zealand will require the development of 
approaches that address barriers to effective participation in the workforce, 
increase educational opportunities, and ameliorate the effects of mental health 
and substance use disorders on living standards in adulthood. 
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Work and Inequality in Neoliberal New Zealand 
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Abstract 
Developed capitalist economies have experienced considerable 
changes in labour markets, the nature of work, and work-related 
inequalities over recent decades. Changes in New Zealand have 
paralleled those in other countries which adopted the neoliberal 
prescription of a market-oriented economic model. This has produced 
relatively high levels of joblessness and greater flexibility and 
insecurity in employment than in the past. The decline in manual 
production work and growing demand for professional and 
managerial skills has also caused some significant shifts in class 
structure. The benefits of economic restructuring and reform have not 
been evenly shared, favouring capital at the expense of labour, and 
skilled workers at the expense of the less skilled. This article uses 
official data sources to examine these changes in the context of New 
Zealand’s economic transformation since the 1980s. 
 
Introduction 
The radical transformation of New Zealand’s economy in the 1980s and 1990s 
entailed major upheavals in production and employment. The post-War decades 
had been a time of industrialisation, full employment and wage growth, under 
the direction of an interventionist state and abetted by an expedient compromise 
between capital and labour. But the global crisis of the 1970s undermined the 
foundations of this economic model and gave impetus to the gathering forces of 
neoliberalism and its advocacy of free-market capitalism. New Zealand was a 
relatively late convert to the neoliberal doctrine that was already transforming 
other developed capitalist economies, but from 1984 onwards it embraced it 
with unparalleled zeal as it embarked on a comprehensive project of 
restructuring and reform. The effects on the labour market were severe as 
production industries withered from exposure to global competition, domestic 
demand slumped and unemployment soared. It was a process of creative 
destruction and in time the economy and employment recovered, but what 
emerged from the wreckage was a very different economic model and a very 
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different labour market. Job growth was in different industries and occupations 
from those which had borne the brunt of restructuring, the labour market was 
characterised by greater labour surpluses and more flexibility and insecurity, 
and organised labour had been severely weakened. The result was a more 
inequitable relationship between capital and labour and between workers who 
had been either the victims or beneficiaries of the restructuring project.  
This article explores the changes in New Zealand’s labour market and 
employment structures in the context of the economic transformations occurring 
locally and globally since the 1980s. It begins with an overview of the 
restructuring process, drawing out key distinctions between the before and after 
economic models and their implications for the capital–labour relationship and 
labour market. It then looks at three particular aspects of change in the labour 
market and employment structures with consequences for inequality: the co-
existence of labour surpluses and skills shortages, the trend towards more 
flexible and insecure forms of employment, and changes in class structure 
resulting from shifts in relations of production and divisions of labour. There 
are some limitations in the scope of the article given the constraints of space: it 
does not include any empirical analysis of the relationship between labour 
market change and income inequality, and nor does it examine the 
consequences for gender and ethnic inequalities in any detail. These are 
obviously important dimensions of the story and are touched on at various 
points of the narrative, but they warrant more detailed analysis than can be 
given here.1  
 
A new mode of development 
The story of New Zealand’s neoliberal revolution of the 1980s and 1990s is 
well known and does not need to be recounted in any detail here (Kelsey, 1995; 
Roper, 2005). However, to understand its transformative effects on the labour 
market and employment structures it is helpful to place it in some historical and 
global context. The restructuring and reforms carried out by the fourth Labour 
and fourth National governments can only be partially understood in terms of 
the actions and motivations of politicians, bureaucrats and capitalists. Their 
efforts to reshape New Zealand’s political economy were an instance of broader 
                                                            
1 These subjects, along with the arguments and analysis presented in the following pages, are 
explored more fully in the doctoral thesis on which this article is based: Ongley (2011).  
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transformations occurring across the developed capitalist world in response to 
the crisis and stagnation afflicting capitalism since the early 1970s.   
We can interpret these transformations using the conceptual tools of 
regulation theory (Boyer & Saillard, 2002; Jessop & Sum, 2006). Very broadly, 
the regulation approach explains the evolution of capitalism in terms of cycles 
of growth, crisis and restructuring. Capitalism is seen to be inherently prone to 
structural crises, which may be resolved or averted through restructuring of 
production and reform of institutions. These episodes give rise to new modes of 
development consisting of distinctive combinations of accumulation and 
regulation. A regime of accumulation involves a particular pattern of production 
and consumption, often based on a distinctive technological paradigm utilising 
new technologies and labour processes. It is supported by a mode of regulation 
which comprises institutionalised norms and behaviours in spheres such as 
capital–labour relations, market competition, monetary regimes, activities of the 
state, and international integration. Modes of development can vary from 
country to country in any given era, reflecting different economic, cultural and 
political contexts. They also have varying degrees of success in averting crises 
and enabling periods of stability and growth.    
The period since the depression of the 1930s has seen two predominant 
modes of development in advanced capitalist economies, of contrasting 
characteristics and success. The first was the Fordist mode which originated in 
attempts to recover from the 1930s Depression and enabled an extraordinary 
period of stability and growth from the end of the Second World War until the 
global crisis of the 1970s. It centred on an accumulation regime of mass 
production and mass consumption, utilising intensive labour processes and 
machine technologies to deliver relatively standardised goods and services for 
predominantly domestic markets. This was supported by a monopolistic mode 
of regulation characterised by restricted market competition and a high level of 
state intervention, from which workers benefitted through full employment, real 
wage growth and an expanding welfare state, thereby sustaining consumer 
demand for the products of Fordist industry (Harvey, 1990: 125–140; Jessop & 
Sum, 2006: 58–75).  
The Fordist growth model began to falter in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
as productivity gains slowed, while continued wage demands generated 
inflationary pressures and threatened profitability, developing into a deeper 
crisis when the oil shock of 1973 further destabilised global markets. After 
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several years of stagnation, the crisis eventually led to restructuring and reform 
and the emergence of new modes of development in most developed capitalist 
economies. Post-Fordist accumulation regimes were typically based on more 
flexible production and fragmented consumption, utilising microelectronic and 
information technologies together with flexible labour processes to produce 
more innovative and diversified ranges of goods and services for increasingly 
differentiated and competitive global markets (Harvey, 1990). Modes of 
regulation varied, depending on the outcomes of political struggles in different 
countries, but there was typically a shift from monopolistic to competitive 
regulation with significant liberalisation of product, financial and labour 
markets and a reduced role for the state in economic management and social 
spending (Boyer, 2005). This model proved far less successful than Fordism in 
stabilising the crisis tendencies of capitalism, providing only intermittent 
periods of growth based on debt-fuelled consumption and speculative bubbles, 
punctuated with successive crises which culminated in the global financial crisis 
of 2007–08 (Foster & Magdoff, 2009; Harvey, 2010).    
New Zealand’s economic development since the Second World War 
broadly conforms to this general pattern, but with some distinctive 
characteristics. New Zealand’s was an atypical Fordist economy in that it 
remained heavily dependent on agricultural exports while the possibilities for 
mass production were constrained by its fledgling manufacturing sector and 
small domestic market (O’Brien & Wilkes, 1993). Accumulation was based on 
a circuit of mass production and mass consumption, but rather than being 
domestically contained it was tied into Fordist growth in its export markets, 
particularly the UK. Consumption growth in those markets fuelled demand for 
New Zealand’s mass produced primary products, in turn funding the 
importation of manufacturing inputs for its own import substitution industries. 
These industries employed mass production techniques to assemble consumer 
durables for the domestic market, in which consumer demand was driven by 
productivity-linked wage growth and Keynesian fiscal and monetary policies. 
The mode of regulation was typically Fordist, based on a high level of state 
intervention, an expanding welfare state and a capital–labour compromise built 
on centralised bargaining between unions and employers, mediated by the state. 
This model delivered steady economic growth, along with full employment and 
rising wages, for most of the post-War period until the onset of global crisis in 
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the 1970s, which for New Zealand was exacerbated by Britain’s entry into the 
EEC (Easton, 1997).  
Here as in other developed economies, the crisis ushered in years of 
stagnation and failed Keynesian interventions which made more fundamental 
restructuring and reform increasingly inevitable – although the nature of those 
changes was not so inevitable. In New Zealand, they reflected the outcome of 
political struggles in which certain fractions of capital in alliance with key 
bureaucratic and political actors secured the adoption of a neoliberal strategy by 
the incoming Labour Government in 1984 (Jesson, 1989). The neoliberal 
project represented an abrupt and complete abandonment of the Fordist-
Keynesian model. Production industries which had driven the growth of the 
1950s and 1960s under the umbrella of government protection were abandoned 
to global market forces; the state rationalised its own economic activities 
through a programme of privatisation, corporatisation and fiscal retrenchment; 
and it adopted a contractionary monetary policy prioritising inflation control 
over economic growth and full employment (Kelsey, 1995). While the Labour 
Government shied away from comprehensive welfare and labour market 
reforms, these were completed by the subsequent National Government, with 
sweeping cuts to benefit entitlements and passing of the Employment Contracts 
Act which sought to individualise employment relations, thereby weakening 
organised labour and strengthening the hand of employers (Roper, 2005: 195–
218). The employment relations legislation was among some reforms which 
were partially rolled back by the Clark Labour Government after 1999, but for 
the most part their policies only sought to alleviate some of the harsher 
consequences of the market reforms while leaving the fundamentals of the 
economic model substantially intact (Roper, 2005: 221–238).  
The mode of regulation which emerged in New Zealand resembled that in 
the US and UK and can best be described as market-oriented, in that its core 
principle was the privileging of market competition over state intervention 
(Boyer, 2005). Its institutional forms were oriented towards the efficient 
functioning of markets: a state concentrating on providing the conditions for 
market competition rather than intervening or participating in the market; 
business models focused on achieving competitiveness through efficiency and 
innovation; an employment relations system prioritising the needs of capital to 
utilise labour flexibly and cheaply; a financial and monetary regime enabling 
the free flow of capital while maintaining price stability; and an international 
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orientation favouring the relatively free movement of goods and capital across 
national boundaries. This supported an accumulation regime built around 
flexible production and fragmented consumption. With import protections 
removed, demand for mass produced goods was increasingly satisfied by cheap 
imports, while the focus of local manufacturing shifted to leaner and more 
flexible operations catering to niche export and domestic markets, where 
competitiveness depended on innovations in product lines and production 
processes. Agricultural products remained the mainstay of New Zealand’s 
export trade but here too there was a shift away from simple bulk production to 
adding value and diversifying product ranges to enhance marketability. Overall, 
however, goods production accounted for a declining share of economic activity 
as investment was diverted into the expanding producer and consumer service 
sectors and speculation in financial and property markets. 
In New Zealand as elsewhere, the market-oriented mode of development 
failed to deliver the generalised prosperity of the Fordist period. The economy 
began to recover from the destructive effects of the restructuring project by the 
early 1990s and benefitted from favourable international conditions in the years 
leading up to the global financial crisis. But by comparison with the Fordist 
period, growth was relatively slow and unsteady, labour surpluses remained 
relatively high and income growth went disproportionately to capital and high-
income earners, resulting in significantly greater levels of inequality and 
poverty (Rashbrooke, 2013). The global financial crisis dramatically exposed 
the failings of the market-oriented model but failed to put neoliberalism in its 
grave. In New Zealand the Key National Government has continued to steer a 
resolutely neoliberal course in its fiscal, monetary, labour and welfare policies 
(Roper, 2011). This mirrors the larger market-oriented economies such as the 
US and UK where – notwithstanding some expedient Keynesian measures 
adopted at the height of the crisis – the fundamentals of the market-oriented 
model remain firmly in place and neoliberal ideas continue to guide the policy 
agenda, despite their complicity in the crisis and their evident failure to resolve 
it (Quiggin, 2010; Crouch, 2011).  As with the crises of the 1930s and 1970s, 
more fundamental reform and restructuring may be necessary to revitalise 
capitalist economies, but it could take several years of political struggle and 
economic adjustment for a new mode of development to emerge. 
The transition to the market-oriented mode of development had profound 
implications for labour markets, the nature of work, and associated inequalities. 
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Fordism had been built around a compromise between capital, labour and the 
state which saw workers secure significant advances in employment protections, 
collective bargaining power and wage growth. Neoliberalism not only revoked 
that compromise but in many ways represented a reassertion of capitalist class 
power (Harvey, 2005). The interests of workers were subordinated to those of 
capital on the premise that businesses required more compliant, flexible and 
affordable labour in order to succeed in highly competitive global markets. This 
entailed a number of shifts in the nature of the capital–labour relationship and 
the operation of the labour market, which can be briefly summarised as follows:  
 
1. Abandoning full employment. Under Fordism full employment 
was a key objective of monetary, fiscal and labour policy and was 
largely achieved, with very low rates of unemployment until the early 
1970s. In market-oriented post-Fordism, the goal of full employment 
was effectively abandoned, and labour surpluses in the form of 
joblessness and underemployment were not only tolerated but seen as 
advantageous in constraining wage demands and inflationary 
pressures, as well as maintaining flexibility in the labour supply. 
2. Individualising employment relations: The capital–labour 
relationship in the Fordist era had been built around collectivised 
employment relations, in which highly unionised workforces 
bargained collectively with employers. Labour market deregulation 
weakened the collective organisation and bargaining power of 
workers, encouraging individualised employment relationships which 
gave employers more power to dictate wage levels and conditions of 
employment, particularly when there were large reserves of jobless 
workers available.   
3. Reducing labour costs. At the heart of the capitalist wage 
relation there is a fundamental contradiction that workers are both 
costs of production and consumers of products. Under the Fordist 
growth model the emphasis was on workers as consumers, with full 
employment and wage growth seen as essential to stimulating mass 
consumption. In the post-Fordist model, the emphasis was on workers 
as costs of production, and in the interests of competitiveness those 
costs were to be reduced by deregulating labour markets and finding 
cheaper sources of labour internationally.   
4. Destandardising work. Under Fordism the prevailing 
employment model was one of permanent and full-time waged or 
salaried employment. Workforces were relatively stable and jobs 
relatively secure. In the post-Fordist world of flexible production 
models, highly competitive markets and uncertain economic 
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conditions, employers sought more flexibility in the volume and type 
of labour they employed so they could adapt to changing labour 
requirements. The result was less job security and increasing 
incidence of non-standard working arrangements such as temporary 
and part-time work and self-employment. 
5. Internationalising production. The mass production industries 
at the heart of Fordism were undermined by liberalisation of barriers 
to the global movement of goods and capital, and technological 
advances which facilitated those movements. Production became 
more internationalised, in terms of both the old international division 
of labour based on trade, and the new international division of labour 
involving transnational production networks dividing integrated 
production processes across different countries offering distinct 
comparative advantages. The result was that more of the manual 
production work was done in low-wage countries, while the more 
developed countries focused on corporate activities, service provision 
and financial speculation.    
The benefits of restructuring were inequitably shared not just between capital 
and labour, but also between different types of labour. As goods-producing 
industries which had thrived under Fordism struggled in the face of 
international competition and depressed domestic markets, vast numbers of 
manual production workers lost their jobs. Lacking the skills and credentials 
required in the growing producer and consumer service industries and 
professional and technical occupations, many faced prolonged periods of 
joblessness or intermittent spells of insecure and poorly paid employment. At 
the same time, however, many workers benefitted from these shifts, particularly 
those with professional and managerial skills for which there was excess 
demand and which were therefore well remunerated. This inequity was not just 
an immediate consequence of the restructuring project but has persisted 
throughout subsequent years.     
 
Labour surpluses and skills shortages 
The market-oriented mode of development produced a labour market 
characterised by much greater levels of joblessness and underemployment than 
in the Fordist era – even in the relatively buoyant period preceding the global 
financial crisis. There were several reasons for this. One was the abandonment 
of full employment as an economic policy objective, so that monetary and fiscal 
policy were no longer used as a means to stimulate labour demand and create 
employment – in fact monetary policy was used to dampen economic activity 
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whenever it threatened to stimulate inflation. Another reason was that there 
were higher levels of frictional unemployment than in the past – that is 
transitional spells of joblessness as people move between jobs or enter or re-
enter the labour market. This reflected the demise of the stable long-term 
employment model of Fordism as labour turnover increased due to greater use 
of temporary workers and more redundancies and business closures in what was 
a very competitive and uncertain economic environment. There was also more 
voluntary movement in and out of the labour force for lifestyle, family or 
educational reasons. More significant though, in terms of both its contribution 
to unemployment and its human costs, was the structural unemployment 
resulting from mismatches between labour supply and demand. This included 
both regional and skills mismatches. Regional mismatches developed as 
employment declined in some regions and grew in others, resulting in pools of 
surplus labour located in different parts of the country from the available jobs. 
Skills mismatches resulted initially from sectoral changes in employment as 
manual production workers lost jobs in the declining primary and secondary 
industries, and often lacked the skills to compete for jobs in the growing service 
industries and white-collar occupations. Additionally, large numbers of new 
workers continued to emerge from the education system without the skills 
required to succeed in the contemporary labour market (Dalziel, 2013). This 
resulted in the seemingly paradoxical situation of skills shortages emerging 
while there were still significant labour surpluses available.  
Figure 1 shows trends in joblessness in New Zealand since the neoliberal 
project commenced in the mid-1980s.2 It uses both the official unemployment 
rate and an expanded or underlying measure including jobless workers who 
don’t meet the restrictive criteria of the official count, such as those who aren’t 
immediately available for work or have become discouraged from active job 
hunting.3 The 1970s and early 1980s had seen steady increases in 
unemployment as a result of the global crisis and the government’s increasingly 
unsuccessful struggle to absorb labour surpluses by means of Keynesian 
                                                            
2 Data in this and the following section are drawn from Statistics New Zealand’s Household 
Labour Force Survey (HLFS) unless otherwise stated.  
3 The official unemployment figures include only those who are available for work in the 
survey reference week and have actively sought work during a four week period, using 
methods other than looking at job advertisements. The expanded measure includes those who 
are available for but not actively seeking work or actively seeking but not immediately 
available for work. It results in an unemployment rate on average 1.6 times higher than the 
official rate.  
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official unemployment rate for 15–24 year olds reaching 20 percent in 1991 and 
1992.  
As the economy began to recover from the initial shock of restructuring 
and recession there was a significant resurgence in job growth and a 
corresponding fall in unemployment – trends which were only interrupted by 
the Asian financial crisis in 1997–98 and ended with the more telling blow of 
the global financial crisis a decade later. In the 15 years before the global 
financial crisis, the number of people in paid work grew by over 650,000. 
However, this was not just a matter of the victims of restructuring being 
absorbed back into the workforce – the labour supply was also increasing due to 
growing labour force participation by women and older people, along with a 
surge in immigration following liberalisation of immigration policy in the late 
1980s and early 1990s.  Moreover, the resurgence in employment was in quite 
different types of work from those which had been most adversely affected by 
restructuring. Employment in production industries over this period generally 
remained fairly stagnant, with the notable exception of construction which 
enjoyed a boom in the 2000s. Instead, most of the job growth was in producer 
and consumer service industries – predominantly in professional, technical and 
managerial occupations, but also in low-skilled sales and service work.  
As a result of this renewed job growth, the official unemployment rate fell 
to a low of just under four percent between 2004 and 2007. This was widely 
hailed as something of an economic triumph, but in fact it only returned 
unemployment to the levels of the mid-1980s when the economy was 
considered to be in such a parlous state that it was in need of radical 
restructuring. And with an underlying unemployment rate of around seven 
percent, and an underemployment rate of around four percent,4 labour surpluses 
were still very high by comparison with the virtually full employment of the 
Fordist era. Moreover, this supposedly healthy labour market was a short-lived 
phenomenon as the global financial crisis caused unemployment to surge again 
from 2008, reaching seven percent in the official rate and 11 percent in the 
underlying rate by 2012. As in the restructuring period, production industries 
bore the brunt of job losses, with manufacturing and construction hardest hit, 
while retailing also experienced considerable losses. And with the job losses 
                                                            
4 The underemployment rate used here is the percentage of employed people working part-
time and wanting to work more hours. It does not include full-time workers wanting to work 
more hours.  
Ongley 
 
147 
disproportionately concentrated among lower-skilled workers, it again had 
particularly severe effects on Māori and Pacific workers and young people – 
although their unemployment rates did not approach the peaks of the early 
1990s.   
Before the onset of the global financial crisis significant skills shortages 
were emerging in certain types of work. In the six years before the crisis an 
average of 40 percent of firms reported difficulty finding skilled workers and 21 
percent had difficulty finding unskilled labour, with almost one in five firms 
citing labour shortages as the main factor preventing expansion of their 
business.5 The skills in shortest supply were predominantly in professional 
occupations, but also in some technical and trades occupations.6 Superficially it 
seems paradoxical that there should be shortages of workers at a time when 
there were also significant labour surpluses, but whereas the unmet labour 
demand was mostly for skilled workers, the excess labour supply consisted 
predominantly of low-skilled workers. Of those officially unemployed at this 
time, on average six in every ten had no post-school qualifications, seven in ten 
were looking for jobs in low-skilled occupations, and four in ten were aged 
under 25 so would tend to have little work experience. Others who were jobless 
but not officially unemployed may have been even more disadvantaged, as 
many would have been discouraged from active job seeking due to a lack of 
marketable skills or prolonged spells of joblessness. 
There was therefore a fundamental skills mismatch which meant that the 
fruits of the recovery were not evenly shared. Those possessing the skills in 
short supply benefited from enhanced job opportunities and growing incomes, 
but many of those made jobless from production industries or emerging from 
the education system with few or no qualifications lacked the skills and 
credentials to compete for those jobs. The declining opportunities in production 
work were to some extent offset by expansion in low-skilled service work, but 
this was clearly insufficient to absorb all the surplus labour, and many were 
consigned to long-term joblessness or intermittent periods of short-term and 
low-standard employment. The existence of large reserves of unskilled or low-
skilled labour also exerted downward pressure on wages at the lower end of the 
labour market, exacerbating income inequalities at a time when those at the 
upper end of the market were able to command high premiums for scarce skills. 
                                                            
5 NZIER, Quarterly Survey of Business Opinion.  
6 Based on Immigration New Zealand’s Long-Term Skill Shortage List. 
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The global financial crisis has only served to further limit the employment 
opportunities and bargaining power of low-skilled workers. Improving their 
circumstances will require more than just a recovery in economic activity and 
labour demand, as that would only mean a return to the pre-crisis situation of 
skills shortages and labour surpluses. It will also require institutional changes 
and policy settings designed to equip workers with the skills required in the 
labour market, and to provide suitable employment for those who are not 
inclined to professional careers but aspire to something more than low-skilled 
and insecure service jobs (Dalziel, 2013; Haworth, 2013).    
 
Flexibility and insecurity 
The labour markets that have emerged in countries adopting a market-oriented 
mode of development are characterised not just by greater levels of joblessness 
than in the past, but also by more flexible use of labour and therefore greater 
insecurity for workers. Under Fordism, a standardised employment model 
prevailed, based on full-time and long-term waged or salaried employment 
offering workers relative security and employers stable workforces. This model 
has eroded due to increasing labour turnover and a shift to non-standard or 
flexible forms of employment such as casual, temporary and part-time work, 
independent contracting, multiple-job holding and homeworking (Houseman & 
Osawa, 2003). This is not new in the annals of capitalism but represents 
something of a return to the pre-Fordist situation when work was also less 
standardised and secure (Quinlan, 2012). A number of inter-related factors have 
contributed to the destandardisation of work in the post-Fordist economy. More 
flexible production models and more competitive markets have required more 
flexible workforces, so that the volume and type of labour can be adjusted to 
meet changing production demands. Temporary labour offers not just flexibility 
but also savings on labour costs, as workers can be more easily dispensed with 
when surplus to requirements and often receive fewer entitlements such as paid 
leave, superannuation, training, and redundancy payments. Destandardisation is 
also related to structural employment shifts from goods-production to service 
industries where non-standard work is more common, particularly in sectors 
such as retailing, hospitality and tourism where labour requirements can be 
highly variable and employment is often insecure and irregular. The 
destandardisation of work has been enabled by labour market deregulation 
which reduced employment protections and gave employers more latitude in 
how they hired, utilised and disposed of labour. In New Zealand, employers’ 
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calls for labour market flexibility were instrumental in the introduction of the 
Employment Contracts Act in 1991 (Morrison, 2003).  
The flipside of flexibility for employers is insecurity for workers. Much 
non-standard work is precarious, with very little job security, few legal 
protections, and low and uncertain incomes. The growth of this type of work 
has led some to suggest the emergence of a precariat, a class of highly insecure, 
poorly protected and lowly paid workers with a tenuous attachment to the 
labour force and little opportunity for advancement (Standing, 2011). This is, 
however, only a subset of non-standard workers. There are also those who have 
relatively secure jobs such as permanent part-time employees, those for whom 
insecurity is recompensed by higher earnings such as independent consultants, 
and those for whom non-standard work provides the flexibility to combine paid 
employment with other activities including students, caregivers and retirees. It 
should also be noted that insecurity is not confined to non-standard workers. 
Permanent employees have also faced greater threat of job loss from 
redundancies or business closures in the volatile environment of the market 
economy. And perhaps as a consequence many have a weaker sense of 
attachment to their jobs, and are more likely to move voluntarily between 
employers and pursue more varied career paths.    
The growth of flexible and insecure employment as capitalist economies 
were restructured in the 1980s and 1990s led some prominent social theorists 
and commentators to suggest we were witnessing a terminal decline in stable 
long-term employment, with flexible and precarious work becoming the norm 
(Bauman, 2005; Beck, 2000; Castells, 2000; Sennett, 1999). Their critics have 
argued that this is not supported by the empirical evidence and reflects an 
uncritical acceptance of the narrative of employers who have exaggerated the 
need for an increasingly flexible labour supply in order to impose unfavourable 
conditions on workers (Doogan, 2009; Fevre, 2007). The truth, unsurprisingly, 
may lie somewhere between these polarised positions. While there have 
undoubtedly been increases in flexible and insecure employment, with serious 
economic and personal consequences for many workers, it is far from becoming 
the norm. The trends were most pronounced as economies were restructured in 
the 1980s and 1990s, reflecting a period of economic uncertainty and structural 
adjustment, and have since slowed or even reversed. Today the majority of 
workers in most developed capitalist economies are still conventionally 
employed in permanent and full-time waged or salaried jobs.  
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The available evidence from New Zealand supports this contention. While 
there are some inadequacies in the official data sources, we can get a reasonable 
picture of the extent of non-standard work from data on self-employment, part-
time work and temporary employment. Data from the HLFS shows a moderate 
increase in self-employment during the 1980s and 1990s which was largely 
reversed during the more buoyant conditions of the 2000s. The proportion of 
workers who were self-employed without employees increased from under 10 
percent to almost 13 percent between 1986 and 2000, but has since fallen back 
to 10 percent. Unfortunately we do not know how many people in this category 
are traditional working proprietors such as tradespeople, retailers and farmers, 
or what proportion are independent contractors. The latter often perform similar 
functions to employees but on a different legal footing – they are engaged under 
a contract for services rather than an employment contract and charge fees 
rather than receiving a wage or salary. It is generally considered that 
independent contracting has increased since the 1980s, providing employers 
with more flexibility, transferring risks and liabilities to workers, and saving on 
some of the costs associated with permanent staff – and for these reasons 
employers have been known to lay off employees and re-engage them as 
contractors (Greene, 2000). We can only speculate as to how widely this has 
occurred, but given that overall growth in self-employment has been moderate 
and unsustained, it does not seem to amount to a major trend. To this, however, 
we should add the caveat that the official data may undercount self-
employment, as the ambiguous status of some self-employed people may cause 
them to be misclassified as employees. 
Part-time work is not necessarily insecure employment – the vast majority 
of part-timers are permanent employees. But it does provide flexibility, both for 
workers who want to combine paid jobs with other activities or commitments, 
and for employers who may require particular types of labour for a limited 
number of hours rather than having underemployed full-time workers on their 
books – particularly during economic downturns. Growth in part-time 
employment has followed a similar trend to self-employment, being most 
pronounced in the late 1980s and 1990s before levelling off in subsequent years. 
The proportion of all employed people in part-time work grew from 17 to 23 
percent between 1986 and 1999, then dropped slightly in the 2000s before 
lifting to around 23 percent again following the global financial crisis. While 
much of the growth was due to increasing labour force participation by women, 
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part-time employment also became more common for men, almost doubling 
from six percent to nearly 12 percent of the male workforce between 1986 and 
1999 – although remaining well below the female rate of 37 percent. Some of 
the increase for both sexes was undoubtedly due to reduced opportunities for 
full-time work, but another factor was increasing numbers of people in the 
labour force for whom part-time work was a preferred option, including mothers 
of dependent children, tertiary students, and people around retirement age. This 
may help to explain why part-time employment did not fall greatly in the more 
buoyant labour market of the 2000s. By this time the vast majority of people 
working part-time were doing so as a matter of preference – fewer than five 
percent on average wanted to work full-time. However, around one in five part-
timers would have preferred more hours, suggesting that a shortage of work was 
still an issue for many.  
Temporary employment – which includes casual, fixed-term and seasonal 
work – is probably the most flexible type of labour for employers and the most 
insecure form of work for employees. It too is generally considered to have 
increased as a consequence of labour market deregulation and restructuring, but 
unfortunately there has been no official data on this type of work until recently. 
Surveys of employers in the mid-1990s indicated that around a tenth of their 
workforces were temporary employees, but whether this had changed 
significantly over preceding years is difficult to gauge (Allan et al., 2001). The 
first large-scale survey of employees to gather information on temporary work 
was Statistics New Zealand’s Survey of Working Life, which found that just 
over nine percent of employees were in temporary jobs in 2008, and just over 
10 percent in 2012. Comparing data from the two surveys is problematic as they 
were conducted in different quarters and there is a strong seasonality factor in 
temporary employment. However, it is safe to say there had been little change 
over the four years, despite the onset of the global financial crisis which might 
have been expected to encourage greater use of temporary labour.  
The 2012 survey showed that almost half of all temporary employees were 
casual workers, with fixed-term employees making up the majority of the 
remainder, followed by seasonal workers and temporary agency workers. 
Casual workers are also the most vulnerable and precarious of all employees. 
They have the least security of employment and the survey showed them to 
have the most variable hours, the least notice of their work schedule, the lowest 
levels of unionisation, the lowest coverage by collective employment contracts, 
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are therefore a long way from the point where non-standard work may become 
standard  (Spoonley, 2004), particularly given the apparent slowing of the 
trends in recent times. Nonetheless, this should not diminish the fact that a third 
of employed people, or 723,000 workers, is a sizeable proportion of New 
Zealand’s workforce. It is undoubtedly a considerably larger proportion than 
would have been in these forms of work before the transition to the market-
oriented mode of development with its flexible production models, volatile 
product markets and deregulated labour markets. And while non-standard 
employment may suit many workers, there are significant numbers who are 
compelled to accept such work because of a lack of alternatives, and for whom 
it can constitute a precarious economic existence (McLaren et al., 2004; New 
Zealand Council of Trade Unions, 2013).   
 
Class structure 
Changes in production and employment in developed capitalist economies have 
also wrought considerable change in class structures, the composition of classes 
and the possibilities for class formation or collective organisation. With the 
decline of traditional working-class jobs in the production industries which had 
underpinned the Fordist boom, working-class employment has not only 
contracted but also changed in character. Manual production jobs have 
increasingly been replaced by service jobs, often characterised by greater 
insecurity and weaker collective organisation, with a consequent diminishing of 
class consciousness and class action. Conversely, middle-class employment has 
grown, but it too has changed in character. The traditional petty-bourgeoisie of 
working proprietors has stagnated while the professional and managerial 
fractions of the middle class have expanded as a consequence of growing 
demand for technical skills, credentialed knowledge and organisational 
expertise. Meanwhile, the capitalist class has remained a small elite grouping, 
but the power within that elite has shifted as the dominance of agrarian and 
manufacturing fractions has waned in favour of finance capital. 
Many social theorists have argued that changes in class structures and 
consciousness have been of such a magnitude that traditional conceptions of 
class have become outmoded. Class, at least as conventionally understood, has 
been viewed as a relic of a vanishing industrial capitalism and a vestige of 
outmoded social theory, with little relevance in a world whose novelty has been 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
employment agreements. However, there is a risk of over-inflating the category by including 
anything that deviates from a very restrictively defined norm.  
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variously signalled by the prefix of ‘post’. Post-industrial theory has asserted 
that old class divisions based on relations of production have been superseded 
by divisions around informational skills and knowledge (Castells, 2000). Post-
modernists have pronounced the death of class, arguing that economic classes 
have decomposed, to be replaced by fluid and multi-dimensional differences of 
lifestyle and culture (Pakulski & Waters, 1996). Even post-Marxists have 
rejected the primacy of class in orthodox Marxism and sought to refocus 
socialist strategy from its concern with working class struggle to a pluralism 
embracing the diverse goals of new social movements (Laclau & Mouffe, 
2001). And among those who maintain that class still matters, there has been a 
shift from economic to cultural conceptions of class – from Marxist and 
Weberian approaches focussing on structured material inequality and its 
consequences, to approaches inspired by Bourdieu (1984) which are more 
concerned with the cultural dimensions of class differentiation manifested in 
distinctions of lifestyle, consumption and identity.  
There are some valid criticisms to be made of conventional economic class 
analysis: generally speaking it has struggled to adequately capture changes in 
capitalist class relations, the intersections between class and other forms of 
inequality such as gender and ethnicity, and the role of cultural distinctions in 
class formation. But while these shortcomings may provide challenges to 
rethink and reinvigorate class analysis, they do not mean that class itself is no 
longer relevant (Crompton et al., 2000; Devine et al., 2005). Class continues to 
play a critical role in shaping material inequalities, life chances, political 
relations, social affiliations and personal identities, and therefore should 
continue to be a focus of sociological investigation (Scott, 2002). While class 
may have become less visible with the decline of the traditional manual working 
class and the weakening of the labour movement, the material inequalities 
associated with class have if anything become more pronounced as capital has 
reasserted its power and income has been redistributed from the lower to the 
higher reaches of the class structure. And those inequalities are still based in 
relations of production and divisions of labour – the wage relation which allows 
capital to appropriate the surplus product of labour, and the inequitable 
redistribution of that surplus within hierarchical divisions of labour. This tends 
to be obscured by post-industrial theory with its emphasis on the control of 
knowledge rather than control of the means of production, and by cultural class 
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analysis with its focus on the sphere of consumption rather than the sphere of 
production. 
There are of course many different ways to approach class analysis and to 
conceptualise class structure, and these have been the subject of vigorous and 
generally fruitless debate within the sociology of class (Crompton, 2008). 
Rather than enter into those debates here, we can simply outline one model 
which seeks to identify the key lines of cleavage within capitalist class relations 
and which can be operationalised to analyse structural changes in class over 
time. The starting point is the work of Erik Olin Wright (1985, 1997),8 who 
identifies three axes of class inequality: ownership, authority and skills. 
Ownership of the means of production still constitutes the fundamental class 
divide within capitalism, enabling capitalists to exploit workers by 
appropriating the surplus produced by their labour. But non-owners of the 
means of production also occupy unequal positions based on their position in 
hierarchies of authority and skill. The higher their position of authority and the 
more scarce and valued their skills, the greater the claim they can make on a 
share of the surplus in the form of higher remuneration or economic rents paid 
to retain their skills and loyalty. Clusters of similar positions in the matrix of 
ownership, authority and skills constitute class locations, and together these 
class locations constitute a class structure. People who occupy similar class 
locations are not necessarily social classes in the sense of subjectively aware 
social groups, but class structure does condition the possibilities for the 
formation of social classes. In other words, people in similar class locations will 
tend to share similar material interests and experiences and are therefore more 
likely to develop a subjective awareness of shared interests and the potential to 
act collectively to advance those interests.        
The model of class structure used in the following analysis applies 
Wright’s criteria of ownership, authority and skills to delineate class locations, 
but identifies somewhat different categories from Wright’s model. This is partly 
because of practical considerations involved in operationalising the model using 
census data, and partly in order to identify categories which are more 
meaningful for the purposes of analysis.9 The model consists of eight locations 
                                                            
8 Wright’s perspective on class has evolved considerably over a long period of time. The 
approach outlined here is based on his major empirical study (1997), which utilises a 
modified version of the approach developed in an earlier work (1985). 
9 For more detailed discussion of the rationale behind the model and the procedure for 
operationalising it, see Ongley (2011: 144–155; 235–237). The categories are populated 
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which can be aggregated into capitalist, middle and working class groupings:  
Capitalist-class locations include two groups at the helm of capitalist 
enterprises: executive employers who both own and control the means 
of production, occupying the top executive positions in their own 
enterprises; and higher managers who have executive control but not 
ownership of the means of production. 
Middle-class locations include three groups who neither own nor run 
capitalist enterprises but who are materially advantaged in terms of 
either authority, skills or ownership. Lower managers occupy 
positions of authority below those of higher managers; professionals 
possess expertise and scarce skills but aren’t in management 
positions; and working proprietors possess their own means of 
production but utilise only their own labour or that of a small number 
of others.  
Working class locations include three groups who lack the advantages 
of ownership, managerial authority or professional skills, but who can 
be differentiated from each other in terms of skill levels. Skilled 
workers require specialised sets of skills below professional level but 
involving some element of formal learning; semi-skilled workers 
require non-credentialed and task-specific skills acquired through on-
the-job training; and routine workers can typically perform their roles 
to an adequate standard with no prior experience and minimal on-the-
job training.  
There are some limitations with this type of model. Firstly, the boundaries 
between class locations are not hard and fast, so there is a degree of 
arbitrariness involved in the classification process. Secondly, it classifies 
individuals rather than households so is not necessarily a true indicator of every 
person’s material circumstances – for instance someone may work in a lower-
skilled job but be materially advantaged by living with a spouse or parent in a 
different class position. And thirdly, it excludes people who are not currently in 
paid employment, either because they are unemployed or not engaged in the 
labour force for various reasons. Nonetheless, it provides an adequate 
approximation for the purpose at hand, which is to depict the employment 
structure in terms of relations of production and divisions of labour. As such, it 
represents a classification of jobs rather than people – those enumerated within 
a class location are employed in jobs which meet the objective criteria by which 
that that category is defined, although as individuals there will be other factors 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
using cross-classifications of census data on employment status and occupation, at the most 
detailed level of the occupational classification.      
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working-class employment, it was relatively modest by comparison with 
middle-class growth, meaning that the shift from working-class to middle-class 
employment continued. Whereas in 1986 people in working-class jobs 
outnumbered those in middle-class jobs by more than two to one, by 2006 the 
ratio was just 1.2 to one. This was not an entirely new trend – managerial and 
professional employment had been growing faster than lower-skilled jobs even 
during the industrialisation of the Fordist period – but it was certainly 
accentuated by the subjection of production industries to global market forces, 
the diversion of investment from production to service industries, and the rise of 
new technologies and production models which increased demand for 
professional and managerial workers across all sectors. However, this certainly 
does not signal the imminent demise of the working class. At the end of the 
period the majority of the workforce were still in jobs which could be 
objectively defined as working-class positions in that they lacked ownership of 
the means of production and authority over other workers and did not require 
professional skills.    
As well as the shift from working-class to middle-class employment we 
can also identify some significant changes within each of these groups. Within 
the middle class there has been a shift from self-employment to professional and 
managerial work. At the start of the period working proprietors (the petty 
bourgeoisie in Marxist terms) made up the largest middle-class group. But their 
numbers stagnated or fell for most of the period while there was strong growth 
in lower management and professional occupations, with professionals 
becoming the predominant fraction of the middle class by the early 1990s. 
Within each of these groups there have also been some important occupational 
shifts. Among working proprietors there has been a shift from traditional areas 
of self-employment such as farming, manual trades and retailing towards 
independent contracting and provision of household and personal services. 
Among lower managers there has been a shift from operations managers – who 
run production, supply and distribution activities – towards corporate managers 
who administer services such as finance, human resources, marketing and 
communications. Among professionals there has been a shift from lower 
professional occupations to the more highly credentialed and highly 
remunerated professions such as doctors, lawyers, accountants and engineers. 
While lower professionals still make up the greater proportion of the 
professional category, higher professional jobs have been growing at faster rate. 
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So within middle-class employment we see a reflection of the upward 
movement within the class structure as a whole. Just as there has been a shift 
from working-class to middle-class employment, within the middle-class there 
has been a shift towards managerial and professional jobs, and within that 
movements from operational to corporate management and from lower to higher 
professional jobs.  
Working-class employment has also changed considerably within its 
overall trend of decline. As we saw in figure 3, semi-skilled employment fell 
dramatically between 1986 and 2006, while skilled employment declined more 
gradually (with a slight lift due to the construction boom at the end of the 
period), and the least skilled or routine jobs remained relatively stable as a 
proportion of the workforce. As a result, routine jobs accounted for an 
increasing share of working-class employment for most of the period and came 
to make up by far the largest proportion of jobs in that category. We can get 
another perspective on working-class employment by breaking it down into 
blue-, grey- and white-collar jobs. The traditional divide between blue- and 
white-collar or manual and non-manual work is well understood, but there is 
also a significant and growing category of employment which straddles the 
boundary between those groups. This grey-collar work includes much of the 
low-skilled service work in areas such as hospitality, health care and household 
services which have been among the growth areas in working-class employment 
over recent times. As grey-collar jobs have grown, white-collar employment has 
generally stagnated and blue-collar work has diminished due to the decline of 
production industries. Consequently, grey-collar work accounts for an 
increasing share of working-class employment – growing to around a quarter by 
2006 – although this is still smaller than the blue- and white-collar categories, 
which each accounted for almost one in four working-class jobs in 2006. Along 
with the shift toward routine and grey-collar work there is likely to have been a 
decline in the quality of working-class employment, as these jobs are often 
characterised by insecurity, low pay and lack of employment protections. This 
is, however, difficult to quantify with the available data.          
Changes in the composition of working-class employment also affect the 
possibilities for class consciousness and class formation – the subjective 
awareness of common material interests and the development of formal or 
informal collectivities with the potential to advance those interests. Lack of 
research on the subject means this is largely a matter of conjecture but it seems 
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likely that while economic transformation in New Zealand has accentuated class 
inequalities it has paradoxically lessened the likelihood of class formation. The 
overall decline in working-class employment has been accompanied by a 
structural shift away from blue-collar production jobs which formerly provided 
a basis for the development of solidaristic relations and collective organisation. 
This is less likely in white- and grey-collar jobs which tend to be in smaller 
workplaces with less stable workforces and lower rates of unionisation. In 
addition to structural changes, possibilities for collective organisation have been 
detrimentally affected by institutional changes encouraging individualisation of 
employment relations, with consequent declines in union membership, 
collective bargaining and industrial action. There has also been a fragmentation 
of identities and interests within the working class as it has become increasingly 
diverse in terms of gender and ethnicity. Gender and ethnic inequality intersect 
with class to produce complex structures of inequality, so people who share 
similar positions in class relations may have divergent positions in gender or 
ethnic relations, and conversely people divided by class may be bound by 
gender or ethnicity. For some, the divisions of gender and ethnicity are more 
significant than class in terms of their subjective orientations and affiliations, 
and so may act against class consciousness and class formation (Bradley, 1996).  
  
Conclusion 
The extent of economic and social change in developed capitalist economies 
over recent decades has been sufficient to evoke prophecies of an epochal 
transformation – the idea that we are leaving industrial capitalism behind and 
entering a new period of history conceived variously as post-industrialism, 
postmodernity, the information age, the new capitalism and so on. In fact, 
capitalism has been evolving in much the same manner as it always has. Over 
the long course of its history there have been incremental developments in 
production, employment and social structures driven by technological change, 
rationalisation and the imperatives of capital accumulation. And periodically the 
course of this evolution has been disrupted by crises which have led to episodes 
of restructuring and the emergence of new modes of development based on new 
patterns of accumulation and regulation. The restructuring of capitalist 
economies following the crisis of the 1970s was the latest such episode. It was 
not the first and will not be the last. 
In countries such as New Zealand which adopted the neoliberal solution 
and moved to a market-oriented mode of development in the 1980s and 1990s, 
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there were some radical changes impacting on the labour market, employment 
structures and work-related inequalities. Gone was the interventionist state, the 
fostering of productive industries, the collective strength of organised labour, 
the goals of full employment and wage growth, and for many the stability of 
secure full-time employment. The changes benefitted capital at the expense of 
labour, allowing employers to utilise labour more flexibly and cheaply, which 
meant insecurity and stagnating wages for many workers. They also benefitted 
those workers who had the opportunity and aptitude to compete in the growth 
areas of professional, technical and managerial employment, where scarce skills 
could command healthy remuneration. But many did not have those 
opportunities, including those who lost semi-skilled or unskilled jobs as a 
consequence of restructuring, and those who continued to emerge from the 
education system with a lack of marketable skills. The fruits of the neoliberal 
revolution were not evenly shared.  
While these changes had very real economic and social consequences for 
many workers, we should be wary of overstating the extent of change. 
Prophecies of the end of industrial capitalism, an inexorable trend towards 
endemic insecurity at work and the fundamental transformation of class 
relations appear exaggerated and unfounded. The changes that have occurred 
are not symptomatic of an epochal and irrevocable rupture in capitalism and the 
nature of work, but are the product of a particular economic model which was 
adopted in response to one of capitalism’s periodic crises. That model has 
proved unsuccessful and we now find ourselves in the midst of another crisis 
which may in time lead to further restructuring and reform which sets the course 
for a new mode of development. Therein lies an opportunity to choose a path of 
greater inclusiveness and equity which better utilises the productive capacity of 
all workers and rewards them accordingly.            
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Abstract 
The previous decade has given rise to the importance of Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) in explaining inequalities in health 
outcomes between groups based on their spatial location and social 
background. The GeoHealth Laboratory, based at the University of 
Canterbury, is a joint venture with the Health and Disability 
Intelligence unit within the Ministry of Health (MoH). The aims of 
this relationship are to add analytical capacity to MoH data 
collections and increase academic outputs of geospatial health 
research in New Zealand. GeoHealth research has often been a joint 
venture between Laboratory staff and students as well as collaboration 
with local and international researchers. These partnerships along 
with widely varied research interests have resulted in a large 
contribution of spatial health research in the field of health geography. 
          This article reports on research undertaken by the GeoHealth 
Laboratory that has focused on access to neighbourhood determinants 
of health. An overview of key neighbourhoods and health research 
areas are outlined within the over-arching themes of indices of access 
to neighbourhood factors, access to undesireable neighbourhood 
destinations, health promoting neighbourhood factors, access to and 
utilisation of health services, and complementary data collection and 
research groups within New Zealand. 
 
Introduction 
In 2004, the GeoHealth Laboratory was established as a means to increase 
geospatial health research capacity in New Zealand (Pearce, 2007). A joint 
venture between the Ministry of Health’s (MOH) Public Health Intelligence 
group (PHI) and the University of Canterbury’s Department of Geography, the 
aim of Geohealth Laboratory is to increase academic output of geospatial health 
research in New Zealand and to add analytical capacity to the data collected and 
held by the MOH. With an emphasis on how neighbourhood and national 
contexts shape health outcomes and inequalities, the Geohealth Laboratory 
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undertakes applied research in the fields of health geography, spatial 
epidemiology, and Geographical Information Systems (GIS). The strategic 
partnership with the PHI has offered rich opportunities help inform health 
policy research and decision making processes, particularly through the use of 
GIS to examine the environmental and social determinants of health and 
healthcare. 
Up until relatively recently, GIS analysis of the inequalities in health 
outcomes at a neighbourhood scale were often generalised by social strata, such 
as socio-economic and/or ethnic groups. However, an increased awareness of 
the utility of GIS in the health sector, improved access to data, and the growth 
of more sophisticated health GIS methodologies, has made it possible for 
researchers to examine the contextual effects of neighbourhood composition on 
the health outcomes of individuals, and of wider populations more generally. 
The ability to focus on the places where people live and the characteristics of 
the local environment has become important in understanding inequalities in a 
range of health related behaviour, and health outcomes, within confined 
geographic environments such as urban areas. In New Zealand, research 
incorporating individual and population data has provided clear evidence of 
geographic inequalities in health between groups at varying spatial scales, from 
regional right down to neighbourhood levels.  
At the scale of the neighbourhood, (Pearce, 2007)  theorises that there are 
three contextual categories from which neighbourhoods might influence health: 
neighbourhood physical characteristics, social characteristics, and community 
resource access. These categorisations can, through plausible pathways, drive 
inequalities between individuals, social and ethnic groups, and between 
spatial/geographic groups (Pearce, 2007). GIS technology allows health 
geographers to integrate any number of spatial data, and increasing awareness 
of the effects of the built environment on health outcomes (Pearce, 2007) has 
required researchers to incorporate both physical and social datasets when 
analyzing the effects of neighbourhoods on health. Aspects of the built 
environment such as parks (‘green space’), hospitals (health service provision), 
and shopping centres (amenities) are combined with underlying social 
demographics of specific areas and also the health outcomes of individuals 
living in these communities. In doing so, GIS has provided the opportunity to 
examine causal pathways between the physical and social attributes of 
neighbourhoods, and health behaviours and outcomes. Through this type of 
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integrated approach, GIS is able to produce more-representative estimates of 
community resource and health service access inequalities and barriers at 
varying spatial scales. Such research is key to producing effective health 
provision policy and has been a major focus of research output from the 
GeoHealth Laboratory since its inception.   
This review article looks at the current body of research from the 
Geohealth Laboratory that has drawn on the contextual categories outlined by 
(Pearce, 2007) and examined neighbourhood access to factors in the built 
environment that can affect health outcomes. The first section focuses on 
methodology-based work that has sought ways to quantify inequality and to 
produce indices of accessibility. Second, work that has explored the relationship 
between how health-affecting factors in the built environment may drive 
socioeconomic and ethnic inequality is examined. Neighbourhood access to 
tobacco outlets, alcohol outlets, gambling opportunities, and food retailers are 
drawn on to tease out some of the complexities relating to neighbourhoods and 
health. Third, previously mentioned themes of neighbourhood inequality are 
explored further in the context of the physical environment, such as access to 
‘green space’ and exposure to air pollution. Fourth, research into the 
relationship between travel time and secondary health service provision is 
reviewed to highlight inequalities that exist in health service accessibility and 
utilisation in New Zealand. Finally, we conclude by locating the literature 
reviewed in this article within the current objectives of the MOH. 
 
Creating indices of access to factors in the built environment 
The development of suitable metrics to assess geographical access to a range of 
health-related community resources is a key part of geospatial health research. 
As such, GeoHealth researchers, in conjunction with collaborators from external 
research groups, have been proactive in producing refining and benchmark 
indices to measure health inequalities. Pearce et al. (2006) created an index of 
key resources that are important in the local New Zealand context, and that have 
a plausible biological pathway to influencing health. Five domains were 
identified with specific sub-domains in most: ‘recreational amenities’ including 
parks, sports and leisure facilities, and beaches; ‘shopping facilities’ including 
supermarkets, dairies, fruit and vegetable stores, and service stations; 
‘educational facilities’ including kindergartens, daycare/playcentres, primary 
schools, and intermediate/full primary schools; ‘health facilities’ including 
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general practitioners, pharmacies, accident and emergency, Plunket,1 
ambulance, and fire stations; and Marae.2 For all of the 38,350 Census 2006 
Meshblocks3 in New Zealand, accessibility to community resources was 
calculated using the travel time in minutes through the road network from the 
population weighted centroid within each meshblock to each sub-domain 
feature.  
Nationally, beaches were the least accessible community resource, while 
parks were the most accessible. Both provide opportunities for exercise, and 
have been linked to positive physical and mental health outcomes. Access to 
shopping facilities was found to be better in urban compared to rural areas, 
while outdoor sport and leisure facilities were, as might be expected, more 
accessible in rural areas. Pearce et al. (2006) also demonstrated that variations 
exist between neighbourhoods in urban areas. For instance, there is greater 
access to shopping facilities sub-domains, such as fresh food retailers, near city 
centres. This pattern of access exists along major transport thoroughfares also. 
However, compared to central-city dwellers, those on the semi-rural periphery 
have much poorer access. Intra-urban variations in access to facilities such as 
daycare centres also followed this trend.  
Building on this work, Pearce et al. (2007) drew on the New Zealand 
Deprivation Index (NZDep2006) - an area-level index of social deprivation - in 
combination with their prior community resource access indices to identify 
whether access inequalities exist across socioeconomic strata. With the 
exception of beaches, travel times to each sub-domain were shorter in the most 
deprived neighbourhoods compared to the least deprived. The ratio of travel 
time between the most deprived and least deprived neighbourhoods for each 
domain were as follows: ‘recreational amenities’ 0.70 (p<0.001), that is total 
travel time in the most deprived areas was 30% shorter compared to the least 
deprived; ‘shopping facilities’ 0.47 (p<0.001); ‘educational facilities’ 0.55 
(p<0.001); ‘health facilities’ 0.54 (p<0.001); and Marae 0.48 (p<0.001). This 
work was an important step in examining neighbourhood accessibility to 
resources in New Zealand, however the authors cited a number of limitations 
                                                            
1 Plunket is an incorporated society formed in 1907, and is New Zealand’s largest provider of 
care for children under the age of five. 
2 For Māori, the indigenous/first-nation people of New Zealand, Marae are ancestral village-
type spaces integral to their mana (identity/pride/strength/respect).  
3 Meshblocks are the smallest Census enumeration unit in New Zealand, each capturing a 
population of approximately 100 people. 
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that require attention in order to improve the assessment. In New Zealand, there 
is poor provision of public transport in many urban areas, and access to buses, 
taxis, and trains is largely non-existent in many rural areas. Further, because 
transport using private vehicles is itself patterned by socioeconomic status, the 
use of travel time as a determinant of access is not a uniform measure across 
groups. The index also did not take into account the quality, service capacity, 
and the population that was served by each resource. The fact that areas of high 
deprivation typically have higher population density,4 and therefore may require 
more community resources than less deprived areas, was also a limitation of the 
index. 
Witten et al. (2011) subsequently developed a Neighbourhood 
Destination Accessibility Index (NDAI) for meshblock units in four New 
Zealand cities: North Shore City; Waitakere City; Wellington; and 
Christchurch. These four cities were selected due to their relatively high 
socioeconomic and built environment diversity. Witten et al. (2011) increased 
the number of domains developed by Pearce et al. (2007) to include: Education; 
Transport; Recreation; Social and Cultural; Food Retail; Financial; Health; and 
Other Retail. Each sub-domain destination was an everyday activity or 
community resource that, through close proximity, may encourage local 
residents from a range of ages and life stages to walk for leisure and/or 
transport.  
          The NDAI has applications for three main areas of social policy and 
planning: first, identifying resources in the built environment that increase 
activity levels, have the potential to improve health outcomes of community 
residents, and that may reduce health inequalities between geographic areas and 
social groups; second, transport planning can use this information to inform 
strategies targeted at increasing active transport (for example walking and 
cycling) and reducing the reliance on vehicles for relatively short trips; and 
third, the NDAI is a starting point for evaluating differences between 
neighbourhoods in access to community resources and the transport behaviour 
of local residents. Between neighbourhood variations in resource accessibility in 
the NDAI were consistent with previous work (Pearce et al., 2006; Pearce et al., 
2007) as Witten et al. (2011) found that there is increased access to most 
                                                            
4 At the 2006 Census, population density was 3.3 times higher in the most deprived compared 
to the least deprived quintile. 
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resources in the index in more deprived areas compared to less deprived, after 
controlling for population density.  
The previous indices focused on elements of the built environment, 
without being able to account for variations in underlying social factors that 
may influence the location of services, or how individuals will access and utilise 
them. Pearson et al. (2011), in their development of the Resilience Index New 
Zealand (RINZ), further emphasised the need to better understand the social 
cohesion of communities. In particular, attention was paid to the interactions 
between individuals and their neighbourhoods, instead of simply identifying the 
presence, or lack of, specific neighbourhood resources. RINZ was created with 
the aim of identifying characteristics in the built environment that may explain 
why some neighbourhoods have unexpectedly good health outcomes in the 
context of a relatively deprived socioeconomic setting. These are considered to 
be resilient neighbourhoods and the authors found they could be generally be 
typified as being in main urban areas, and having lower overall environmental 
deprivation, better access to safe drinking water, and lower access to gambling 
and alcohol outlets. Higher population density and a potentially protective 
factor attributed to Māori population density, both aspects of neighbourhood 
social composition, were also evident in the findings. The authors highlighted 
the importance of interactions between individuals and their neighbourhood, the 
perceptions residents have towards their local environment, and the role of 
social networks as important for understanding the role that social constructs 
play in promoting neighbourhood resilience.  
Elements of social cohesion were explored further by Pearson et al. 
(2013) in their analysis of how socioeconomic isolation is associated with 
mental health outcomes among the most deprived neighbourhoods in Auckland. 
The authors created a spatial isolation index which quantified isolated areas that 
were deprived, yet surrounded by, affluent areas. These areas were believed to 
have high levels of ‘social comparison’ present where individuals are exposed 
to people of lower relative deprivation, which may in turn may affect negative 
views of the circumstances of their own lives. This is in contrast to residents of 
deprived neighbourhoods that are surrounded by areas with similar level of 
deprivation, which arguably may result in higher levels of social cohesion. 
Among deprived neighbourhoods in Auckland, the most isolated deprived 
areas had 36% higher rates of anxiety/mood disorder compared to the least 
isolated deprived areas. The most isolated deprived areas also had 8% higher 
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rates of individuals with anxiety/mood disorder who were also receiving 
secondary treatment for alcohol/drug abuse. After adjusting for percent male, 
percent Māori, percent Pacific Peoples, and access to general practitioners 
(GPs), 56% higher levels of anxiety/mood disorder treatment were found in the 
most compared to the least isolated deprived neighbourhoods. This work has 
provided evidence to support the application of previous neighbourhood 
indices: communities with higher levels of social cohesion and interactions may 
improve the health outcomes and behaviours of those living there. 
          While not a complete solution in itself, the creation of indices in 
geospatial health research has enhanced our understanding of the patterns and 
processes that generate differences between neighbourhoods in New Zealand. 
The ability to identity and model spatial health inequality more effectively 
offers, among other things, more options for informing policy designed to 
increase the social capital within communities. Further, enhanced indices-based 
modelling techniques may assist in more cost-effective means to identify at-risk 
communities. Better understanding of where to target funding will help 
initiatives aimed at empowering communities to shape the future of their 
neighbourhood based on the collective attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours of the 
residents. In doing so, it is hoped cohesion and resilience can be improved at the 
community/neighbourhood level. 
 
Inequalities in access to undesirable neighbourhood destinations 
A major focus of neighbourhoods and health research conducted through the 
GeoHealth Laboratory has directed attention towards the role that factors in the 
built environment may play in contributing to inequalities between social and 
ethnic groups in New Zealand. In particular, access to neighbourhood provision 
of tobacco, alcohol, food sources, and gambling opportunities have been 
explored using a range of GIS techniques. 
Tobacco outlets 
Barnett et al. (2004) and Pearce et al. (2011) describe three major 
elements of the built and social environment within neighbourhoods that may 
influence individual smoking behaviour. First, material influences in healthy or 
unhealthy infrastructure and provision or lack of tobacco availability, may serve 
to increase or reduce smoking behaviour by influencing community norms. 
Second, social capital and neighbourhood social practices can serve to reinforce 
particular behaviours among residents. By example, neighbourhoods with low 
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social capital and social practices that see smoking as an acceptable behaviour 
are less likely to prevent initiation or encourage cessation among individuals. 
Third, place based regulation and policy targeting the retail tobacco 
environment by restricting availability and presence of tobacco products in 
outlets, and banning advertising of tobacco products in neighbourhoods and 
stores, is also strongly attributed to individual smoking behaviour at the 
neighbourhood level. 
 Pearce et al. (2008), in their analysis of retail tobacco outlets and 
individual smoking behaviour in New Zealand, found higher access to, and 
concentration of, tobacco outlets in more deprived areas. However, increased 
neighbourhood access to tobacco products in supermarkets and convenience 
stores was only moderately associated with higher levels of individual smoking. 
The authors state that effects may be different across groups, and that young 
people and sole parents who are more likely to lack adequate transport, may 
benefit most from restrictions on retail tobacco sales. Conversely, greater 
neighbourhood access and exposure to tobacco outlets may serve to normalise 
smoking behaviour, and in turn facilitate addiction and decrease the ability of 
individuals to quit. 
 Bowie (2011) examined adolescent smoking behaviour in relation to 
neighbourhood access to tobacco outlets, as well as the density of outlets around 
high schools. There was evidence of increased outlets in deprived 
neighbourhoods, but no evidence of variation in the number of outlets around 
deprived compared to affluent schools. Higher rates of adolescent smoking were 
associated with more outlets within 800m of neighbourhoods, however 
adjustment for area-level deprivation attenuated this relationship. Within 3000m 
of neighbourhoods, and after adjustment for deprivation, a positive association 
between outlet counts and female smoking rates remained. There was a negative 
association between outlet counts within 3000m and adolescent males and 
females who had never smoked. Because access to retail tobacco outlets is often 
high in both deprived and affluent neighbourhoods throughout New Zealand, it 
has been difficult to conclusively link access to smoking behaviour.  
Alcohol outlets 
 Pearce et al. (2008) examined access to off-license alcohol outlets in New 
Zealand and found a clear social gradient when neighbourhoods were stratified 
by deprivation. The most deprived neighbourhoods had 4.99 more outlets per 
100,000 residents compared to the least deprived. Variation in access was 
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demonstrated for all outlet types: hotels, taverns, or clubs (with an outlet per 
capita ratio between least and most deprived of 7.07); bottle stores (3.51); and 
supermarket/grocery stores (2.76). Within an 800m buffer from neighbourhood 
meshblock centroids, similar results were found. The most deprived 
neighbourhoods were 2.98 times more likely to have six or more outlets close 
by compared to the least deprived. This inequality in access to alcohol outlets is 
expected to drive inequalities in both drinking behaviour, and related health 
outcomes, between areas of high and low deprivation. 
 Pearson et al. (2013) used multiple GIS techniques to determine if 
socioeconomic inequalities in neighbourhood access to alcohol outlets were 
associated with alcohol/drug abuse treatment among individuals previously 
diagnosed with anxiety/mood disorder. Alcohol consumption is often used by 
individuals with anxiety/mood disorder as a self-coping strategy (Thomas et al., 
2005). This may lead to alcohol abuse among already vulnerable individuals, a 
behaviour that may be driven by greater access to alcohol outlets. Pearson et al. 
(2013) found that road network distance to the nearest outlet was associated 
with dual anxiety/mood disorder and with alcohol/substance abuse diagnosis. 
Areas in the quintile of best access had 37% higher rates of dual diagnosis than 
those with the worst access. Density of outlets within a 3000m road network 
buffer was also associated with dual diagnosis. Rates of dual diagnosis were 
76% higher in areas with the best compared to the worst access. This research 
suggests that health and urban policy should enable Liquor Licensing 
Authorities to take into account access to existing outlets when granting new 
licenses. 
 Day et al. (2012) provides further support for measures that reduce the 
density of alcohol outlets, particularly in low socioeconomic neighbourhoods, 
as these areas are often home to vulnerable populations. Their work examined 
the relationship between outlet density and serious violent crime in New 
Zealand. After adjusting for neighbourhood deprivation, access to alcohol 
outlets was associated with higher levels of serious violence. In relation to 
Police station catchments, the quintile of areas that have the highest violent 
offences rates had 2-2.5 times more alcohol outlets compared to areas with the 
lowest rates. Low socioeconomic areas are already over-represented in violent 
crime statistics, and Day et al. (2012) demonstrate that the clustering of alcohol 
outlets in these areas may be an important driver of this. 
Gambling opportunities 
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 In New Zealand, there is a strong social gradient in problem gambling, 
with a much higher prevalence among low socioeconomic groups, as well as 
among Māori and Pacific populations. Rates of gambling have been shown to 
be approximately three times higher in the most deprived neighbourhoods 
compared to the least deprived, and gaming machines are also more prevalent in 
these areas. Pearce et al. (2008) examined neighbourhood access to gambling 
opportunities and individual gambling and problem gambling behaviour in New 
Zealand. They found that travel distance to the nearest gambling destination was 
typically double in the least deprived compared to the most deprived 
neighbourhoods,  The median number of outlets within 5000m of 
neighbourhoods was also higher in the most (n=26) compared to the least 
(n=17) deprived neighbourhoods. 
 Pearce et al. (2008) identified that individual gambling behaviour was 
associated with neighbourhood access to gambling opportunities. After 
adjusting for individual and neighbourhood socioeconomic status and 
urban/rural status, closer proximity to any gambling venue type was positively 
associated with individual gambling, with an odds ratio of 1.51 between 
neighbourhoods with the greatest compared to the worst access. The same was 
true for density of outlets within a 5000m buffer, where an odds ratio of 1.67 
was found for neighbourhoods with the greatest number of venues compared to 
neighbourhoods with no venues. Neighbourhood access to gambling venues was 
also positively associated with problem gambling among individuals. 
Neighbourhoods with the shortest distance to any type of gambling venue had a 
2.05 times higher odds of problem gambling than those with the furthest 
distance. Such evidence supports recent local government moves to restrict the 
number of Class 4 (non-casino) gambling venue gaming machines, which are 
often in close proximity to residential areas. 
Food retailers 
 Unlike alcohol, tobacco, and gambling opportunities, which all are 
identified as having negative impacts on neighbourhood health outcomes, 
access to food retailers has the potential to either promote or inhibit health 
outcomes, depending on the type of outlet. By example, fast-food outlets and 
convenience stores are locations where the availability of healthy food options 
is often limited. Clustering of unhealthy food outlets has led to the term 
‘obesogenic environments’, an umbrella term coined to help frame research into 
how locational access to these retailers may affect weight related health 
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outcomes of local residents. In contrast with fast-food outlets, within the 
obesogenic literature, supermarkets, grocery stores, and produce vendors are 
most often regarded as providing consumers with the opportunity to make 
healthy food choices (Lovasi et al., 2009; Giskes et al., 2011). 
In New Zealand, obesity rates have doubled in the past 25 years, and the 
nation now has the worlds’ third highest rate of obesity. There is evidence of 
large social inequalities of obesity, with much higher rates among deprived 
groups, and these inequalities are evident between ethnic groups also (Pearce et 
al., 2007). Obesogenic environments have been suggested as a contextual factor 
in explaining the unequal social distribution of this growing epidemic. 
Obesogenic environments surrounding and within schools have received 
particular attention due to the high rates of obesity emerging among children 
and adolescents. 
Pearce et al. (2007) found that exposure to unhealthy food options in 
school areas where children spend much of their time may influence the diet of 
students. Shorter travel distance to fast-food outlets was also evident around the 
most deprived schools across New Zealand. Spatial cluster analysis of this 
relationship from Day and Pearce (2011) found that there were three times more 
convenience stores and fast-food outlets within 800m of the most deprived 
schools compared to the least deprived. There was also evidence of school 
clustering of outlets nationwide, with higher than would be expected numbers of 
both fast-food and convenience stores within 1.5km of schools. Of concern is 
the higher ratio of outlets within a road network distance of 400m and 800m 
from schools, compared to the 1,200m and 1,500m buffers that were measured, 
as this indicates better access to unhealthy food outlets within relatively close 
walking distance from schools. 
Pearce et al. (2007) also examined neighbourhood access to fast-food and 
healthy food retailing in New Zealand in relation to socioeconomic status. 
Nationally, significantly shorter travel distance to both international and locally 
operated fast-food outlets was found in the most deprived compared to the least 
deprived neighbourhoods. Distances to the nearest fast-food outlet were at least 
twice as far in the most compared to the least deprived areas. After adjusting for 
population density, the results were statistically significant. Access to 
supermarkets and other food retailers selling potentially healthier options was 
also better in the most deprived neighbourhoods. These findings were repeated 
in a follow up study from Pearce et al. (2008), which examined the density of 
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supermarkets, convenience stores, and fast-food outlets within 800m of New 
Zealand neighbourhoods.  
Following this proximity analysis, Pearce et al. (2008) researched the 
effect of neighbourhood access to supermarkets and convenience stores on the 
fruit and vegetable consumption of local residents. Using travel time as the 
access measure, consumption of fruit was not associated with access to 
supermarkets or convenience stores in New Zealand. No association between 
consumption of vegetables and supermarkets was evident, however individuals 
in neighbourhoods with the best access to convenience stores had 25% lower 
odds of eating the recommended daily vegetable intake compared to those with 
the worst access. This may be representative of convenience stores being a 
source of generally unhealthy food choices, such as ready to eat foods and high 
sugar content drinks. 
 Using BMI data from the New Zealand Health Survey (2002/03), Pearce 
et al. (2009) subsequently examined the relationship between neighbourhood 
access to fast-food outlets and the diet related health outcomes of individuals. 
Compared to the findings relating to convenience store access in the previous 
study (Pearce et al., 2008), recommended daily vegetable, but not fruit intake, 
was lower among residents of neighbourhoods with better access to fast-food 
outlets. In contrast to the expected outcome, the odds of being overweight were 
higher in neighbourhoods with the worst access to fast-food outlets. Based on 
this research, the authors concluded that neighbourhood access to fast-food 
outlets is unlikely to be a contextual driver of social inequalities in obesity in 
New Zealand. 
In each of these studies, the authors note that while access may be better 
in deprived areas, the increased distance from affluent neighbourhoods is not 
large. Retailers selling both healthy and unhealthy food options may be attracted 
to low socioeconomic areas for reasons already outlined in this article, such as 
low land/rent costs, and a lack of community resistance. Despite a higher 
concentration of fast-food outlets being located in poorer neighbourhoods, these 
services are still highly accessible to individuals living in more affluent 
neighbourhoods. 
  
The influence of neighbourhood physical environments on health 
inequalities  
There are elements of the physical environment of neighbourhoods that may 
promote or inhibit health outcomes of the local community. Previous GeoHealth 
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Laboratory work has focused on access to green spaces, such as parks and 
reserves, which are believed to be associated with better physical and mental 
health outcomes. Inequalities and themes of social injustice relating to air 
pollution exposure, which is associated with ill-health, have also been explored. 
Access to ‘green space’ 
Access to recreational amenities in the neighbourhood environment has 
increasingly been studied in health geography literature. Neighbourhood 
environmental factors can be grouped into four categories: functional factors, 
such as street and path design and traffic flows; safety factors; neighbourhood 
aesthetics; and destinations (Pikora et al., 2003). Previous work has found that 
physical activity among residents increases with the number of recreational 
amenities nearby. The relationship varied by amenity type, use of sporting and 
recreational venues was less sensitive to distance than open spaces (Giles-Corti 
and Donovan, 2002; Giles-Corti et al., 2005). Higher rates of physical activity 
and lower obesity were observed in neighbourhoods with better access to leisure 
facilities, open green space, and beaches. 
Witten et al. (2008), in their study of neighbourhood access to open 
spaces and the physical activity of residents, found little variation in BMI and 
physical activity and park accessibility. There was evidence of lower BMI 
among residents with the best access to the beach, after adjusting for 
socioeconomic status and urban/rural status. Respondents with the best access 
to the beach were also more likely to carry out recommended levels of physical 
activity and were less likely to be sedentary. 
The role of green space and the effect on mental health has received 
considerable attention by health geographers. There are three proposed 
mechanisms for how green space can influence health: first, by providing 
increased opportunities for physical activity, improving both physical and 
mental health outcomes (Barton and Petty, 2012); second, increasing the 
opportunities for social interaction to occur (Zhou and Rana, 2012); and third, 
exposure to green space can provide restorative effects and reduce stress which 
has an etiologic association with chronic physical and mental illness (Ward 
Thompson et al., 2012). Internationally, low socioeconomic neighbourhoods 
have been shown to have poorer access to urban green space, and this may 
contribute to inequalities in physical activity and health outcomes between more 
and less deprived communities (Comber et al., 2008). As stated, more deprived 
neighbourhoods in New Zealand have been shown to have better access to green 
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space than less deprived areas (Pearce et al., 2007; Pearce et al., 2008). 
Subsequently, local literature has focused on the usable qualities of green space 
in relation to neighbourhood access and health outcomes. 
Richardson et al. (2013) calculated the percentage coverage of total and 
usable green space within New Zealand Census Area Units5. Usable green space 
was defined as urban parkland; open spaces; beaches; and non-commercial, 
accessible forestry. The authors examined the association between the 
proportion of neighbourhood green space and two causes of mortality: 
Cardiovascular disease (CVD), which might be associated with green space 
through effects on physical activity and stress; and lung cancer, which was not 
expected to be associated with green space due to a very small link to physical 
activity. There was a contrasting socioeconomic gradient in neighbourhood 
green space coverage, where increasing deprivation was associated with lower 
total, but higher usable, green space coverage. This research found no 
association between CVD and either total or usable green space after adjusting 
for area level demographics, deprivation, smoking rates, and air pollution. The 
authors considered that a lack of variation in exposure to green space between 
New Zealand neighbourhoods, together with the high amount of green space in 
private gardens that were not included in the model, were limiting factors in 
their research into neighbourhood green space on health. Richardson et al. 
(2013) argue  that focusing on the quality of green space and the neighbourhood 
environment may be a better predictor of health than green space quantity alone. 
 Further to this work, Richardson et al. (2013) examined the association 
between total neighbourhood green space and four health outcomes: CVD, 
overweight/obese, poor general health, and poor mental health. The role of 
physical activity as a mediator in these associations was also investigated. After 
adjusting for individual-level covariates, neighbourhood green space coverage 
was associated with lower risk of both CVD and poor mental health. Individuals 
living in the quintile of neighbourhoods with the highest proportion of green 
space had higher levels of physical activity, including physical activity. 
Although Richardson et al. (2013) argue that their findings only partially 
explained the relationship between green space and health, this work was the 
first to find positive associations between green space and health in New 
Zealand. 
                                                            
5 Statistical boundaries that usually have a population between 3000 to 5000 individuals and 
that vary in geographic size. 
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 Nutsford et al. (2013) derived a range of neighbourhood to green space 
access measures to examine the relationship with anxiety/mood disorder 
treatment in Auckland, New Zealand. For both total and usable green space, the 
authors calculated road network distance to the nearest green space, proportion 
of green space within 300 meters, and proportion green space within 3000 
meters from each meshblock. Distance to the nearest usable green space was 
associated with anxiety/mood disorder treatment counts. Nutsford et al. (2013) 
found that every 100m decrease in distance to usable green space resulted in 3% 
lower treatment counts. The proportion of green space within 3000m was also 
associated with mental health. For each 1% increase in both total and usable 
green space, anxiety/mood disorder treatment dropped by 4%. This research 
supports two hypotheses of how green space can influence health outcomes: 
first, through exposure to a restorative and stress-reducing environment and; 
second, the authors suggest a physical activity component based on the 
relationship between distance to nearest usable green space. 
 Richardson et al. (2013) and Nutsford et al. (2013) have identified the 
potential for future work to further explore the role green space plays in 
improving mental health, particularly in light of conflicting and negative 
associations with some physical health outcomes. Given that deprived 
neighbourhoods have been demonstrated to have relatively good access to green 
space in New Zealand, future work should focus on the role that quality of these 
spaces and the surrounding neighbourhood environment, along with measures 
of private green space. Such work could incorporate potential barriers to using 
recreational amenities, such as fear and safety, particularly around age, and 
gender and ethnic preferences. 
 
Exposure to air pollution 
Air pollution and health has been a long established area of research in the 
GeoHealth Laboratory, research outputs have included a series of reviews and 
commentaries that contribute both to local (Kingham, 2011; Kingham and 
Dorset, 2011) and international (Wilson et al., 2005; Wilson et al., 2006) 
understanding of air quality and health issues. The research projects have 
included a series of papers that would broadly be classified as environmental 
epidemiology. This includes work that has attempted to assess population 
exposure to poor quality are both spatially (Kingham et al., 2008) and 
temporally (Kingham et al., 2006). The results of this work have then been used 
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to relate to various spatial (Kingham et al., 2008) and temporal (Cavanagh et al., 
2006; Epton et al., 2008) health outcomes while a further temporal analysis 
paper included the air quality methods within the health paper from Wilson et 
al. (2010). Rarely are relationships between air quality and health 
straightforward with a range of confounders and challenging methodological 
issues. Some of these have been the specific focus of research including a study 
by Sabel et al. (2007) that examined the role of confounders within an intra-
urban context and Fukuda et al. (2010) which found that the effect of spatial 
variation in air pollution on adverse health outcomes in winter can be identified 
more accurately if viral infection data is accounted for. 
Inequalities in exposure to air pollution and rates of related health 
outcomes have become increasingly polarised in New Zealand over the past 25 
years with lower socioeconomic neighbourhoods tending to have higher rates of 
air pollution related illness compared to more affluent areas. However, research 
suggests that these areas may suffer a disproportionate burden of harm. This 
theme of environmental justice has been applied in air pollution research, with 
studies increasingly showing that neighbourhoods with the most sources of 
emission have the lowest levels of pollution Kingham et al. (2007). 
Pearce et al. (2006) suggest four reasons why environmental harm is 
unequally distributed spatially throughout the population. First, low 
socioeconomic groups may have a lower overall demand for environmental 
quality; second, disadvantaged groups tend to be less educated and less aware of 
the potentially adverse effects; third, disadvantaged communities lack the social 
cohesion to resist corporate and political influences; and last, institutional 
discrimination may have influence over the location of pollution sources. From 
within this framework, Pearce et al. (2006; 2007) examined social and 
geographic inequities in domestic heating-related air pollution in Christchurch, 
New Zealand. In these studies, the most deprived neighbourhoods suffered more 
than areas of average to high socioeconomic status. In addition, air pollution 
levels were significantly lower in areas with more domestic wood burners. The 
effects of the inequality in the distribution of air pollution are exacerbated by 
the fact that individuals living in areas with the greatest exposure (low 
socioeconomic status) are predisposed to be vulnerable to the health effects of 
air pollution because of underlying health conditions, more barriers in access to 
healthcare, and poor housing conditions. Following these studies, Kingham et 
al. (2007) examined inequalities in exposure to vehicle related air pollution in 
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Christchurch. Like sources of domestic heating, the most deprived 
neighbourhoods had 1.5-2.0 times more vehicle related air pollution compared 
to more affluent areas. Areas with the highest level of vehicle ownership had the 
lowest levels of vehicle pollution, suggesting that those responsible for 
producing the most suffer the least. 
With social and geographic inequalities in air pollution sources and 
exposure well documented, Richardson et al. (2011) studied this association by 
comparing air pollution levels and associated respiratory illness in New 
Zealand. The authors examined if air pollution is associated with respiratory 
disease mortality, and if individuals living in low socioeconomic areas suffer a 
greater predisposition to air pollution exposure. Richardson et al. (2011) found 
that exposure to air pollution was associated with respiratory disease mortality, 
as areas with the highest levels of air pollution had an 18% greater risk of 
respiratory disease mortality compared to areas with the lowest levels of 
exposure. Significant inequalities in respiratory disease mortality existed 
between low and high socioeconomic areas, however the role of socioeconomic 
status was not a significant modifier in the relationship between mortality and 
pollution. This study suggests that disadvantaged communities are not more 
susceptible to the effects of air pollution, but they do suffer a greater burden 
pollution related disease. In order for air pollution related health inequalities to 
be reduced, initiatives to reduce air pollution levels must be targeted towards 
achieving reductions in low socioeconomic areas. 
 
Inequalities in access to and utilisation of health services 
Patterns of inequality of healthcare utilisation were highlighted by Barnett and 
Lauer (2003) in their study of neighbourhood deprivation and hospital 
admissions in Christchurch for the period 1990-1997. The authors found that 
total admission rates rose during the study period, however there was evidence 
of social polarization in their results. The likelihood of hospitalisation for 
individuals living in the most deprived, compared the least deprived 
neighbourhoods, rose from 1.67:1 in 1990 to 2.21 in 1997. The socioeconomic 
gradient in admissions changed markedly as well: for every one decile unit rise 
in deprivation in 1990, hospital admission rates rose by 2.86/1,000 people. By 
1997, this had increased to 7.38/1,000. Socioeconomic polarisation in multiple 
admissions increased during the study period also.  The rate of admission from 
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the most deprived neighbourhoods was 3.26 times higher than from the least 
deprived neighbourhoods in 1997, compared to 1990. 
 There was evidence of inequalities in length of stay between groups, with 
patients from the most deprived neighbourhoods staying, on average, 6.5% or 
0.34 fewer days than individuals from the least deprived. A lower length of stay 
is likely to be reflective of poorer quality of care, and this may result in higher 
readmission rates. The authors found evidence that readmission was higher 
among more deprived groups and that there was a widening of the gap between 
deprived and affluent neighbourhoods over time. In 1990, an increase of one 
decile of neighbourhood deprivation was associated with an increase in 
readmission rates of 1.16/1,000. By 1997, this had risen to 3.77/1,000. Just as 
lower length of stay may result in higher readmission rates, these high rates may 
in turn lead to pressure on bed space and force higher turnover of patients. It is 
possible that individuals with particular illnesses may be more likely to be 
discharged sooner, and there was evidence in this study of differences between 
socioeconomic groups in the causes of admission. Individuals from the most 
deprived areas were more likely to be readmitted with asthma and other 
respiratory diseases, chronic airway obstruction, and pneumonia, while the least 
deprived patients were more likely to be readmitted for ongoing treatment of 
various forms of heart disease. 
 Barnett and Barnett (2004) subsequently examined the role of 
socioeconomic status in utilisation of general practitioners (GPs), the main 
source of primary care in New Zealand. Unlike many hospital admissions, there 
is a cost associated with consultation and treatment from GPs. This is believed 
to be significant enough to deter individuals, particularly from low 
socioeconomic groups, from seeking prompt and adequate care. The financial 
barrier that GP fees present for some people may increase pressure on hospital 
services, with avoidable admissions tying up resources that should otherwise be 
treated in a GP setting. The authors found that patients who are faced with 
financial difficulties were more likely to delay seeking care and medication, and 
were also more likely to seek financial help from their GP. From a practice 
setting, GPs in deprived neighbourhoods were more likely to charge lower fees 
than those in affluent areas, however they were generally less flexible in the 
provision of financial options to patients. Beyond direct costs to GPs, Barnett 
and Barnett (2004) cited direct correlations between distance and the utilisation 
of GP and hospital services. There is also evidence of an undersupply of GPs 
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located in low socioeconomic neighbourhoods, and an oversupply in more 
affluent areas. Individual perceptions of access to care in deprived, high need 
areas are likely to be low if there is significant travel distance required and few 
providers serving the population. 
 The effect of neighbourhood access to GPs was further explored by 
Hiscock et al. (2008) to determine if travel time is a predictor of utilisation and 
patient satisfaction. Residents living in neighbourhoods with the longest travel 
time to GPs were less likely to have visited a GP in the previous year (Odds 
Ratio 0.74). However, this relationship was present only in rural and secondary 
urban areas, with no relationship in urban areas after adjustment. There was no 
evidence that travel time was associated with healthcare service satisfaction, 
and as the relationship with utilisation was not consistent, the authors concluded 
that access to GPs could not explain health inequalities in New Zealand. The 
association with travel time and utilisation in rural communities should also be 
set within the wider challenges faced by health care providers serving rural 
communities that cover large geographic areas and that correspondingly have 
isolated residents. 
Brewer et al. (2012) set their analysis of access to healthcare services in 
the context of travel time and distance to services and inequalities between 
ethnic groups in cervical cancer diagnosis and mortality trends in New Zealand. 
Previously in New Zealand, marked ethnic inequalities in cervical cancer 
incidence and mortality have been found, with Māori and Pacific women at 
higher risk compared to European women (Ministry of Health, 2010). Māori 
and Pacific women were also comparatively under-screened (Smith et al., 
2011), and there is evidence of large differences between groups in the stage of 
cervical cancer at diagnosis (Brewer et al., 2009). This study found weak 
associations between travel time/distance and cervical cancer screening, stage at 
diagnosis, and mortality among New Zealand women. The primary effects of 
travel time, though weak, were associated with ethnic variation in cervical 
cancer stage at diagnosis but not the subsequent survival rates. 
 
Beyond the GeoHealth Laboratory: spatial health data and research in 
New Zealand 
The previously discussed indices and measurements of access to neighbourhood 
resources and subsequent population level health outcomes and behaviours have 
set the scene for research focused at smaller spatial scales. Aggregated datasets 
have been useful in identifying potential health promoters or barriers in the 
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natural and urban environment however the underlying causal pathways cannot 
be fully understood using these methods. Emerging research has begun to focus 
on how individuals interact with their physical environment on a daily basis to 
examine how behaviours and perceptions of residents vary between and within 
neighbourhoods. A large aspect of this work has been raw data collection to 
better understand and explain the processes of interest and answer more specific 
research questions that have developed out of previous work, such as that 
discussed in this article, that has been largely ecological in nature. Two major 
goals are clear from this data collection and research: to better inform policy 
makers and provide benefits to local communities through tangible solutions 
and outcomes. 
Spatial health data 
Health data in New Zealand is collected at a local (practitioner), regional 
(District Health Board (DHB)), and national level, however, most primary care 
services are private and are not under statute to provide data for national 
collection. Data for primary health care services can be sought directly through 
DHBs or through local health care providers: Public Health Organizations 
(PHOs). DHBs are funded and monitored by the MOH and this provides the 
basis for collection of data at a national level. The MOH collects individual 
records for hospital inpatients and non-admitted hospital patients (e.g. 
Emergency presentations), laboratory tests conducted, prescriptions collected, 
and primary care enrolment.  In addition to this core data the MOH also collects 
data on directly funded services (e.g. telephone lines, national initiatives 
(immunization, well-child checks) and pilot schemes).  
Almost all individual health data collected centrally has a unique 
identifier attached to it, known as the National Health Index (NHI), and a spatial 
component, meshblock of domicile. Having the NHI means that datasets can 
easily be joined together and used to form supplementary, enhanced 
information. For example a virtual diabetes register has been made using 
laboratory, hospital and pharmaceutical records.  
Lastly, the MOH conducts a continuous, National Health Survey, which 
consists of  a set of core questions combined with a flexible programme of 
rotating topic areas/modules – for example health surface utilization(Ministry of 
Health, 2013). The survey is rich in robust data which cannot be collected 
elsewhere, for example information on weight, exercise, Health service 
utilization and health behaviours. Survey data can be linked to geography 
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through the respondents Meshblocks or domicile and it is this ability that has 
enabled the development of indices of access to factors in the built environment. 
Neighbourhoods and health research groups 
The University of Otago’s Department of Public Health is a major 
contributor in the field of neighbourhood effects on health. The 
Neighbourhoods and Health project, running since 2004, has focused on 
measuring community resources and both social cohesion and social 
fragmentation to examine the association with morbidity and mortality. This has 
been achieved through analysis of existing data as well as the collection of new 
information (University of Otago, 2013). Alongside this work is He Kainga 
Oranga, the Housing and Health research programme. Links to ill-health as a 
result of poor housing stock are well known in a New Zealand context however 
the causal pathway of this relationship is not well understood. The multi-
disciplinary research team working on this project is furthering knowledge in 
this field and has a strong policy focus. By utilizing existing data and carrying 
out new studies they aim to introduce housing-related interventions that will 
improve the health of individuals, families, communities and the population as a 
whole (University of Otago, 2013). 
The New Zealand Centre for Sustainable Cities has brought together 
multi-disciplinary experts, including current and ex-GeoHealth staff, to 
investigate solutions that provide for cities that a built foundations of resilience, 
live-ability and competitiveness. There are a number of core project strands in 
their Resilient Urban Features Programme that cover urban change and 
development, community form and social development, infrastructure and 
transportation, environmental exposures and effects. This work has a strong 
focus on policy outcomes and has experimented with local trials, such as rental 
housing Warrant of Fitness and cycleways, to better realize the opportunity for 
wider implementation. Funding is provided by the Ministry of Business, 
Innovation and Employment (Centre for Sustainable Cities, 2013). 
SHORE, based at Massey University, undertakes research spread across a 
range of health and social topics. Neighbourhood determinants of health and 
wellbeing and sustainable cities are two key themes of this research. Access to 
tobacco, alcohol and gambling opportunities at a community level and the 
associated behaviours and health outcomes have also received attention from 
this group. This research draws on qualitative and quantitative techniques to 
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inform policy makers and carry out community based research (Massey 
University, 2013). 
 
Concluding remarks in light of current health sector priorities 
The Geohealth Laboratory work reviewed in this article  represent research 
priorities relating to  neighbourhood access to factors in the built environment 
that can affect health outcomes, demonstrating the wide range of research that 
we have done in this space. Although overseen by and aligned to the current 
priorities and objectives of the Ministry of Health, the GeoHealth Laboratory 
remains a status as an independent research entity. As a consequence, a number 
of publications have generated sector and media interest and debate (Todd, 
2011). In the context of the current health sector there are several debates that 
our work has been able to contribute to.  
First, work outlined in the inequalities in factors of the built 
neighbourhood environment section has contributed to debates relating to the 
degree to which government control over health behaviour should take 
precedence over personal choice.. For example, left uncontrolled we have 
shown fast-food, tobacco and alcohol outlets are more likely to locate next to 
deprived areas than next to affluent areas. Recently, the New Zealand Burden of 
Disease study, a systematic analysis of health loss by cause for New Zealanders, 
highlighted key risk factors for health loss i.e. poor health (Ministry of Health, 
2013), among these were substance use (tobacco, alcohol and illicit drugs) and 
dietary risk factors. 
Second, research by the GeoHealth Laboratory relating to the 
equity/efficiency models of health service provision has provided evidence of 
the inequalities in access to, and utilisation of, health services. We have shown 
that an undersupply of health services in deprived neighbourhoods, significant 
travel distances, and financial barriers, whether perceived or real (co-payments 
have largely reduced costs to zero for low SES groups) all affect health service 
use by deprived groups (Hiscock et al., 2008). This was confirmed recently by 
the New Zealand Health survey which showed that rates of unmet need were 
higher in deprived areas (Ministry of Health, 2012). Undertaking work of this 
nature has helped to inform policy for delivering health services ‘closer to 
home’ in an economic climate where health funding has focused on centralised, 
co-located services. 
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Lastly, it should be noted that New Zealand is not unique in experiencing 
the health issues identified above. For instance, the recent global burden of 
disease study highlighted an increase in non-communicable diseases such as 
ischemic heart disease and diabetes, and a shift towards disabling causes rather 
than fatal causes in developed countries. This is mainly due to population aging 
and to a lesser extent, population growth. In Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and 
richer countries in Western Europe and North America, health loss for non-
communicable diseases contributed to more than 80% of all health loss (IHME, 
2013). Thus our research is applicable to and has influences wider than just 
New Zealand, but can be applied globally.  
There is still a significant amount of research to undertake. The geospatial 
and health landscape is constantly changing. New health priorities, further 
improvements in health data quality, and new technologies in GIS, are all 
allowing us to progress research which hitherto, was never possible.  The New 
Zealand Burden of Disease study, which highlighted some recent major areas of 
health concern such as cancer, vascular and blood, and mental disorders, 
coupled with rising health care costs and the need for better local regional and 
national planning, is fuelling recognition of the importance of geospatial 
research.  The continuous New Zealand Health survey, previously held every 
four years (and annually since 2011), allows the opportunity to explore robust 
spatial data on specific topics such as patient choices and health behaviours over 
time. Health sector-wide geocoding of patient addresses at point of entry will 
improve the accuracy of administrative health data and improve the confidence 
of results. Further, sophisticated geographical techniques such as spatial micro 
simulation (Campbell and Ballas, 2013), hill shading (Llobera, 2003), can be 
juxtaposed against simple online applications to display and disseminate 
research results, making a wide range of data available to policy and decision 
makers. 
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Abstract 
From the early 2000s, the financialisation of global capitalism 
reshaped the strategies of transnational media conglomerates.  As 
financial institutions expanded their operations, non-financial 
corporations became seen as an assemblage of business units that 
ought to be continuously restructured to maximise share price 
performance and profit rates.  Media corporations thereby moved 
away from conglomeration toward a strategy of rationalizing holdings 
around strong market positions in certain sectors.  Aggressive, 
unlisted financial operators, such as financial equity companies, 
regard media holdings as a lucrative source of revenue by means of 
acquisition and/or a leveraged buyout.  In this context, we argue that 
those transnational media corporates that have colonized the New 
Zealand mediascape are themselves becoming colonized by listed and 
unlisted financial institutions. This process is well-advanced in the 
cases of MediaWorks, Fairfax and APN and News Media. Their 
difficulties have been exacerbated by an historic decline in print news 
readership and concerns about the commercial viability of on-line 
news provision. More recently, financial interests have increased their 
ownership stake in Sky Television. Together, these developments 
point to an uncertain future for commercial media organizations and 
media professionals alike.  Meanwhile, mainstream news media 
coverage continues to thin out as advertising culture prevails. 
 
 
Introduction: financialisation and global media 
From about 1980 media-communication conglomerates with lucrative holdings 
across key media markets took over stand-alone businesses.  Major players such 
as Time Warner, Bertelsmann, Viacom, Disney, NBC Universal and News 
Corporation subsequently acquired worldwide cross-media portfolios.  During 
the 1990s and early 2000s a global oligopoly of media entertainment 
corporations established a dominating presence across core areas of cultural 
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production and leisure activity (film, television, recorded music, print media, 
hotels, resorts, theme parks)  Each corporation sought to control the production 
and distribution of cultural content through vertical integration.  Within the 
media entertainment system as such, advances in internet applications, digital 
`television and mobile telephony blurred traditional separations between 
broadcasting, computing, telecommunications and consumer electronics 
(Murdock & Golding, 2002; McChesney, 1999; Fitzgerald, 2012). 
          At the same time, however, media entertainment corporations operated 
within business conditions shaped by the financialisation of the global 
economy.  The general process was enabled by the proliferation of neo-liberal 
policy regimes requiring the dismantling of international currency agreements 
and the deregulation of nationally centred financial sectors. At the same time 
digital convergences between information and communication technologies 
provided necessary infrastructure for the globalisation of financial institutions 
and financial flows. These developments effectively changed the structure and 
strategy of corporate governance.  The process dates from the 1980`s when new 
kinds of financial activity reshaped the American corporation. Hostile takeover 
firms were then growing in number and activity. They broke up conglomerates 
so that component parts could be sold for more than the previous market 
valuation. Individual investors gave way to institutional investors who gained 
major control over corporate stock. Such investors did not simply value 
conglomerates as a whole; priority was given to divisional profit performance 
and the establishment of `focused` firms. Consequently, share analysts grew in 
number and developed specialisations. Corporations eager to attract favourable 
analyst coverage were obliged to sell off businesses unrelated to core 
competencies. The core competency-shareholder value priorities of institutional 
investors and analysts began to shape corporate governance and strategy. The 
CEO worked with the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) to generate profits from 
core competencies and to manage the share price, in accordance with the 
preferences and estimates of institutional investors and analysts.  
Correspondingly, specialist teams of analysts announced buy and sell 
recommendations on a real time basis. The net result was share price volatility 
and a short-termist culture of corporate governance.  (Zorn & Dobbin, 2005)                     
Financialisation has compelled media corporates to move away from 
conglomeration and diversification toward a strategy of rationalizing holdings 
around strong market positions in certain sectors.  Non-core holdings are 
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divested and sold.  For example, Time Warner divested Warner Music Group 
(2003) and Time Warner Book Group (2006)  Viacom divested CBS group 
(2006) and News Corporation divested DirectV (2000) and Gemstar TV-Guide 
International (2008) (Fitzgerald, 2012).  Financial institutions themselves regard 
media holdings with strong market positions as revenue streams and acquisition 
targets.  This is especially true for financial equity firms.  In North America, 
Western Europe and Australasia, they have acquired or bought into publicly 
traded media companies via leveraged buyouts.  This strategy involves the use 
of debt financing to takeover and restructure undervalued companies.  Private 
equity operators then exit their investments by selling the restructured assets at 
high profit margins.  The original debt financing obtained from investment 
banks, hedge funds and/or other institutional investors is collaterised against the 
targeted assets (Crain, 2009).   
          Since about 2004 such deals have affected commercial broadcasting in 
different national settings (most notably, Clear Channel’s radio network in the 
United States and Germany’s Sat1 commercial television network) (Crain, 
2009; Rosenberg & Mollgaard, 2010).  Private equity buyers and investment 
banks have also restructured Hollywood film studio Metro Goldwyn Meyer 
along with major US theatre chains. Private equity activity has also been 
evident in music publishing, video game publishing, digital media, 
telecommunications as well as the cable and satellite industries (Crain, 2009). 
Newspapers and other print media have been especially affected.  Between 2004 
and 2007 private equity syndicates bought out Readers Digest, Dutch publishing 
conglomerate VNU and various public listed US newspaper chains (Crain, 
2009).  After 2008, financial crisis and worldwide recession coincided with the 
spread of on-line news consumption and on-line advertising.  Newspapers have 
thus become especially vulnerable to private equity takeovers and other 
financial incursions.  During 2011, 71 daily newspapers in the US were sold as 
part of 11 different financial transactions (Pew, 2012).  In May 2012, billionaire 
Warren Buffett’s investment vehicle Berkshire Hathaway announced that it was 
buying 63 US newspapers, including 23 dailies, from the Media General 
Company for $142 million (Ng & Hagey, 2012). 
Financialisation of media ownership prioritises short-term returns over 
long-term viability of media institutions.  Within news organizations 
restructuring processes inevitably entail redundancies, a loss of journalistic 
expertise and a thinning of news content.  With these thoughts in mind, we will 
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trace the emergence and growth of media financialisation in New Zealand 
against the backdrop of transnational media ownership. 
 
From National to Transnational Media Ownership in New Zealand 
During the 1940s and 1950s in New Zealand, public spheres of communication 
were dominated by an insular, family-owned provincial press and a paternal 
state-regulated radio system with commercial and non-commercial stations.  In 
the four main centres – Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin – 
daily papers and local stations widened their commercial influence as urban 
populations increased. During the 1960s and 1970s, old family configurations of 
agrarian and mercantile capital became supplanted by interlocking corporate 
ownership.  In 1980, Fletchers, Tasman and Challenge merged to become New 
Zealand’s largest company.  The nine outside directors who made up the board 
collectively sat on the boards of over 60 companies (Jesson, 1980). The growth 
of corporate capitalism opened up business opportunities in the media sector.  
When Fletchers, Tasman and Challenge merged 31 of New Zealand’s 33 daily 
papers were owned by major news conglomerates.  Additionally 70 percent of 
all individual papers were owned by Independent Newspapers Ltd (INL), New 
Zealand News and Wilson and Horton.  Ron Brierley had gained a four percent 
shareholding in New Zealand News and was in the process of buying up a stable 
of private radio stations through Hauraki enterprises (Street, 1983). Television 
remained publicly administered but there were tentative challenges against the 
TVNZ monopoly.  In 1980, Wilson and Horton formed Northern Television 
while Independent News Ltd/New Zealand News/Hauraki enterprises gave both 
to Alternative Television Ltd bidders for the proposed third channel. 
          Labour’s election victory in 1984 unleashed a comprehensive neo-liberal 
policy agenda.  Consequently, upper reaches of the national economy were 
absorbed into global rhythms of capital circulation and investment.  Foreign 
ownership of stock exchange listed companies rose from 21.4 percent in 1980 to 
32.6 percent in 1986.  In the aftermath of the October 1987 stock market crash, 
New Zealand listed companies were bankrupted and this increased further the 
proportion of foreign shareholdings on the stock exchange (to 51 percent by 
1994) (Le Heron and Pawson, 1996: 31-36).  Over the same period under 
Labour and National governments, infrastructures of energy, power, 
telecommunications and rail transport were incorporated within the balance 
sheets of transnational corporations.  And, by 1996, six of the seven major 
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banks and nine of the top 10 insurance companies were overseas-owned 
(Rosenberg, 1998: 47).  In this context, local media owners forged connections 
with transnational media conglomerates.  As of March 1987, Rupert Murdoch’s 
News Corporation assumed a 40 percent interest in INL.  During 1989, 
Newscorp holdings increased to 49 percent.  Most significantly, in August of 
the following year, the National Business Review announced Commerce 
Commission approval of a rapid expansion in INL holdings.  This resulted from 
NZ News (Brierleys) selling its Auckland suburban newspapers plus the Sunday 
Star Times.  The Auckland Star was closed down permanently.  New Zealand 
had shifted from a triopoly to a duopoly of newspaper ownership.  By 1991 
Wilson and Horton had 45.5 percent of metropolitan press circulation and INL 
45 percent (McGregor, 1992: 30).   
          The broader picture at that time can be sketched as follows.  New 
Zealand’s media system was being hollowed out by transnational corporations 
with cross-media holdings.  Four pivotal events accelerated this process; the 
deregulation and corporatization of broadcasting (1989):  the entry of private 
and pay television (1989); the sale of Telecom (1990); and the removal of all 
restrictions on foreign media ownership (1991).  By 2001, TV3 (and, 
subsequently, TV4) was owned by Canada’s largest private television 
broadcaster, Canwest Global Communications Corporation. Satellite operator 
Sky Television was owned by Telecom (12 percent) and INL (66 percent) News 
Corp’s 45 percent share of INL ensured that satellite digital services in New 
Zealand would be incorporated within the Murdoch empire (Rosenberg, 2002: 
78-80).  Independent Newspapers Ltd also owned 49 percent of New Zealand’s 
daily newspaper circulation along with extensive holdings in magazines, 
national weeklies, community titles and websites.  Wilson and Horton, the other 
major print and web media holding company, was purchased by Irish billionaire 
Tony O’Reilly through Independent Newspapers Plc (INP).  Local titles 
included Auckland’s New Zealand Herald, the New Zealand Listener, the New 
Zealand Woman’s Weekly and 32 community newspapers as well as various 
publishing operations.  Subsequently, INP sold its shareholding to APN News 
and Media, a company in which INP had a 40 percent holding (Rosenberg, 
2002: 67-69).  In 1996 Radio New Zealand’s commercial stations were sold for 
NZ $89million to three O’Reilly associated companies, and by 2001 the Radio 
Works stable of FM private radio stations was 71 percent owned by CanWest 
(Rosenberg, 2002: 84-850.) 
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          After 2001, global absorption of New Zealand media assumed a trans-
Tasman dimension.  In June 2003, John Fairfax Holdings purchased INL’s press 
and magazine holdings for A$1.2 billion (at the time INL was 45 percent owned 
by Newscorp).  In March 2006, Fairfax purchased the online auction site Trade 
Me for NZ$700 million) (Rosenberg, 2008: 2). And APN News and Media was 
also an Australian registered company, albeit controlled by Tony O’Reilly’s 
Independent News and Media.  APN was in its own right, a fully-fledged multi-
media conglomerate.  It had business interests in newspapers, magazines, radio 
and outdoor advertising in Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Indonesia and 
Malaysia.   
          Independent Newspapers Ltd (INL) used cash from the sale of print 
holdings to Fairfax to purchase the total shares of Sky Television (at that time 
INL already controlled 66 percent of shares) Effectively, therefore, INL’s 
majority-owned Newscorp increased its commercial influence over Sky 
operations and its commercial share of Sky revenues.  Newscorp’s dominance 
was extended when INL merged with Sky in 2005. 
 
Financialisation of Transnational Media Ownership in New Zealand 
Initial forays of private equity firms 
At the end of 2006, four overseas corporations dominated the national 
mediascape – Fairfax, News Corporation/Sky TV, APN News and Media and 
Media Works.  Financialisation of their New Zealand holdings began in the first 
half of 2007 when APN News and Media became the target of a failed offer 
from a consortium of the parent company Independent News Media (ANM) 
along with private equity investors Providence Equity Partners and the Carlyle 
Group.  Meanwhile, Ironbridge Capital purchased MediaWorks’ assets 
including those held by CanWest (Rosenberg, Mollgaard, 2010: 100).  At the 
time, Ironbridge also owned one of the largest aged care chains in New Zealand, 
Qualcare Holdings and Enviro Waste Services Ltd (acquired in 2005 and 2006 
respectively). In response to the charge that Ironbridge had no media 
experience, New Zealand representative Kerry McIntosh stated that “Ironbridge 
did not know much about waste either before buying Enviro Waste” (Vaughn, 
2007: C4 as cited in Rosenberg, 2008).  In May 2007, Australia’s James Packer 
split his major investment vehicle PBL into internet/gaming and media holdings 
groups.  Within PBL media 75 percent of ACP magazines was sold to private 
equity fund CVC Asia Pacific.  Fifty five titles were involved, including Metro, 
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North and South, Women’s Day and the Australian Women’s Weekly (New 
Zealand edition) (Rosenberg, 2008: 10). 
Media financialisation spreads 2010 – 2013 
Between 2010 and 2013 listed and unlisted financial institutions increased their 
share of media ownership in New Zealand. Unlisted financial institutions are 
privately held and include companies such as private equity and venture capital 
firms, investment funds and fund management companies. These privately 
owned companies are responsible to their owners and executives. They don’t 
have the same disclosure rules as the financial companies listed on stock 
markets, such as commercial banks. Stock market listed companies are publicly 
traded and they need to provide regular financial information for their 
shareholders. These companies are regulated by certain authorities and stock 
market operators such New Zealand stock market operator NZX. According to 
Crain (2009), private equity funds are “exclusive high-stakes investment groups 
that manage and deploy massive amounts of private capital” (Crain, 2009: 209). 
Crain points out that publicly traded companies, such as commercial banks, 
have more financial transparency which “helps potential investors and 
shareholders make investment decisions and calculate risks.” (Crain, 2009: 
229). Generally speaking, private equity funds and venture capital firms aim for 
a quick return on their investment whereas other investors such as media 
corporations seem to have longer term investment objectives. For example, 
INM has been a long term investor in APN News and Media, and Rupert 
Murdoch’s News Corporation was a major shareholder in Sky TV for years 
before selling its stake earlier this year. 
          In trans-Tasman context, APN News and Media exemplifies the spread of 
ownership financialisation. In 2010, 22.6 percent of their substantial 
shareholders were listed or unlisted financial institutions (5.9 percent and 16.7 
percent respectively). By 2012 55.6 percent of APN and Media’s substantial 
shareholders were in the latter category (table 1). Unlisted entities include 
private equity firms, unlisted fund management companies, hedge funds and 
advisory businesses. Within APN and Media, such firms included Allan Gray 
Australia, Maple-Brown Abbot, Dimensional Fund Advisors and Baycliffe 
Limited (table 2). Perpetual Investments is a listed unity, MLC Investment 
Management is part of National Australian Bank and NBIM is an investment 
arm of Norway’s central bank, Norges Bank Investment Management (table 2). 
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Table 1: APN News & Media substantial shareholders (owning more than 5% of 
company’s shares) 
 2010 2011 2012 
Listed financial 
institutions 
5.9%  None named None named 
Unlisted financial 
institutions 
16.7% 55.5% 55.6% 
Other corporations, 
individuals 
31.6% 30.4% 28.9% 
(Source: APN News & Media Investor Relations, APN News & Media Annual Reports:  
2010, 2011, 2012) 
 
The shifting ownership structure of trans-Tasman Fairfax Media has been 
detailed elsewhere (Myllylahti, 2011; 2012; Hope & Myllylahti, 2013). For our 
purposes here two current trends are identifiable: the growing corporate 
influence of Gina Rinehart and the continuing significance of listed and unlisted 
financial shareholders. In 2011, the Fairfax family cut its ties with Fairfax 
Media when John Fairfax’s company Marinya Media sold its 9.7 percent stake 
in the company. This sale paved the way for Rinehart’s ownership, and in 2012 
she took a substantial shareholding in Fairfax Media. In July 2012 she owned 
14.99 percent of Fairfax Media’s shares through her company Hancock 
Prospecting.  
 
Table 2: APN major shareholders as at June 2013 
Allan Gray Australia Pty Ltd 19.9% 
Independent News & Media 17.6% 
News& Media NZ 11.3% 
Maple-Brown Abbot 5.5% 
Perpetual Investments 4.7% 
MLC Investment Management 3.3.% 
NBIM 2.4% 
Dimensional Fund Advisors 1.8% 
Baycliffe Limited  1.3% 
Argo Investments Limited 0.6 
(Source: APN, 2013). 
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Table 3: Fairfax Media shareholders 
 2010 2011 2012 
Financial owners  70.4% 73.9% 56.5% 
Other corporations, 
individuals 
9.7% 9.7% 25.6% 
Top 20 holders 80% 83.6% 82.4% 
(Source: Fairfax Media Annual Reports 2010, 2011, 2012). 
 
Although financial ownership of Fairfax shrunk from 70 percent in 2010 to 56.5 
percent in 2012, the latter figure is still a strong indicator of media 
financialisation (table 3). Although the ownership share of unlisted institutions 
peaked in 2011 they still constituted a marginally higher ownership percentage 
than listed entities in 2012 (table 4) As of August 2012 the major shareholders 
of Fairfax Media included unlisted financial owners such as Allan Gray 
Australia, Maple-Brown Abbot and IOOF Holdings alongside listed entities 
such as AXA Group, National Australian Bank (NAB) and Lazard Asset 
Management (table 5). In February 2013 a small Australian fund management 
company, Ausbil Dextia, obtained 5.3 percent of Fairfax’s shares. 
 
Table 4: Fairfax Media substantial shareholders (owning more than five per cent of 
company’s shares) 
 2010 2011 2012 
Listed financial 
institutions 
18.3%  21.2% 26.1% 
Unlisted financial 
institutions 
5.8% 55.5% 26.6% 
Other 
corporations, 
individuals 
9.7% 9.7% 14.9% 
(Source: Fairfax Media Annual Reports 2010, 2011, 2012) 
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In 2011 as a part of a debt reduction drive Fairfax started to sell down its stake 
in Trade Me. The remaining 51 percent of the company was divested in 
December 2012 for A$616 million (Fickling & Haigh, 2012) Trade Me, which 
is the largest Internet-auction site in New Zealand, was founded in 1999 by Sam 
Morgan who sold his company to Fairfax in 2006 for NZ$700 million. After the 
2012 sell off business columnist Brian Gaynor (2013a) observed that “we have 
bought back Trade Me to New Zealand.” In fact, however, ownership of the 
company has shifted from one corporate owner to multiple financial institutions. 
In 2013, Westpac bank and its associates announced that its ownership of Trade 
Me had increased to 11.8 percent. Baillie Gifford disclosed ownership of 7.9 
percent and Hyperion Asset Management announced that it had acquired 12.5 
per cent of the company’s shares (Westpac, 2013a; Westpac, 2013b, Baillie 
Gifford, 2013, Hyperion Asset Management, 2013).  
 
Table 5: Fairfax Media major shareholders as at 31 August 2012 
Hancock Prospecting  14.9% 
Allan Gray Australia 8.3% 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia  7.5% 
AXA Group 7.1% 
NAB 6.5% 
Maple-Brown Abbot Ltd 5.8% 
Lazard Asset Management 5.1% 
IOOF Holdings Ltd 5.0% 
(Source: Fairfax Media Annual Report 2012) 
 
Sky TV experienced substantial changes in its ownership structure during 2012 
and 2013. Before then major stakes in the company were owned by Todd 
Communications (a company owned by the Todd family) and the media 
corporation News Limited which is part of Rupert Murdoch’s News 
Corporation. During 2012-2013 ownership shifted towards financial holdings. 
In November 2012, the New Zealand based Todd Communications announced 
that it had sold  its entire 11 percent stake in Sky TV for NZ$218 million 
(Myllylahti, 2012). The shares were sold as a block investment to Credit Suisse 
bank; later they were divested to other financial holders. Additionally, in March 
2013, Rupert Murdoch’s News Limited confirmed that it was selling its 44 Ten 
percent stake in Sky TV for $815.3 million (McBeth, 2013).  
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Table 6: Sky TV shareholders 
 2010 2011 2012 
Financial owners  32.9% 29.9% 29.3% 
Other corporations, individuals 54.8% 54.8% 54.8% 
Top 20 holders 87.7% 84.8% 84.1% 
(Source: Sky TV Annual Reports 2010, 2011, 2012) 
 
The deal was underwritten by Deutsche Bank and Craigs Investment Partners, 
and the shares ended up in the hands of new financial owners. Hyperion Asset 
Management and JCP Investment Partners are unlisted companies and hold 14 
percent of Sky TV’s shares whereas Lazard Asset Management Pacific (part of 
the listed Lazard Asset Management) and the global bank UBS AG own 12 
percent of the pay-TV company’s shares (table 7). 
 
Table 7: Sky TV major shareholders as at May 2013 
Hyperion Asset Management  6.2% 
Lazard Asset Management 
Pacific 
5.2% 
JCP Investment Partners Limited 7.9% 
UBS AG and its related bodies 
corporate 
6.8%% 
(Source: Sky TV, 2013)  
 
As of July 2013, APN News and Media was the only major New Zealand news 
media corporation left with a media corporate (INM) as its substantial owner. 
However INM has previously stated that it would consider divesting its stake in 
the company. Also, APN’s financial owners are pushing to sell assets as part of 
the strategy to reduce debt. APN has already started to sell some of its New 
Zealand assets. In April 2013 it sold the Christchurch Star and Oamaru Mail 
newspapers to the Christchurch-based independent media company Mainland 
Media. The company is privately owned by Pier and Charlotte Smulders, and 
chaired by Nick Smith who is the director of Allied Press (Wood, 2013). Allied 
Press is another independent publisher owning the Otago Daily Times as well as 
Hurunui News, Ashburton Courier and CTV in Canterbury. 
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       MediaWorks, the company that owns TV3, TV4 and half of New Zealand’s 
radio stations, was primarily owned by unlisted American and Australian 
private equity firms until June 2013. The major owner had been the private 
equity firm Ironbridge Capital. As we have noted, it bought all the media 
company’s shares from Canadian CanWest in 2007. In 2012, MediaWorks 
obtained two new venture capital owners - Texan private equity company TPG 
and American private equity company Oaktree Capital Management as part of 
its debt restructuring (Myllylahti, 2012) . In June 2013 MediaWorks was placed 
in receivership to “reduce its debt burden”. In a media release MediaWorks’ 
Managing Director Susan Turner commented that the company’s debt structure 
had been “unsustainable” since its purchase by Ironbridge Capital in 2007 
(MediaWorks, 2013). As Brian Gaynor pointed out, the “MediaWorks saga 
shows the high-risk nature of leveraged private equity acquisitions.” (Gaynor, 
2013b). Under Ironbridge Capital’s ownership, the total debt burden of 
MediaWorks went from NZ$165 to NZ$769 million. Interest costs soared from 
$13.8 million in 2006/7 to $92.8 million the following year (Gaynor, 2013b) 
Once in receivership, MediaWorks sought to cut its debts from NZ$ 700 million 
to less than NZ$100 million. The company’s assets were transferred to a new 
company whose primary owners are major lenders. These included Westpac 
Banking Group, Rabobank, RBS Group, TPG Capital, Oaktree Capital and JP 
Morgan. 
 
Consequences and concerns: 
New Zealand’s mediascape is rapidly evolving as media corporations search for 
viable business models. The financial owners of media companies are likely to 
demand further asset sales from media corporations who need to further reduce 
their substantial debts. Media companies are thereby poised to cut more jobs, 
further restructure their operations and divest portfolios (in certain cases they 
may allow takeovers and mergers). It is important to note that the 
financialisation of New Zealand media corporations has occurred at the same 
time as the media industry is going through an historical transformation from 
print to digital. This has caused most news print companies to lose advertising 
dollars and income from print subscriptions. Thus, the intensification of 
financial ownership has taken place at the same time as the media corporates` 
business models are faltering and their profitability is under serious pressure. 
Although most New Zealand media companies are still turning profits, they are 
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not at the same level as they were ten years ago when print newspapers could 
rely upon substantial income from advertising. 
          As observed, unlisted financial players such as private equity and venture 
capital firms have become increasingly involved in media corporations, largely 
because of lucrative restructuring opportunities.  During 2012 the share prices 
of New Zealand news media companies plummeted, making them ideal 
takeover targets.  Yet, as the MediaWorks case exemplifies, media companies 
don’t necessary offer a quick return: Ironbridge Capital has allegedly lost its 
$700 million investment in the company. As the ownership structures of Fairfax 
Media and APN News and Media reveal, financial institution Allan Gray 
Australia is a substantial shareholder.  It therefore wields substantial power over 
the two companies. The financial shareholders are not just passive investors in 
media corporates; they are increasingly involved in operational decisions. For 
example, in June 2013, APN News and Media announced that it had appointed 
Australian Westpac’s executive Anne-Templeman Jones to its board (Davidson, 
2013). She is a director of corporate and institutional banking at Australian 
Westpac Bank and holds a directorship in the financial firm Cuscal Limited. 
The chairman of APN, Peter Cosgrove, commented that Templeman-Jones was 
chosen for her expertise in "strategy, finance and banking, risk management, 
compliance, and governance” (Davidson, 2013). Prior to the MediaWorks 
receivership, all three directors were Ironbridge Capital appointees including 
Brent Harman, Michael Hill and Kerry McIntosh (MediaWorks, 2013).  It is 
highly likely that any new board will be occupied by the representatives of 
different banks. Similarly, Fairfax’s director James Millar serves as consultant 
at Ernst & Young, and he is a specialist in corporate finance restructuring. 
Another director Peter Young is the Chairman of Barclay Banks Australian 
operations (Businessweek, 2013). 
          The financialisation of transnational media ownership in New Zealand is 
of historic importance.  Financial institutions, especially unlisted ones, have no 
inherent interest in any particular media industry or sector. Instead they seek to 
maximise investment returns before moving on toward a more attractive target. 
Since 2007, these short-term commercial imperatives have prevailed at the 
expense of journalists’ livelihoods, media content diversity and public debate on 
issues of national importance. By December 2012, financialisation had 
destabilised the prospects of three major media players:  Fairfax Media, APN 
News and Media and MediaWorks.  By mid-2013, MediaWorks was in 
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receivership and financial holdings had assumed control of Sky TV.  Clearly, 
we are experiencing the recolonisation and desiccation of the New Zealand 
commercial mediascape. 
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Capitalism and Democracy at Cross-Purposes 
 
Robert H. Wade 1 
 
Mainstream politicians and mainstream economists in Anglophone countries 
have been very relaxed about people becoming “filthy rich”, as though a 
structure of income distribution with high concentration at the top has no 
society-wide costs. In the words of University of Chicago professor of 
economics and Nobel Prize winner Robert Lucas, “[O]f the tendencies that are 
harmful to sound economics, the most seductive and … poisonous is to focus on 
questions of distribution” (2004). In the words of Willem Buiter, former 
professor of economics at the London School of Economics and currently chief 
economist of Citigroup, “Poverty bothers me. Inequality does not.  I just don’t 
care” (2007).     
 This essay begins by describing the neoliberal thinking that sanctions a 
relaxed attitude to income inequality; next it describes why the discipline of 
economics has failed to provide a critical focus on income inequality; and then 
it summarizes evidence on the society-wide costs of inequality, especially the 
underemphasised political costs. The essay ends with some basic points for a 
centre-left strategy of reform.  
The central argument is that neoliberal thinking has helped to produce a 
rising degree of income concentration at the top both directly and indirectly 
through its contribution to the transformation of the Anglophone state into a 
“plutocratic” state. The plutocratic state has a structure of laws and policy 
settings which – net -- channels income upwards, even as some parts of the 
residual welfare state counter these tendencies by channelling income and 
                                                            
1 The essay is based on talks I gave about income inequality in New Zealand in July 2013, at 
the invitation of Bridget Williams of Bridget Williams Books, Wellington and with financial 
support from the J.R. McKenzie Trust. The talks were linked to the publication of Inequality: 
a New Zealand Crisis, edited by Max Rashbrooke.  My earlier relevant essays include Wade, 
2011a; 2012; 2011b. I am a New Zealand citizen, based in London at the London School of 
Economics where I teach and research in the broad subject of global political economy. As 
the son of one of the first generation of New Zealand diplomats after the Second World War, 
much of my growing up was overseas; but I attended primary and secondary school in 
Wellington, and Otago University and then Victoria University of Wellington where I did a 
BA Honours degree in the Economics Department headed by Professor Frank Holmes. I left 
in 1967 for the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex University to do a PhD; became a 
Fellow of the Institute, and have made only short visits since.  
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services downwards. The combination of high-inequality capitalism and a 
plutocratic state undermines the democratic political system.   
  
Neoliberalism 
People born in western countries before the 1960s came to maturity during the 
post-war consensus around ideas of social planning and welfarism (University 
of Chicago economics department and a few others excepted).  Governments 
followed full employment strategies, unions were strong, and governments 
believed that rising wages and job security were good for capitalism. Since the 
1980s that consensus has been thoroughly displaced by another known as 
“neoliberalism”, especially in the Anglo countries and in international 
organizations those states control, including the World Bank and the IMF 
(Wade, 2009a; 2009b; 2010; Vestergaard and Wade, R., 2012; 2013).  
There are many strands of neoliberalism, but they share the core idea that 
“the (private) market” is the best mechanism for meeting human aspirations, 
and better, in particular, than “the state”, which is inefficient and a constraint on 
freedom,  though necessary for certain limited purposes like national defence 
and law and order.  
This is how neoliberalism is generally presented.  But the presentation 
actually conceals what neoliberalism is about.  “The market” is the polite way 
of referring to “the owners and managers of capital, especially financial 
capital”. To say that “the market” is the best mechanism for meeting human 
aspirations is to say that the state and public policy should reflect what the 
owners and managers of capital want – “should reflect” because their 
preferences for state institutions and policies will benefit the whole society 
more than the preferences of other categories (workers organized in trade 
unions, for example).  This is the sentiment behind slogans such as “a rising tide 
lifts all boats”, and “what is good for General Motors, and Goldman Sachs, is 
good for you and me”.     
Alan Budd, Special Advisor at the UK Treasury in 1979-81, explained 
how the Thatcher government sought to create such a neoliberal structure in 
Britain by first creating mass unemployment, disguising the strategy as an anti-
inflation strategy.  Interviewed in 1991 he said:  
The nightmare I sometimes have … is that there may have been 
people making the actual policy decisions, or people behind them, or 
people behind them, who never believed for a moment that this was 
the correct way to bring down inflation. They did, however, see that it 
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would be a very, very good way to raise unemployment, and raising 
unemployment was an extremely desirable way of reducing the 
strength of the working classes…. What was engineered there in 
Marxist terms was a crisis of capitalism which re-created a reserve 
army of labour and has allowed the capitalists to make high profits 
ever since”.   
He said this a month after Tory Chancellor Norman Lamont stated in parliament 
(6 May 1991): “Rising unemployment and the recession have been the price that 
we have had to pay to get inflation down. That price is well worth paying”.  In 
fact, the rate of retail price inflation when Mrs. Thatcher left office in 
November 1990 was identical to the rate when she took office in May 1979, at 
9.2%. 2 
The neoliberal microeconomic formula prescribes:  
x low tax rates on high incomes and capital gains, so as to incentivize 
value creation – and hence generate economic growth and 
employment;   
x low state benefits to people on low incomes, so as to incentivize job 
search, training and hard work;  
x profit-seeking private firms or charities (not publicly-owned 
agencies) for supplying goods and services, which translates into the 
imperative to privatize and outsource government services to the 
maximum extent possible;  
x employment on short-term contracts, linked to performance targets 
and regular monitoring – because a highly “flexible” labour market is 
a mark of an economy’s strength (and not at all to be described as 
Marx’s “reserve army of labour”);  
x employment on short-term task-related contracts is especially 
important in  the public sector, where the efficiency-inducing 
discipline of private profit-seeking competition is lacking;  
x freedom for savings and loans, or building societies, to become 
consumed by national or multinational banks with no regional roots.   
The paradox is that this agenda is particularly favoured by political parties 
which describe themselves as “conservative” yet have little interest in 
conserving institutions which block opportunities for private profit-making.  
The reconciliation is effected by claiming that when applied comprehensively, 
neoliberalism produces more prosperous and more moral societies, composed of 
adults who are self-reliant, hard-working, and law-abiding citizens,  and  
                                                            
2 Alan Budd, interviewed by Adam Curtis, June 1991, http://cheltenham-
gloucesteragainstcuts.org/2013/04/09/former-thatcher-adviser-alan-budd-spills-the-beans-on-
the-use-of-unemployment-to-weaken-the-working-class-sound-familiar/. Emphasis added. 
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children who follow rules set by their strict fathers – or more so than societies 
with more state and less market (Lakoff, 2002).   
Contrary to the pattern in earlier bouts of hard times, elites in western 
countries have even strengthened their commitment to neoliberalism since the 
global financial crisis of 2008 and subsequent long slump. Neoliberalism 
supports the macroeconomic agenda known as “expansionary austerity” or 
“fiscal consolidation” applied through much of the western world and now 
increasingly in developing countries too (amplifying recessionary and 
unequalising tendencies on a world scale).  It rests on the claim that fiscal 
contraction at a time of recession (mainly through public spending cuts) will 
boost economic growth; or conversely, that above a certain threshold (generally 
believed to be around 90%) further increase in the amount of public debt to 
GDP will stunt growth. E.U. policy makers and central bankers have been 
particularly zealous in insisting that there is no alternative to public spending 
cuts and shrinking the state, however unpalatable that may be. “Growth is the 
key to getting out of the crisis, we all agree on that”, said Jens Weidmann, head 
of the German central bank recently.  “But renouncing budget consolidation will 
not bring us closer to that objective” (quoted in Taylor, 2013: 22).     
A simple – and no doubt simplistic – way to see the fallacies of a lot of 
neoliberal economic thinking is to consider the situation where 100 dogs are 
ushered into a room in which 95 bones have been hidden. The macro (or 
Keynesian) problem is that there are not enough bones for the dogs; five must 
go without. But neoliberals reduce it to microeconomics and morality. 
Neoliberals of the compassionate conservative kind say: the problem is that the 
five dogs lack hunting skills, they must be sent to bone-hunting school, the state 
may even subsidize their education. Neoliberals of the normal conservative kind 
say: the five dogs are lazy, they must be incentivized by withdrawing their 
income support, as in Norman Tebbitt’s “get on your bike”.   
Meanwhile, the Western finance industry has effectively blocked 
government efforts to strengthen financial regulation (which could moderate 
neoliberalism). Banking is the most heavily  subsidized industry in the world, 
by far, especially through the invisible subsidy of an implicit guarantee that if 
one of them collapses the relevant taxpayers will save it – which allows the 
banks to take bigger financial risks than otherwise, grow bigger than otherwise, 
and become too big to fail – or jail, or manage effectively. The balance sheet of 
one British-based bank, Barclays, is bigger than Britain’s entire GDP. Andy 
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Haldane of the Bank of England calculated the taxpayer subsidy to the world’s 
largest banks at $70bn every year between 2002 and 2007, the subsidy 
accounting for roughly half the average post-tax profits enjoyed by these banks 
over that period.  
On top of the subsidies, governments authorize big tax advantages to the 
use of debt financing, as compared with equity financing, even as they complain 
that the economy is handicapped by too much debt and too little equity. The tax 
advantages of debt boost the demand for debt, and hence bank profits. And the  
tax advantages of debt  mean that multinational companies like Google keep 
their profits in low-tax jurisdictions and borrow to pay out dividends rather than 
repatriate profits (on which they would pay tax); so squeezing western tax 
bases.  
Understandably the industry is doing everything it can to protect these 
built-in advantages, including all possible lobbying of governments against 
efforts to make the banks safer. Robert Rubin, the Democratic kingmaker on 
Wall Street and Treasury Secretary under Bill Clinton, recently gave a 
remarkable defence of the necessity of having some banks which are too big to 
fail. Asked by an interviewer whether he thought that “too big to fail” was a 
problem, Rubin replied “No, don’t you see? Too big to fail isn’t a problem with 
the system. It is the system. You can’t be a competitive financial institution 
serving global corporations of scale without having a certain scale yourself. The 
bigger the multinationals get, the bigger financial institutions will have to get” 
(quoted in Sharpe, 2012: 141). In other words, the system requires that the 
biggest private banks are propped up regardless of their performance.  
 Separately from finance industry lobbying, governments have recently 
taken the initiative to scale down their financial regulatory efforts in the hope 
that this will encourage the banks to lend more to households, that households 
will increase consumption, and that consumption will again boost economic 
growth -- and improve their re-election prospects. 
The upshot is that the effort at a Great-Re-regulation in the wake of the 
Crash has become, instead, the Great Escape. The sprawling Dodd-Frank Act in 
the US has generated endless rule rewriting by regulators, leaving holes big 
enough to drive a coach and horses through. Almost three years into the euro 
crisis the European Union is still in the early stages of figuring out how it might 
regulate banks across borders.  
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 More favouritism to the banks comes via the monetary policy known as 
Quantitative Easing. It is presented to the public as a means of keeping interest 
rates low to stimulate business investment and the housing market. But it is at 
least as much about making banks appear more solvent or less insolvent. Low 
interest rates raise the price of debt instruments, and higher prices of debt 
instruments raise the value of banks’ balance sheets. In this way their collapse 
or radical restructuring is postponed in the hope that they can trade their way 
out of trouble, at least up to the next election. And while the policy has 
substantially failed in stimulating investment it has worked to boost the stock 
market and the housing market – and thereby channel income up towards the 
top.  
Neoliberal ideas have penetrated every nook and cranny of western 
societies. In British universities they shape operations all the way from 
undergraduate recruitment to fees to the content of courses to research agendas 
and to promotions. Not that this is all bad. For example, the periodic programs 
to evaluate the research output of every British academic and every academic 
department (known as the Research Assessment Exercise, RAE, though the 
current one, whose census date is December 31 2013, is known as the Research 
Excellence Framework, REF) have helped to break the Oxbridge-dominated 
old-boys networks and the leisurely academic life style that could earlier be 
enjoyed.  On the other hand, the exercise produces a homogenization of 
thinking discipline by discipline, because the assessment panels tend to be 
readily captured by people representing the current orthodoxy, who judge 
others’ research by the standards of that orthodoxy.  
Moreover, the intense  performance-management justified by neoliberal 
ideas (and impelled by liability under employment law) produces, in 
universities, gross inefficiencies, such as a proliferation of managers and very 
time-consuming managerial demands on academics;  an erosion of intellectual 
collegiality; and a “bottom line” criterion for measuring the value of courses.   
Far from wanting to conserve the BBC as a landmark of Britishness, 
ministers in the Conservative Party-led government, and the radical 2010 intake 
of Tory MPs, want to reduce the BBC to the insignificance of US public 
broadcasting, seeing it as an affront to the profit-seeking private sector media 
companies. The government has also been very helpful to private health firms 
wanting to divert tax-financed revenue flows away from that other landmark of 
Britishness, the British National Health Service (NHS). The government boosts 
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a narrative of NHS failure (nurses too busy to care for their patients, is one of 
the perennials) in order to justify privatization, including care for older people. 
And it downplays recurrent evidence of private firms making over-ambitious 
bids and under-fulfilling contracts. The biggest company is Serco, whose modus 
operandi includes steep job cuts when it takes over from a local NHS trust, 
providing false data on its response to emergency calls, and even (according to a 
current investigation) charging the Ministry of Justice for tagging dead people.   
The privatization or “opening up” of public services has fuelled the 
process of casualization of employment. Local authorities respond to cuts in 
funding by driving through tighter tenders on outsourced contracts, whose 
contractors respond by offering employment on “zero hours”, such that 
employees are tied to the company with no guarantee of work. Agency working, 
temporary work and enforced part-time working have mushroomed since 2008; 
nearly half of the jobs created have been temporary, as half a million permanent 
jobs have been lost. In early August 2013 the Conservative-Liberal Democratic 
coalition introduced a prohibitive £1,200 fee for anyone going to an 
employment tribunal to protect their legal rights (Milne, 2013).  The obvious 
next step in “flexibility” is child labour.     
Mainstream media content reinforces the neoliberal bias. Media 
ownership by profit-maximizing firms (as distinct from firms in the legal 
category of low-profit, or in cross-subsidizing trusts, as in the case of  The 
Guardian)  means that content is driven towards crime, sex, celebrity and 
scandal and towards political and economic commentary in line with the 
preferences of the owners and managers of capital. The result, in Britain, is that 
the readership of national newspapers is about 75% for “right-wing” papers and 
25% for “not right-wing” (including Financial Times). Scarcely an edition in 
the 75% leaves the presses without a hit against the BBC or the NHS. The 
British public is surrounded by a fog-horn of right-wing opinion.   
New Zealand has been an epicentre of neoliberal ideology since the 
reforms pushed through by the Labour government’s Finance Minister Roger 
Douglas after 1984.  A story told by a former champion of neoliberal thinking 
in New Zealand, now senior policy advisor, illustrates how deeply neoliberalism 
took hold. He and colleagues were planning the privatisation of air traffic 
control. One of his colleagues suggested that firms should tender or auction for 
each individual landing.  At this point the penny dropped.  “We suddenly 
realised it wasn't very practical”, he said, without joking. Such was the zeitgeist 
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when New Zealand was “a neoliberal model for the world”, and woe betide a 
New Zealand economist who argued against it.  
New Zealand’s current labour law is among the weaker labour laws in 
OECD countries in terms of protecting and assisting workers, in line with 
neoliberal precepts. Most workers’ pay is now set unilaterally by the employer; 
only 9% of private sector workers are covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement, and about 25% of public sector workers. In the face of weak 
collective bargaining, labour productivity rose by almost 50% between 1989 
and 2011 while the real average hourly wage rose just 14% -- a gap which 
directly sluiced income up towards the top.   
Yet the National Party-led government is now proposing to pass a law 
weakening labour protection and assistance still more. The draft law gives 
employers close to carte blanche to apply to the Employment Relations 
Authority for an order declaring an existing collective bargaining agreement at 
an end.  And it creates a “no rights” period of 60 days thereafter when 
employers are free to pressure workers to sign individual agreements or to 
threaten to contract out the work to no-union firms.  
          This is just what neoliberal economics prescribes, for it sees unions as (a) 
groups which concentrate on getting a bigger share of the pie for themselves at 
the expense of making it grow over time, and (b) groups which cause 
inefficiency of resource allocation.  So the right policy is to limit or remove the 
unions’ ability to exercise their harmful monopoly power; just what the new NZ 
labour law aims to do. This ignores – in line with the tendency of neoliberal 
economics to justify the preferences of the owners and managers of capital, and 
ignore structures of power – the effect of weakening unions on income 
distribution and the balance of power in the political system. Weaker unions 
allow business lobbying to face less counterweight, which indirectly tips 
income distribution even more towards the top (Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2013).  
Economics 
The discipline of economics might have provided an evidence-based check on 
the application of neoliberal precepts. However, throughout the West the great 
majority of university economists teach fairly conventional neoliberal 
economics3.  Indeed, they may not even teach much about real-world 
                                                            
3  For a case study of what happened when orthodox economists, backed by the university 
administration, tried – over three decades -- to marginalize or close down the teaching of 
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economies, as distinct from mathematical models.  David Colander investigated 
the views of 231 graduate students at the seven top-rated US economics 
departments, and found that (in the early 2000s) only 9% thought that “a 
thorough knowledge of the economy” was “very important” for success. Broken 
down by year of study he found that 15% of first and second year graduate 
students thought it “very important”, while less than 1% of fourth and fifth year 
students thought it very important – suggesting that the already low level of 
interest in real-world economies among the first and second year students had 
been thoroughly beaten out of them by the fourth and fifth years (Colander, 
2005).  
        Deep socialization into the mathematically-elegant world view of 
economics leads economists to see themselves as members of an elite group, 
superior to other social scientists. As Durkheim’s and Pierre Bourdieu’s 
researches would lead us to expect (Bourdieu, 1989). neoclassical economists 
are aware of their dominant position among economists and of the status of 
economics as queen of the social sciences, and fearful of abandoning the 
“normal” conceptual and normative ideas of the paradigm even in response to 
easily observable events – like frequent financial crises and collapses of output 
around the world -- lest they be alienated from the group.  Robert Shiller, one of 
the few economists who spelled out the likelihood of a major crisis well in 
advance, admitted that, during his tenure on the advisory panel of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York from 1990 to 2004, he warned about the housing 
bubble “very gently and felt vulnerable expressing such quirky views. Deviating 
too far from consensus leaves one feeling potentially ostracized from the group, 
with the risk that one may be terminated” (Shiller, 2008: 5). Durkheim could 
not have put it better. 
Young academics are often advised not to publish at all than to publish in 
low-ranked journals like the Cambridge Journal of Economics or the Journal of 
Economic Issues or the Review of Keynesian Economics – low ranked because 
they publish papers which are “heterodox” and may not use formal theory4. 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
(left) political economy, despite strong student demand, see Butler, Jones & Stillwell,  2009.  
For neoliberal trends in the sub-discipline of international political economy see Phillips and 
Weaver (2011), including Wade (2011c).     
4  Lee, Pham and Gu, 2013. The journal now called Review of Keynesian Economics was 
founded when the new chief editor of the leading journal, American Economic Review, 
informed some leading Keynesians in the early 1970s that under his editorship the journal 
would be unlikely to publish papers written from the approach of Keynesian economics.   
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The discipline’s epistemic certainty in the neoliberal core was expressed 
recently by one of the most highly respected academic-cum-policy-making 
economists in Britain, who has been central both to macroeconomic policy and 
control of entry to top economics journals. He exclaimed, “Keynes was a 
disaster. Skidelsky [a latter-day Keynesian] should be locked up. Krugman has 
lost all respect in the economics profession (Personal communication, 
November 2011).”  
The discipline accepted largely at face value the study by Carmen 
Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff which discovered the 90% threshold for public 
debt relative to GDP, above which subsequent growth falls sharply. Policy 
makers and politicians wanting to slash social programs even in the face of 
mass unemployment seized on the finding as support for “expansionary 
austerity”.  Soon after the paper was released some critics pointed out that a 
negative correlation between debt and subsequent growth does not mean that 
high debt causes lower growth; low growth could cause high debt, as in Japan 
following its growth collapse in the early 1990s.  But only when a graduate 
student at one of the few US centres of “heterodox” economics tried to replicate 
the results and discovered coding errors did the study receive wider critique.  It 
is now clear that the 90% threshold is not robust; and that the study fudges the 
important distinction between “failure to impose austerity amounting to a few 
percentage points of GDP might reduce GDP a decade from now by a fraction 
of a percent” and “failure to impose austerity is very likely to reduce future 
GDP by 10 percent”, which is how the austerity champions have interpreted it 
(Krugman, 2013a; 2013b).   
A new IMF research paper finds that fiscal consolidation typically raises 
income inequality, raises long-term unemployment, and lowers the share of 
wage income; and that cuts in spending have bigger effects of these kinds than 
tax increases – yet most of the burden in western countries has been placed on 
public spending cuts (Ball, Furceri, Leigh and Loungani, 2013.  See also 
Fontana and Sawyer, 2011).  Two things are striking about this paper, beyond 
its conclusions. First, it comes from the IMF – though it is a working paper 
from the IMF research department, which is quite separate from IMF 
operations; in its operations the IMF continues to push fiscal consolidation in 
most cases. Second, it is one of very few – in the economics literature as a 
whole -- to examine the distributional effects of the standard western policy 
prescription over the past several years. Few economists have been interested in 
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distributional effects, reflecting the general lack of interest in income and 
wealth distribution across the mainstream economics profession.   
The conviction of epistemic certainty reflected in the above quote from 
the distinguished British economist helps to explain why the discipline  has 
resisted – until a small concession by the American Economic Association very 
recently – all efforts at an organized discussion about professional ethics. 
Economics has far more influence over people’s life chances than any other 
social science, up there with medicine and engineering. But while medicine and 
engineering give a great deal of attention to professional ethics, economics 
gives virtually none (DeMartino, 2011; Wade, 2013).  
Anyone who thinks economists’ allergy to ethics is not a serious problem 
should see the films Inside Job and The Flaw.  The former includes the 
memorable exchange:   
Charles Ferguson (director): “A medical researcher writes an article 
saying ‘To treat this disease, you should prescribe this drug’. Turns 
out doctor makes 80% of personal income from the manufacturer of 
said drug. Doesn’t that bother you?”     
 
John Campbell (chair of Harvard University’s economics 
department): “I think … It’s certainly important to disclose the, 
um…The, um… Um… Well, I think that’s also a little different from 
the cases we’re talking about here, because, um….Um….”  
 
Income inequality  
Neoliberal ideas encourage a very relaxed attitude to inequality, seeing it both 
as inevitable and as necessary to provide incentives. So where neoliberal ideas 
reign one finds that substantial increases in inequality do not provoke much 
political attention or citizen concern (beyond talk-back radio).  The standard 
reflex is to point to Steve Jobs, J.K. Rowling, Steven Spielberg, David Beckham 
and other contributors to the mass enhancement of life and say, “They 
obviously deserve their riches” – implying that the larger structure of income 
concentration carries no society-wide costs and that the government has no right 
to try to reduce income concentration at the top (except perhaps when an 
individual’s riches are “undeserved”).5  
                                                            
5 See Gregory Mankiw’s defence of present US levels of income concentration, at 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2013/07/former-bush-economist-defends-the-1-
percent.html. 
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          Like other Anglo countries, New Zealand has experienced a substantial 
rise in income inequality over the past three decades. In the early 1980s the top 
10 percent of population received about a fifth of disposable income. Ever since 
the mid 1990s its share has been more like a quarter. In the three decades to 
2012 the average income of the top 10 percent grew (inflation-adjusted) by 63 
percent or 1.6% per year, while the average income of the bottom 90 percent 
grew at less than half of that. 6  Most households in the bottom 90 percent 
experienced stagnant and falling real incomes for the first two decades, until 
economic policy began to abandon the most extreme forms of neoliberalism.  
But real top 10% incomes increased in just about every year. 
 The top 1 percent did even better.  Precise figures are not available, but 
estimates suggest that their share of total disposable income has risen from a 
low of slightly under 6 percent in 1980 to a bit under 9 percent today. But this 
includes only reported incomes, not capital gains or the large amount of income 
shifted into trusts (which pays lower taxes). Nor does it  include the incomes of 
those living outside the country for part of the year who avoid having to pay any 
income tax at all (which does not prevent many of them being actively involved 
in New Zealand politics: B. Perry,  2013: 236). With these several kinds of 
income included the share of the top 1 percent would be appreciably higher. 
          This degree of income concentration puts New Zealand well into the 
more unequal half of the OECD countries. By comparison, the share of the top 
1% in Scandinavia is around 5-6% of national income, and has remained flat 
since the 1980s (Norway was an upper exception for a few years in the 2000s). 
Other northwest European countries are similar.  These countries demonstrate 
that it is possible to have a prosperous capitalism without income concentration 
as high as in NZ and other Anglo countries.  
On the other hand, NZ income concentration remains well below the US 
level, the US having the most concentrated distribution among the OECD 
countries (apart from new developing country members like Chile and Mexico). 
The share of the top 1% in US national income (including capital gains) fell 
from a peak of around 23% in 1929 to reach a low of around 9% by the late 
1970s, and then, with globalization, technical change and Reagan, rose fast to 
                                                            
6 One should be wary of “inflation-adjusted”.  Statistician John Williams (shadowstats.com) 
reports that recent US real GDP growth has been artificially boosted by an understated 
measure of inflation.  If nominal GDP is deflated with the previous official methodology US 
GDP growth has actually been negative between 2007 and today. See also Paul Craig 
Roberts, The Failure of Laissez Faire Capitalism, Clarity Press, 2013.  
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re-gain the 1929 level by 2006, paving the way for the great Crash of 2008. 
Another measure is the share of the increase in national income accruing to the 
top 1%. During the Clinton years (1990s) the share was about 45%, during the 
Bush years (2000s) about 73%, and in 2010 (Obama) it was 93%. Still another 
measure is the ratio of the remuneration of chief executives to that of the 
average salary in the same company.  Chief executives at Fortune 500 
companies now earn on average 324 times the average salary.  This is not a 
misprint. 
British trends are similar to the US’s, though not as extreme. Chief 
executives of the top 100 British companies now earn 185 times the average 
salary – making £4.8mn or US$7.4mn a year with a mix of salary, bonuses and 
long-term share plans. So British chief executives are impoverished compared 
to American counterparts. On the other hand, they have gained very 
handsomely compared to 1979, when the executive pay ratio was only 15 times 
the average wage.7  And today they do very well compared to German 
counterparts; executive pay at the DAX 30 companies is “only” 90 times the 
average salary. 
  
Costs of income inequality: economic 
If higher inequality countries (among the developed countries) were more 
prosperous, and if one could plausibly argue that their inequality was a 
necessary condition for their higher prosperity,  then one could shrug off 
worries about inequality   as merely “the politics of envy”.  
At first glance the US seems to suggest that inequality does go with 
prosperity: it is the most unequal of the developed countries, and also about the 
most prosperous by GDP per person (though below about seven European 
countries in terms of the more relevant measure of prosperity, GDP per hour 
worked). But by many non-income measures of performance the US looks 
backward. It has the highest rates of infant and maternal mortality in the 
developed world; and life expectancy at birth and at 60 is among the lowest. 
The inequalities cascade down the generations, as rich families invest more in 
their children’s education and the state provides minimal pre-school education; 
so the prosperity of American children is more dependent on the prosperity of 
their parents than that of children in most other developed countries (Porter, 
                                                            
7 The top pay/average pay figures come from the UK High Pay Center. The 1979 ratio is 
based on five major companies.   
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2013). The US and Britain have the lowest rates of intergenerational social 
mobility of the core OECD member states; which is ironic, given that they 
present themselves as free market economies with open opportunities, unlike 
the nanny states of old Europe.  
Overall there is no evidence that more unequal countries are more 
prosperous, even by the standard income measures.  New Zealand, one of the 
more unequal of the developed countries, ranked number 21 in the OECD in 
terms of GDP per person (2005), and number 22 in terms of GDP per hour 
worked. This is hardly testimony to the economy-wide success of Roger 
Douglas’ neoliberalism (“Rogernomics”).  
Most political attention to issues of inequality in the Anglo countries is 
actually about poverty and exclusion, such as the issue of the “living wage”.  
What many advocates miss is the intimate connection between problems at the 
bottom and income concentration at the top. They are opposite ends of the same 
thought.  Increasing income concentration squeezes the share of income and tax 
payments of those lower down the income hierarchy.  While the share of the top 
1% was soaring in the US over the 2000s the disposable income of families in 
the middle of the distribution shrank 4 percent between 2000 and 2010, 
according to OECD figures. So to focus only on problems of the bottom (as in, 
“stop cutting resources for people with disabilities”) misses main causes of the 
problems at the bottom8.     
 
Costs of income inequality: social and health 
The best summary of the social and health costs of inequality is the book by 
Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, The Spirit Level: Why More Equal 
Countries Almost Always Do Better (2009). Testifying to public concern about 
rising inequality, the book has sold since publication in 2009 about 250,000 
copies in 23 languages. 
The book pulls together a mass of evidence about the relationship 
between inequality, on the one hand, and, on the other, nine variables relating to 
social costs and health costs:  
x level of trust;  
x mental illness (including drug and alcohol addiction);  
x life expectancy and infant mortality;  
                                                            
8 A fuller exposition of the economic costs of income concentration would include the effects 
on financial fragility and crashes. See Wade, 2011d; 2011e; Liang, 2012.  
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x obesity;  
x children’s educational performance;  
x teenage births;  
x homicides;  
x imprisonment rates;  
x social mobility.   
It draws on data from two samples: one, around 23 developed countries; two, all 
50 US states. It measures income inequality by the average income of the top 
20% over that of the bottom 20% when comparing countries, and the Gini 
coefficient when comparing US states.    
 The bottom line is that the higher inequality entities (countries and US 
states) have higher frequencies of social and health problems of the kind 
measured by the above nine variables.  The correlation between inequality and 
frequency of social and health problems is much stronger than between average 
income (of countries, US states) and the frequency of those problems; in 
particular, it is not the case that the frequency of the problems is higher in 
poorer entities and lower in richer entities. The US and Norway have similar 
average incomes, but are at almost opposite ends of the scale in terms of the 
index of social and health problems. The US has the worst performance in the 
sample by a long way.  
 Wilkinson and Pickett’s argument has been criticised for relying largely 
on comparisons between countries and US states at one point in time, providing 
little evidence on trends across time. True, but not much longitudinal evidence 
exists. Also, if the cross-sectional correlations are found to hold at different 
times and places, that is evidence that the relationship between inequality and 
social and health problems also holds over time in any one society: as the 
society becomes more unequal performance on the above indicators deteriorates 
relative to what it would be if the society had not become more unequal. If you 
have photos of a man and a woman eating together in Wellington, London and 
Paris it is safe to assume that they are in a relationship9.    
 The best known correlations are those between inequality and health 
outcomes, though these are actually weaker than those between inequality and 
the social indicators. One major study concludes, “Our meta-analysis of cohort 
studies including around 60 million participants [and including studies across 
time] found that people living in regions with high income inequality have an 
                                                            
9 Thanks to Richard Wilkinson for this metaphor, 2 August 2013.  
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excess risk for premature mortality independent of their socioeconomic status, 
age and sex…. Although the size of the excess risk seems relatively ‘modest’, it 
has potentially important policy implications for population health as income 
inequality is an exposure that applies to society as a whole” (Kondo et al., 
2009).  Another major study concludes:  
The death rate for U.S. adults 18 years and older continues 
declining… thanks to substantial socioeconomic development, 
medical advances and the public health movement. But increasing 
income inequality in the past three decades suppressed the overall 
improving health trend. We might have seen an even higher extent of 
improvement of health if income inequality had remained at a 
relatively low level (Zheng, 2012). 
Then there is another whole debate about the likely causal pathways from levels 
of inequality and social and health outcomes.  One is that higher income 
concentration is associated with a higher proportion of the population in relative 
poverty, and relative poverty is associated with poorer health and social 
outcomes.  Wilkinson and Pickett go further, and argue that income inequality 
worsens health and social outcomes of not only the relatively poor but also the 
better off, through the mechanism of harmful effects of psychosocial stress.  
This latter is contested.   
Wilkinson and Pickett show a strong positive correlation between the 
level of income inequality and the density of the prison population: more 
unequal countries and US states have more people in prison per 100,000 
population.  New Zealand’s figures are a lot worse than the average for 
countries with its level of inequality. The prison population rose from 91 per 
100,000 in 1987 to 199 per 100,000 by 2011; and for the Māori it is now around 
700 per 100,000. On a world scale the extremes are the US, with around 740 per 
100,000, and Iceland, with around 50.  Scandinavia has around 60-70, Germany 
90, the UK around 135, the highest in Western Europe. So the New Zealand 
figure is far higher than the highest in Western Europe. Yet crime rates have 
fallen significantly in the last twenty years (see see Workman and McIntosh, 
2013).  Just how the rise in income concentration has helped to drive the New 
Zealand trends is not clear.     
 
Costs of income inequality: political 
It is hardly surprising that elites in relatively unequal countries institute harsh 
penal regimes as a core defence of their superior position.  Nor is it surprising 
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that once the technology permits they institute mass surveillance of their own 
populations’ contacts with each other and with foreigners; and classify 
information about the mass surveillance as top secret, and brand whistleblowers 
such as Edward Snowdon “traitors”. In fact, the intelligence services of western 
governments have long known full well about the US and others’ programs; 
Snowdon’s “crime” is that he revealed the programs to the public being 
surveilled, to whom governments are meant to be accountable.  What is 
worrying is that large majorities of western populations have passively accepted 
the steady rise in income concentration, the proliferating number of super-rich, 
the harsh penal regimes, the cuts to social services in the name of spurious 
economics like “you can’t cure a debt problem with more debt”; and now the 
passive acceptance of mass surveillance10.  Passive and fearful acceptance 
                                                            
10 I asked several prominent New Zealanders whether the Snowdon revelations about the US 
Justice Department scooping up data on telephone calls and internet communications had 
raised alarm bells in NZ,  given that NZ and its GCSB is a member of the five-country 
sharing entity at the core of western intelligence (with US, UK, Canada, Australia). They 
seemed to know virtually nothing about it, and evidenced no concern.  My question stems 
from my and many others’ concern that the US Patriot Act section 215 allows the FBI and the 
NSA to obtain court orders for surveillance – from the highly secret Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court – on grounds that it might produce evidence “relevant” to an 
investigation, and not just a present investigation but a possible future one; and they need not 
demonstrate probable connection to a crime or terrorism. The court can approve surveillance 
of whole categories of people or organizations, not just specific people. It has so far refused 
only about 10 out of 21,000 requests for approval. One of the architects of the Patriot Act, 
Representative James Sensenbrenner, has said, “Congress intended [with the Patriot Act] to 
allow the intelligence communities to access targeted information for specific investigations. 
How can every call that every American makes or receives be relevant to a specific 
investigation?” (quoted in Granick and Sprigman, 2013).  But the Obama government is at 
full steam ahead in its mass surveillance activities, seemingly marginalizing the Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution, which declares that “The Right of the people to be secure in 
their prisons, homes, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizure shall not 
be violated…”.    
The public passivity in response to the Snowden revelations can be compared with US 
public anger at “Obamacare”, the effort to introduce a social insurance component into the 
private and very profitable US health care system. The anger helped propel von Hayek’s The 
Road to Serfdom – about the consequences of Beveridge’s proposed National Health Service 
in Britain, published in 1944 – to number 241 on the Amazon Best Seller’s list in mid 2010. 
Conservative thinkers promoted the book as a guide to the “leftish” machinations of the 
Obama government. See Farrant and McPhail, 2010).   Hayek expounded his overall 
argument as, “The trouble ... with partial planning is precisely that every step forces us to 
further steps … and that it constantly reduces our freedom of action and makes us more and 
more the servants of the machinery we have created”. Hayek, unpublished “Postscript” to The 
Road to Serfdom, quoted in Farrant and McPhail, 2009).   
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would not be surprising in a military dictatorship; but we in the west live in 
democracies.     
The political costs of income concentration at the top include the erosion 
of the old understandings of the social compact binding states to citizens, as the 
resource flows based on these understandings are squeezed by the concentration 
of income at the top and by the ability of the rich to get their preferences 
translated into government policy when their preferences diverge from those of 
middle- and low-income voters (see below).  
The upshot is a tendency for “establishment” elites to become 
“plutocratic” elites, the latter concerned mainly to use the levers of state power 
to create a structure of laws and markets which channels income and wealth 
upwards; and rely on a combination of penal institutions, Murdoch-like media, 
and neoliberal economists to obtain social compliance. As the income ladder 
stretches up, those high on the ladder tend to demonstrate a widening “money-
empathy” gap, in the sense that their having far more money than everyone else 
itself tends to make them less empathetic, more prejudiced about categories of 
“other”, more selfish, more inclined to see others as either aids or obstacles to 
their own ambitions. This is one of the main conclusions from a body of recent 
research on the effects of social class by social psychologists such as Paul Piff 
at Berkeley (see Miller, 2012).   
          The spirit of the money-empathy gap is caught in the recent statement by 
Paul Ryan, chair of the Congressional Budget committee, one of the most 
powerful politicians in the US:  social programs “turn the safety net into a 
hammock that lulls able-bodied people to lives of dependency and 
complacency”11.  
New Zealand Prime Minister John Key gave his own gloss. The National 
Business Review reported, “Prime Minister John Key today stood by his 
comment that some people needed to use foodbanks because they had made 
poor choices "…Anyone on a benefit actually has a lifestyle choice. If one 
budgets properly, one can pay one's bills’, Mr. Key said” (National Business 
Review, 2011, emphasis added).   
The money-empathy gap of the rich is all the more worrying in the light 
of recent research by Martin Gilens, among others, which shows that US 
                                                            
11 Krugman, 2013, emphasis added. For more on the money-empathy gap of billionaires, see 
Frank, 2012.  
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national politicians respond mainly to the wealthiest voters (not to the “median 
voter”). As Gilens summarizes:  
 
When Americans with different income levels differ in their policy 
preferences, actual policy outcomes strongly reflect the preferences of 
the most affluent but bear virtually no relationship to the preferences 
of poor or middle-class Americans. The vast discrepancy … in 
government responsiveness to citizens with different income levels 
stands in sharp contrast to the ideal of political equality that 
Americans hold dear….representational biases of this magnitude call 
into question the very democratic character of our society (Gilens, 
2005: 778, emphasis added). 
  
Research by Benjamin Page and colleagues comes to much the same conclusion 
about the preferences of ordinary Americans and those of the very wealthy 
(Page, Bartels and Seawright, 2013). The average American is somewhat 
worried about large budget deficits, unsurprisingly given the barrage of media 
focus on the deficit as the big problem. But the wealthy by a large margin regard 
the deficit as the most important problem, not unemployment or part-
employment; and say that it must be cut by cutting welfare spending, not by 
raising taxes. The wealthy also say that the minimum wage should not be linked 
to the cost of living, contrary to the preferences of the majority. Actual policy 
reflects upper-class preferences. As Paul Krugman summarizes “What the top 1 
percent wants becomes what economic science says we must do” (Krugman, 
2013a). 
Another study starts from the staple of democratic theory, the argument 
that active participation in associations and civic organizations is crucial to a 
vibrant democracy (Levin-Waldman, 2012).  It examines the relationship 
between household income and civic participation (such as voting, visiting 
public officials, participating in school groups, civic and religious 
organizations) as the current recession developed from 2008 onwards. It finds 
that the already low level of civic participation by low-income households 
(under $30,000 a year) fell; the higher level of participation by middle-income 
households also fell; and the level of participation of high-income households 
(over $100,000 a year), which was initially lower than that of middle-income 
households, was sustained. These findings help to illuminate the mechanisms 
behind the representational biases discovered by Gilens and Page et al.     
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The large representational biases found in the US go with much evidence 
that the US middle-class, long the world’s embodiment of optimism and upward 
mobility, has become fearful of falling out of the middle class over the next few 
years. This pervasive middle-class fear feeds into the polarization of US 
politics, including foreign policy.   
In New Zealand, Finance Minister Bill English recently asserted, 
“Economic policy in NZ is not made by the top 1% for the top 1%”12.  Nicky 
Hager’s The Hollow Men: a Study in the Politics of Deception provides graphic 
details about the role of a dozen or so super-rich donors to the National Party in 
the first half of the 2000s, which point against the English hypothesis; but they 
are hardly conclusive. More comprehensive studies of the role of rich donors in 
New Zealand politics are lacking. 
 
Conclusions 
All through the period since 2008 the centre-left has remained on the defensive, 
unable to cohere around alternatives beyond more or less diluted neoliberalism. 
This is good news for the top 1% and especially the top 0.1%.   
The centre-left should take a leaf out of the strategy of the neoliberals.  
Milton Friedman summarized the right strategy for the neoliberals at the time 
when they were on the political and economic margins and the consensus was 
for social planning and welfarism: “Only a crisis – actual or perceived – 
produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend 
on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to 
develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until 
                                                            
12 English made the assertion in an interview on TVNZ’s Q&A, Sunday 14 July 2013, in 
response to my summary statement that economic policy in high-inequality countries like the 
US, UK and NZ is being made by the top 1% for the top 1%.  (I should have made a bit of 
distinction between NZ and the others, for reasons given earlier.) The irony is that, according 
to Hager, 2006: especially p. 213, English was replaced as National Party leader in 2003 by 
Don Brash because he advocated too centrist policies for the dozen or so Big Donors on 
whom the National Party depended; while Brash promised the party caucus that the donations 
would flow with him as leader and future prime minister – without spelling out the hard-right 
policies wanted by the money men. Hager’s book describes in detail the deception of the 
electorate that went on in the run-up to the 2005 election, to keep the hard-right policies out 
of sight. So English himself had directly suffered from the influence of Big Donors on 
National party policy.  Hager observes, “What is significant about National’s main donors is 
not so much their wealth (and they are very wealthy) but their political beliefs. These are not 
well-heeled businesspeople who happen to lean a bit to the right. This small and distinct 
group comes mostly from the radical right of New Zealand politics and business” (223).           
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the politically impossible becomes the politically inevitable” (Friedman, 1962: 
xiv).   
Hence the neoliberal movement through the 1940s to the 1970s 
concentrated on quietly building think-tanks and networks to develop the ideas 
and train cadres while awaiting the crisis. When it came in the later 1970s the 
movement had the blue-prints to put on the table and the cadres to implement 
them on behalf of the governments of Reagan, Thatcher, Lange/Douglas and 
others.  The subsequent great achievement of the movement has been to make 
the core neoliberal ideas seem as natural as gravity, to which there is no 
alternative, whether the troublesome public likes them or not. The wealthy like 
them very much, for they have directly helped to raise their share of national 
income and political power. And as the research by Gilens, Page et al. cited 
earlier suggests, the wealthy are able to shape public policy in line with their 
preferences and marginalize the preferences of middle- and low-income people 
when their preferences differ from those at the top, thanks to the financial 
imperatives of modern democracy and the ease with which the wealthy can exit 
or threaten to exit from a political domain they do not like.   
Since the 1980s the non-neoliberal left, which has been at least as 
marginal as the neoliberals through the 1940s to the 1970s, has done little to 
build corresponding organizations and networks – one obvious reason being that 
non-neoliberal financing is always more difficult. New Zealand has nothing 
close to a centre-left think-tank, and the few “heterodox” economists are 
scattered and disparate.  The organizational weakness of the centre-left, 
combined with media ownership by profit-maximizing firms (the national radio 
station being the valuable exception), produces the parlous state of New 
Zealand newspapers and television, which allows much neoliberal policy to go 
unchallenged except at the edges.   
The centre-left should be able to capitalize on the fact that high income 
concentration probably means that a majority of the population experience 
stagnant or falling incomes, and a squeeze on tax-financed social spending. 
Here are several points that should go into a centre-left strategy.  
All taxation and public spending should be scrutinized for distribution effects.   
One of the most important steps is to “normalize” the evaluation of all tax and 
public spending in terms of effects on the distribution of income and wealth. 
Too often many of these measures escape distributional scrutiny by being 
presented as good for “the economy”.  The implicit government guarantee that 
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banks above a certain size will not be allowed to fail, and the tax advantages 
given to debt financing, are examples. And the most spectacular recent case of 
hidden income concentration effects is the combination of the fiscal policy of 
“expansionary austerity” or “fiscal consolidation” across the western world 
since 2008, and (in some countries, notably the US and the UK) the monetary 
policy of “quantitative easing”, both of which are discussed above.  
“Predistribution” is even more important than redistribution.   
Those concerned to rein in income concentration must pay attention to matters 
well beyond tax and spending—the latter having been the familiar battle ground 
for left-right fights. The key distinction is between predistribution of market 
incomes, and redistribution of market incomes by the state through taxation and 
public spending. The main determinant of inequality of “take home” income 
(after tax and spend) is not the magnitude of redistribution but the inequality of 
market incomes (before tax and spend); so to focus on lowering the 
concentration of income by tax and spending measures is to miss more than half 
the picture. One has to examine the whole array of state laws, regulations and 
policies for their effects on the distribution of market income, before taxes, 
particularly to show how, in high-inequality developed countries, many parts of 
the array (including corporate governance law, trade union law, patent law, 
monetary policy, exchange rate policy, and more) have the effect of sluicing 
market incomes upwards. If corporate governance law says, for example, that 
CEOs appoint the boards of directors, and that the directors decide the 
remuneration of CEOs, no prize for guessing what happens to CEO 
remuneration.  Of course, we are told that top pay rises because firms compete 
globally for the best talent – and therefore whatever is paid is justified. In fact, 
only 1 percent of the chief executives of Fortune Global 500 companies were 
poached from another company in a foreign country.  
          It is largely through predistribution measures that the plutocratic elites of 
the US, the UK and some other western states have quietly built up a 
“conservative nanny state”, with income concentration as one of its expressions 
(Baker, 2006, 2012). The centre-left should press hard to reveal the mechanisms 
by which the conservative nanny state works.  
 
Insist on banks maintaining a high minimum capital-adequacy ratio.  
This is one issue that commands a lot of agreement across the political 
spectrum: banks typically borrow too much and the present regulations are too 
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confusing. The solution is to have a simple number indicating the extent to 
which a bank’s owners could bear most losses without requiring a bailout. If a 
high ratio (15 percent or more) means that banks are smaller and lend less, that 
is the price of a more stable system. 
Stop talking down the state. A further major change to be promoted by the 
centre-left begins by challenging the standard neoliberal opposition between 
“state and market”, based on the idea that “the market” is natural and the state is 
“artificial”; which goes with a constant talking down of the state and talking up 
of the private sector, as though the latter is a caged lion just waiting to spring 
free from state regulations. For all its faults, the democratic state has an 
advantage over the private sector in that state actions do have to be justified in 
terms of societal values, as the actions of private firms do not; and the leaders of 
the state can be replaced (and their remuneration set) as a result of citizen 
preferences expressed in public forums – which is not the case for leaders of 
firms. The state can also exercise comprehensive foresight about the economy’s 
future growth, in a way that private firms typically do not.  These and other 
points are the basis for formulating a vision of more complementary roles of 
state and markets in capitalist society.  
Stop talking down the state means that the question of privatization or 
outsourcing is to be answered pragmatically, not by an assumption that the 
private sector is always more productive than the public sector (or vice versa). 
The pragmatic answer is that a private company will probably out-perform a 
public agency when the goals are clear, when achieving them does not 
undermine other socially desirable outcomes, and when rewards to managers 
and employees can be aligned with the goals. When the goals are complex and 
diffuse the profit motive may make them more difficult to achieve, and 
privatization is probably not the solution (Porter, 2013).  
Industry policy can help achieve a “high productivity-high wage” growth path.  
The idea of a complementary relationship between state and market – and not 
just a “framework-providing” state -- is especially important in the case of 
industry policy, or economic development policy more broadly. In neoliberal 
economics the very phrase “industrial policy” is toxic and automatically equated 
with “picking winners”, to be rejected with “the government cannot pick 
winners but can pick losers” (Wade, 2004; 2012). The centre-left has been far 
too willing to conduct the debate on the terrain favoured by the right -- the 
public sector -- and ignore how to reform the private sector. 
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That the US remains by far the most innovative economy in the world is 
due in no small part to an active industrial policy – but one kept below the radar 
to escape political censure (Wade, forthcoming; Lind, 2012).  The Defence 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the National Institutes of 
Health, and several other federal agencies have been key to a swathe of US 
breakthroughs in “general purpose technologies”.  To take only the information 
and communications revolution: The US National Science Foundation funded 
the algorithm that drove Google’s search engine. Early funding for Apple came 
from the US government’s Small Business Innovation Research Program. 
Moreover, in the words of Mariana Mazzucato, “All the technologies which 
make the iPhone ‘smart’ are also state-funded… the internet, wireless networks, 
the global positioning system, microelectronics, touchscreen displays and the 
latest voice-activated SIRI personal assistant”13.   
The reason why the state role has been seminal is beyond the ken of 
neoliberal economics: it is that private companies will not bear the uncertainties, 
time spans and costs associated with fundamental innovation; and the more 
competitive, finance-driven the economy the less its firms will bear these 
risks14.  (In another blow to neoliberal economics, the great breakthrough 
discoveries from the private sector – from Bell Laboratories, for one – came 
from monopolists, with money to spare.) The US state has not only born the 
costs of many breakthrough innovations; it has acted as an entrepreneur, 
providing directional thrust to entrepreneurship in the private sector. The 
problem is that the neoliberal conviction about the sanctity of private profit then 
kicks in, with the result that the public sector hands over innovations to the 
private sector for almost no return, while the private sector appropriates the 
credit and the profit -- so the neoliberal dictum “The government cannot pick 
winners but can pick losers” prevails, and state budgets (including for research) 
continue to be squeezed.  The solution is to implement “taxpayer warrants”, 
such that the public sector earns royalties on innovations (in IT, 
pharmaceuticals, etc.) from which the private sector profits.  This is all the more 
                                                            
13 Mazzucato, 2013; Wolf, 2013: To describe the component technologies of the iPhone as 
entirely state-funded is an exaggeration.    
14 This statement now needs some qualification, as billionaire entrepreneurs like Jeff Bezos of 
Amazon and Sergey Brin, cofounder of Google, are pushing for the next big technological 
breakthroughs in space exploration, robotics, advanced materials and new forms of ground 
transportation.   
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imperative if societal challenges like climate change, renewable energy, healthy 
ageing and food security are to be met.      
         Germany too has long practiced active and successful industrial policy, 
also kept unadvertised; though in the past decade and more its government has 
limited the role of the state and the economy has failed to remain at the 
forefront of today’s new technologies (TUC, 2012. For a NZ prospectus, see 
New Zealand Council of Trade Unions, 2010). Taiwan has long practiced both a 
“big scale” and centrally coordinated industrial policy and also a small-scale 
nudging kind of “industrial extension” policy carried out by the Industrial 
Development Bureau (see Wade, 2004: especially chapters 7 and 9).   
        Active industrial policy is all the more important to promote economic 
diversification in countries like New Zealand reliant on commodity exports to 
China, as China slows down; and all the more important for everyone as climate 
change and population aging speed up. Diversification and innovation left to 
“the free market” will be far too slow.15  That the economics profession in 
developed countries operates within the ideological precepts of neoliberal 
economics and largely ignores the non-neoliberal programs of industrial policy 
is testimony to the epistemic certainty of the neoliberal core.   
          Of course, in a small open economy like New Zealand the constraints on 
an entrepreneurial role of the state are tighter than in a much larger and less 
open economy like the US. The owners and managers of large businesses can 
always threaten to exit, and exporters can put all their lobbying efforts into 
keeping labour costs as low as possible, ignoring the Keynesian mechanism of 
higher wages translating into higher demand. But it would be possible to 
counter these tendencies by a government talking up its entrepreneurial role in 
assisting firms to shift to a “high productivity-high wage” path; which entails 
more tripartite collaboration around the vision of a national project in forums 
like the old Planning Council, and more public effort at building up New 
Zealand-based supply chains, along the lines of what Taiwan’s Industrial 
Development Bureau has done ever since the 1950s (Haworth, 2013).  
 
Rebalance power in the labour market. Then there are a whole set of issues 
around the representational biases in democratic politics reported earlier, and 
the effects of the hollowing out of middle classes on civic participation. One 
                                                            
15 Pilling, 2013.  The need for industrial policy also stems from the need to accelerate the 
switch to sustainable energy sources.  
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issue is to do with the “minimum wage”. Increases in the minimum wage tend 
to raise median wages, and increases in both can be expected to raise 
participation in democratic society. Plutocratic elite is likely to fear such an 
increase in participation and to resist wage increases not only for profit reasons 
but also for political reasons. But everyone who values a vibrant democracy 
should support efforts to rebalance power in the labour market, including 
through higher minimum and living wages and an expansion in the legitimate 
role of trade unions (drawing inspiration from their role in Germany and 
Scandinavia).  
Political financing. A second issue under the heading of correcting 
representational biases is political party financing (for background on party 
financing see Hopkin, 2004.) 
          As long as political parties and candidates depend heavily on a relatively 
small number of donors and lenders – which goes up as income concentration 
rises -- their policies and commitments will incline towards the wealthy when 
the preferences of the wealthy differ from those of the rest. It is as simple as 
that. But political party financing is the “third rail” of politics, which none of 
the big players wish to touch. The UK Committee on Standards in Public Life 
published “Political party financing: ending the Big Donor culture” in 
November 2011.  It identified three main routes for reform: (1) Restrict the 
amount any individual or organization (companies, trade unions) can give or 
loan; (2) limit party and candidate (campaign) spending; (3) provide public 
funding. Although long and careful, and launched with fanfare, the report died 
on the day of publication. Nothing more has been heard of it, to audible relief in 
the corridors of Westminster.   
          This short discussion has suggested several agenda items for a centre-left 
strategy.  The starting point has to be the evidence that capitalism in much of 
the West has been working at cross-purposes to democracy.  Yet the confluence 
of forces making for a conservative nanny state and rising income concentration 
at the top – and squeeze lower down – seems to be locked in, through 
mechanisms as varied as political party and candidate funding, tax advantages 
attached to debt finance, dependence of banks on proprietary trading for a major 
share of profits (almost a guarantee of imprudent banking),  and the hegemony 
of neoliberal economics, with its nonchalance about income concentration and 
its antipathy to unions. The centre-left has its work cut out, but it can draw 
courage from Milton Friedman’s summary of the strategy for the neoliberal 
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movement at a time when it was on the fringes; and from the obvious electoral 
opportunities presented by the fact that large majorities find their standard of 
living stagnant or declining as income concentration rises. Hopefully the centre-
left will draw in some far-sighted wealthy people and organizations equivalent 
to John Maynard Keynes, who while making fistfuls of money for himself and 
Kings College, Cambridge also worked seriously on solving the problems of 
mankind.    
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Measuring Changes in Family Wellbeing in New Zealand 1981 to 
2006 
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Abstract 
Since the mid-1980s, New Zealand has experienced extensive 
economic, social and political reforms. The economic impact of these 
changes has been closely monitored and much commented upon. 
However, the social impacts of the reforms on different categories of 
families and households are less well understood. This article presents 
data from a project designed to monitor how the reforms have 
impacted upon these categories, via indicators of wellbeing 
constructed from census data. All of this reveals variable impacts by 
category, with single-parent family households faring worst over the 
1981–2006 period. 
 
Introduction 
The period from the early 1980s until the late 1990s in New Zealand was 
marked by extensive economic reforms, the outcomes of which have been much 
analysed and debated. The reforms also had considerable social impacts, most 
obviously rising levels of unemployment and inequality. Apart from the usual 
measures of unemployment and the use of poverty measures to assess the 
impact of these changes, the ability of researchers to monitor the social 
consequences of these reforms was limited. In the early 2000s, a series of 
measures were put in place to monitor social impacts, but the ability to similarly 
assess the earlier reforms remained limited (for example see Crothers, 2000; Big 
Cities Quality of Life, 2001–; Ministry of Social Development, 2001–; Roper, 
2011). 
 COMPASS Research Centre at The University of Auckland undertook 
from 2002 to 2007 a project to develop measures to monitor more so the social 
impact of the reforms, and looking at how different types of families and 
households were affected. Measures of wellbeing were constructed using 
Statistics New Zealand (SNZ) census data for the 1981–2006 period. This 
article details the project, outlining the construction of indicators of wellbeing at 
the levels of the family and the household, and examining the results, updating 
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an article published in Social Indicators Research (Cotterell, et al., 2008a), 
which only covered the censuses up to 2001. 
 
The reforms in New Zealand, 1981–2006 
New Zealand underwent a series of far-reaching economic, political and social 
reforms in the post-1984 period as a result of the election of the Fourth Labour 
Government in 1984. After taking office, Labour moved to deregulate and 
privatise large sectors of the economy, removed subsidies and tax exemptions in 
many areas, lowered overall rates of personal tax, allowed the New Zealand 
dollar to float, restructured some government departments along commercial 
lines, subsequently selling some, and prioritised inflation control as a primary 
policy objective (Dalziel and Lattimore, 2004). The economic reform process 
continued through the 1980s and was deepened with the election of the National 
Government in late 1990. Once in government, National moved to deregulate 
the labour market and reduce welfare spending by cutting payment levels for 
many beneficiaries and by increasing the use of means testing. These policies 
were partially reversed by the subsequent Labour-led coalition (1999–2008) but 
then the general policy direction reverted once again under the National-led 
coalition (2008–present), although this was hampered by the Global Financial 
Crisis. 
 
Monitoring the impact of the reforms 
The immediate and long-term impacts of the earlier of these reforms on the 
economy have been much discussed and monitored (for example see Dalziel, 
2002; Roper, 2005). The data needed to conduct these discussions are available 
from the well-established and generally agreed upon methodological approaches 
to collecting such data and their presentation in such formats as the System of 
National Accounts. 
 Data on the social impact of these reforms, especially in the late 1980s, 
but also through to the late 1990s, were less comprehensive. Measurement of 
the social impacts of reforms tended to focus largely upon rising levels of 
unemployment and economic inequality (for example see Stephens and 
Waldegrave, 2001; Waldegrave, et al., 2003; Perry, 2013; Statistics New 
Zealand, 1999). 
 Early in the 2000s, measures were introduced to overcome this inability 
to adequately monitor the social impacts of reforms. These measures revolved 
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around the development of sets of social indicators for the measurement of 
changes in the level of wellbeing for different groups and regions of the 
country. The two primary resources were the Ministry of Social Development’s 
Social Report and the local government Big Cities Quality of Life project (see 
Cotterell and Crothers, 2011). 
 The Social Report, compiled by the Ministry of Social Development, is 
an annual report first published in 2001, with the latest available report 
published in 2011. It contains some 40–45 indicators grouped under ten 
domains – see www.socialreport.msd.govt.nz. The Big Cities Quality of Life 
project contains information on a wide range of quality of life indicators in New 
Zealand’s largest cities, with the first report having been published in 2001, and 
the most recent (partial) report in 2012 – see www.bigcities.govt.nz. It organises 
the data into 11 domains and there are 56 key indicators, along with an 
extensive range of lower level indicators. 
 These publications have two limitations. First is the extent of historical 
information provided. While for some indicators data are available back as far 
as 1986, in many cases the periods covered are more recent, rendering them 
inadequate for conducting an analysis of the earlier period of extensive reform. 
Second, for many of the indicators referred to are individual outcomes, and 
analysis of change for families and households is generally not conducted. 
 The indicators derived from the Family Whānau and Wellbeing project 
(FWWP) run by COMPASS were intended to fill this gap. FWWP was part of a 
five-year research programme supported by the Social Science funding pool of 
the then Foundation for Research, Science and Technology (FRST), which has 
ended up as part of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment 
(MBIE). The project was extended so as to allow inclusion of figures from the 
2006 Census, but the article that this one updates was written before those were 
available. 
 One of the goals of FWWP was to develop ways to use census data to 
examine and monitor the social and economic determinants of family and 
whānau wellbeing, and how these had changed over the period since 1981. 
More recently, 1976 Census unit record data have become available, and it is 
hoped that these might be added to the study in due course, as well as, of 
course, data from the 2013 Census. 
 The remainder of this research note examines the data used that were 
used to compile indicators to track these determinants, assesses the advantages 
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and disadvantages of the indicators, and presents the results of them for a set of 
household categories. 
 
Measuring wellbeing using census data 
The data used to construct the wellbeing indicators were sourced from the 
formerly five-yearly New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings 
conducted by SNZ. The census collects data on a range of individual and 
household variables including income, household and family structure, 
employment, housing, education and health. The use of census data to both 
construct indicators of family wellbeing and monitor changes over time has 
advantages and disadvantages (Errington, et al., 2008). 
 The primary advantage of using census data is that this allows for an 
assessment of continuity and change in societal patterns over a long segment of 
time – 25 years in this case. Second, information obtained from the census 
covers (almost) all members of the population, and therefore allows us to 
examine the wellbeing of all New Zealanders, and provides information on 
small population groupings, including at family and household levels. Third, 
while the census does not collect information on the subjective elements of 
wellbeing, many of the core outcomes (good jobs, adequate income, education 
and health) identified as promoting wellbeing are based on objective living 
conditions, data on which are captured (with the limitations outlined below) in 
the census. 
 Thus, in many instances, a strong link exists between objective and 
subjective measures of wellbeing, and although the census provides little direct 
information on the subjective intangible aspects, it can provide some indirect 
insights into these. 
 The disadvantages associated with using census data to measure changes 
in family and household wellbeing are linked to the limited range and depth of 
information collected, the frequency of collection for some questions, and the 
ways in which family types are defined and measured. The selection of 
indicators was constrained by the census data available. The wellbeing of a 
family or household may be influenced by other factors (e.g. the perceived 
quality of family relationships) for which no information is available. This lack 
of information also results in some of the constructed indicators rather being 
indirect measures of a particular attribute. For example, the only indicator for 
health examines changes in proportions of households with at least one person 
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receiving health-related benefits, rather than being an actual measure of the 
physical health of a household. 
 Lack of data availability may constrain time series analysis. Some census 
questions relevant to wellbeing are no longer asked, e.g. housing insulation, 
while others are included irregularly, e.g. smoking. This means that we cannot 
monitor changes in some domains as frequently as we wish. 
 A lack of in-depth information limits the ability to interpret change in 
some indicators. For example, because income data are in bands rather than 
discrete amounts, indicator construction requires some estimation – in this case 
band medians were made available, but this greatly diminishes variability and 
thus the ability to detect changes. 
 The census definition of family only incorporates members living within 
the same household. Census wellbeing measures may be particularly poor 
indicators for families whose members do not all reside within the one 
household. Particularly affected are parents who usually share custody of their 
children and children who live across two households. The ability to monitor 
the wellbeing of extended families is also constrained by this household-based 
definition of family. 
 After a comprehensive process of checking census data consistency over 
time, a set of indicators measuring family wellbeing was constructed and 
reported on (Milligan, et al., 2006), with 12 indicators under 5 domains in the 
original set. Table 1 below presents a streamlined set of indicators that will be 
reported on in the remainder of this research note. Note that for consistency 
with earlier outputs from FWWP, except for ‘median equivalised income’, the 
indicators are all presented negatively, so that high values always mean less 
wellbeing. 
Household categories 
Four household categories are included and compared in this research note. 
These are different from the five family types used in the article herein updated 
(Cotterell, et al., 2008). The updated categorisation follows the lead of subgroup 
analysis reports produced in the intervening years (Sua’ali’i-Sauni, et al., 2008; 
Kiro, et al., 2010), changing to a simpler focus on households. 
Statistics New Zealand notes that: 
A ‘family nucleus’ is a couple, with or without children, or one parent 
and their child(ren) usually resident in the same dwelling. The 
children do not have partners or children of their own living in the 
same household. People who usually live in a particular dwelling, and 
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are members of a family nucleus in that dwelling, but who are absent 
on census night, are included, as long as they are reported as being 
absent by the reference person on the dwelling form.1 
Table 1: Wellbeing indicators examined in this research note 
Domain Indicator Definition 
Income Median 
equivalised 
income 
Median equivalised real household income. For the 
purposes of this report, median equivalised real income is 
median gross income adjusted for household composition 
using the Revised Jensen Scale (Jensen 1988) and expressed 
in 1999 dollars using the March quarter CPI (base 1999) for 
the relevant year (Statistics New Zealand 2005) 
Low income The percentage of households where the equivalised gross 
income is less than 60% of the overall median equivalised 
gross household income 
Education Any educational 
attainment 
The percentage of households where no adult has any 
educational qualifications 
Post-secondary 
educational 
attainment 
The percentage of households where no adult has any post-
secondary educational qualification 
Work Parental 
employment 
The percentage of households where no adult is in formal 
paid employment 
Long working 
hours 
The percentage of households where at least one adult 
works more than 48 hours per week 
Housing Home ownership The percentage of households that are not owner-occupied 
Rental 
affordability 
The percentage of households, living in rented dwellings, 
where the weekly rent is greater than 25% of the gross 
equivalised household income 
Crowding The percentage of households that are living in dwellings 
where they require at least one additional bedroom to meet 
their sleeping needs 
Health Health-related 
benefits 
The percentage of households where at least one adult 
receives either a sickness or an invalid’s benefit 
Smoking The percentage of households where at least one adult 
regularly smokes cigarettes 
Connectedness Internet access The percentage of households where there is no access to 
the Internet 
In contrast, a household is defined as any group of families or individuals living 
in the same dwelling, regardless of their relationships to one another. Therefore, 
census families are wholly contained within households. However, it is 
important to note that not all households contain families and also that some 
households are made up of a family or families cohabiting with non-family 
members. 
          In this research note the primary focus is the household. Indicators are 
presented for four categories: couple-only households, single-parent family 
                                                            
1 http://www.stats.govt.nz/Census/about-2006-census/information-by-variable/family-
type.aspx 
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households, other one-family households and multi-family households. The 
makeup of these categories at each census point is presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Household categories examined in this research note 
Household composition 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 
Couple-only households 27.8% 30.1% 31.6% 32.6% 34.1% 34.3% 
Couple only 213,405 249,765 278,715 309,819 330,201 366,042 
Single-parent family households 10.7% 12.5% 15.3% 15.0% 16.7% 15.6% 
One-parent family 68,904 85,377 108,435 114,957 126,840 134,517 
One-parent family plus others 13,299 18,504 26,367 27,762 34,944 32,454 
Other one-family households 58.8% 53.3% 48.5% 45.3% 43.1% 42.4% 
Couple with children 412,134 404,322 388,407 379,218 358,779 392,268 
Couple only plus others 11,493 12,186 15,870 23,526 26,748 29,166 
Couple with children plus others 27,999 25,893 24,150 27,639 31,563 31,095 
Multi-family households 2.6% 4.1% 4.6% 7.0% 6.1% 7.7% 
Two 2-parent families with or 
without children 
9,372 10,182 13,584 25,701 4,224 5,796 
Two-parent plus one-parent 
family 
7,575 14,373 17,274 23,925 10,518 13,101 
Two 1-parent families 2,286 5,916 6,738 10,701 8,514 10,095 
Other two-family households - - - 102 30,537 45,168 
Three or more families 1,281 3,459 3,057 6,117 4,749 7,794 
Total households 767,748 829,977 882,597 949,467 967,617 1,067,496 
 
The second and third categories have at least one child by definition, and as we 
did not break things down any further, there is no restriction in those categories 
on the age of children – the only requirement is to be living with parent(s) and 
thus identified as dependent/independent children by the census. In previous 
FWWP reports the family types were broken down into, for instance, couples 
with dependent children and couples with only independent children – defined 
based on considerations of age and employment status. Again, the terminology 
used here is consistent with the more recent reports on wellbeing from FWWP 
and associated projects. 
 The following analysis examines changes in wellbeing for the household 
categories described earlier. A selection of the indicators presented in Table 1 is 
covered below. 
 
Median equivalised income 
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The first income indicator measures median equivalised household income and 
Figure 1 below shows the shifts in income experienced by each of the 
household categories over the period under review. Equivalised income is gross 
income adjusted for family composition using the Revised Jensen Scale (Jensen, 
1988). Income equivalences and the estimation of family expenditure on 
children are expressed in 1999 dollars using the Consumers Price Index with the 
base to 1999 for the relevant year. 
For all four of the household categories, median equivalised income rose 
over the period, although for single-parent family households this was marginal. 
For most, income declined through the 1980s, a period marked by high inflation 
and rising unemployment, and then recovered partially thereafter. 
Single-parent family households had the lowest median equivalised 
income over the period and while multi-family households were also low, their 
relative income increased more. 
Figure 1: Median equivalised household income 
 
Low income 
The low income indicator captures the percentage of households in each 
category with less than 60% of the overall median equivalised household 
income for that category. The results are presented in Figure 2 below. Among 
our household categories, only single-parent family households saw a small 
increase over the period as a whole. They were also the most likely to 
experience low income at each time point, followed by multi-family 
households. 
Figure 2: Low income 
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Educational attainment 
The any educational attainment indicator measures the percentage of 
households where no adult has any educational qualification. Figure 3 shows the 
results for this. All of our household categories saw declines in this indicator 
over the period, with the largest consistently occurring between 1981 and 1991. 
Other one-family households were the least likely to have an adult with no 
educational qualifications. This pattern is echoed in the post-secondary 
educational attainment indicator, which similarly shows the percentage of 
households where no adult has any post-secondary educational qualification. 
Figure 4 shows the results for this indicator. 
Figure 3: Any educational attainment 
 
Figure 4: Post-secondary educational attainment 
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Parental employment 
This is calculated as the percentage of households where no adult is in formal 
paid employment. Figure 5 shows the results for this indicator. 
 For all household categories, the indicator peaked in 1991. Other one-
family households were the least likely to have no adult in formal paid 
employment, while single-parent family households were the most likely, at 
more than 50% for most of the period. 
 
Figure 5: Parental employment 
 
 
Long working hours 
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This indicator specifies the percentage of households where at least one adult 
works more than 48 hours per week. Figure 6 shows the results.  All household 
categories experienced an increase in the likelihood of their having at least one 
adult working more than 48 hours per week over the period. Single-parents 
were the least likely to be working long hours, at every census point. 
Figure 6: Long working hours 
 
Home ownership 
This is the percentage of households that are not owner-occupied. Figure 7 
shows the results. All household categories experienced an increase in the 
percentage not living in their own dwellings, over the period. Couples-only 
households were the most likely to own their dwellings, at every census point, 
while single-parent family households were consistently the least likely. 
Figure 7: Home ownership 
 
Rental affordability 
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The rental affordability indicator shows the percentage of households, living in 
rented dwellings, where the weekly rent is greater than 25% of the gross 
equivalised household income. Figure 8 shows the results for this indicator. 
Over the period this indicator increased for all household categories, with the 
steepest increases occurring in the 1986-1996 period. Single-parent family 
households were the most likely to be paying more than 25% of their 
equivalised income in rent over the period. 
Figure 8: Rental affordability 
 
 
Crowding 
The household crowding indicator shows the percentage of households that are 
living in dwellings where they require at least one additional bedroom to meet 
their sleeping needs. (The number of bedrooms required by a household is 
calculated using the concept of the adult equivalent. The required number of 
bedrooms is calculated as: ½ × the number of children under 10 years + the 
number of couples + the number of remaining householders aged 10 years and 
over (Morrison, 1994; Statistics New Zealand, 2004). All household categories 
saw decreases in this indicator over the period. Not too surprisingly, multi-
family households were the most likely to be crowded, at each census point. 
Health-related benefits 
This indicator gives the percentage of households where at least one adult is 
receiving a sickness or invalid’s benefit. Figure 10 shows the results. All 
household categories saw increases in this indicator over time. Multi-family 
households had the highest percentage at every census point, while single-
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parent family households saw the biggest absolute percentage increase over the 
period. 
Figure 9: Crowding 
 
Figure 10: Health-related benefits 
 
Smoking 
The smoking indicator reports the percentage of households where at least one 
adult regularly smokes cigarettes. Data on smoking were only captured in the 
1981, 1996 and 2006 Censuses, so we do not have as good a time series as for 
the previous indicators. Figure 11 shows the three figures using the same scale 
on the graph. With these limitations in mind, the data available do suggest that 
there was a distinct and even decline in smoking rates over the period. Single-
parent family households did not see nearly as big an absolute decrease as did 
the other household categories. 
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Figure 11: Smoking 
 
 
Internet access 
Again reading negatively, this indicator gives the percentage of households 
where there is no access to the Internet. Data for this were only collected in the 
census from 2001, so we have only two measurement points. Figure 12 presents 
these on the same time scale as for the other graphs. All that can be said is that 
there were substantial increases in access to the Internet over the 2001–2006 
periods for all household categories, and especially for couple-only households. 
 
Figure 12: Internet access 
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Discussion 
The data displayed above show that single-parent family households fared worst 
over the twenty-five year period of reforms. In terms of income levels the gap 
between single-parent family households and the other household categories 
widened over the period, and the same was true for levels of home ownership. 
Even where they did see improvements in wellbeing, as in the education 
indicators, single-parent family households improved their positions at a slower 
rate than their couple equivalents. 
 These results have significant implications in the New Zealand context. 
The previous Labour-led government made building stronger families and 
improving outcomes for children an important part of its policy focus (Maharey, 
2000). Indeed it went as far as to establish a Families Commission in 2004, 
charged with the role of acting as an advocate for the interests of families within 
the government and in the public arena. 
 Given that different household categories had different experiences 
during the reform period, any policy introduced to strengthen families and 
improve the wellbeing of children needs to take into account these different 
experiences. The evidence displayed above suggests that in most cases it is the 
single-parent family households upon whom policy needs to be focused if 
lifting levels of wellbeing is a priority. This is particularly the case in New 
Zealand where in a recent review of literature, Mackay noted that “children 
raised in lone-parent families have been found, on average, to do less well 
across a range of measures of wellbeing than their peers in two-parent families, 
while parental separation has been found to be associated with an array of 
adverse outcomes for children” (Mackay, 2005: 111). 
 
Other and future research 
The wellbeing indicators developed have allowed further projects to examine 
changes in family and household wellbeing at a more detailed level of analysis. 
Central to this analysis is an examination of differences in the wellbeing of 
families with parents of different ethnicities. Wellbeing for ‘Pacific families’ 
(Sua’ali’i-Sauni, et al., 2009) and for ‘Māori families’ (Kiro, et al., 2010) have 
been examined since the original FWWP reports were produced. Other focuses 
have included wellbeing by education level (Cotterell, et al., 2008b) and 
attempts to track wellbeing for specific family groups across censuses (Davis, et 
al., 2012). 
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 Furthermore, data from the 2013 Census will be available around mid-
2014, and hopefully will be incorporated into the analysis to determine whether 
the economic growth experienced in New Zealand during the 2000s has 
translated into an improvement for all families/households or for perhaps just a 
subset of them. 
 
Conclusion 
The wellbeing indicators of FWWP provide a unique way of assessing the 
impact of the economic reforms of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s on a range of 
different household categories, filling a long neglected analytical gap. The data 
indicate that New Zealand households experienced considerable changes in 
their levels of wellbeing, with single-parent family households generally faring 
worst. The differences are important when taking into account the current 
government’s concern with family wellbeing, and the strong suggestion that 
different family types or household categories will require different types and 
levels of resources in order to improve their wellbeing. 
 While analysis of the impact of the reforms on different household 
categories is limited to some extent by the nature of the data collected by the 
census, the results show that our indicators do offer a useful way to monitor 
ongoing changes in family and household wellbeing over time. In addition, with 
the inclusion of data for subsequent censuses the wellbeing indicators have the 
potential to become an established part of the social wellbeing monitoring 
programme and so to contribute to information-based policy in New Zealand. 
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Appendix: The New Zealand Literature on Social 
Class/Inequality 
 
Charles Crothers 
 
A broad account of the New Zealand class system can be readily assembled 
from popularly-available sources such as the item in the official New Zealand 
online Encyclopaedia Te Ara or the Wikipedia entry, together with common 
knowledge. Having provided a sketch, this appendix then goes on to provide a 
brief overview and then listing of a bibliography on Social Class/Inequality in 
New Zealand. 
          Traditional Māori society was strongly based on rank, which derived 
from ancestry (whakapapa). There were three classes – chiefs, commoners and 
slaves - with very limited mobility between them. Chiefs were almost invariably 
descended from other chiefs, although those in line to take up a chieftainship 
would be bypassed in favour of a younger brother if they did not show aptitude. 
In some tribes exceptional women could emerge to take on leadership roles. 
Prisoners of war were usually enslaved with no rights and often a low life 
expectancy. However, children of slaves were free members of the tribe. 
Contemporary Māori society is far less hierarchical and there are a variety of 
routes to prominence. 
          European settlement of New Zealand came with a ready-made class 
structure imposed by the division between cabin and steerage passengers with 
the former mainly constituting middle class with a sprinkling of upper class 
‘settlers’. This shipboard class division was reinforced by the Wakefield 
settlement system which endeavoured to reproduce a cross-section of UK 
society in the colony, with the mechanism that capital was needed by the 
middle/upper class to provide the frame in which the working class voyagers 
(they were only retrospectively entitled to be termed ‘settlers’) could be put to 
work. However, the rigidity of this imported framework did not entirely endure 
as it took time to get the intended structure up and running.  Various accounts 
stress the continuing importance in various areas of colonial life of an imported 
educated and landed elite. 
          There quickly developed an ideology of ‘egalitarianism’ with its claim of 
(relative) classlessness. This still allowed some wriggle-room for language 
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concerning class groupings.  Egalitarianism arose because of a desire for many 
immigrants to not reproduce their class-bound origins, an open frontier (access 
to land), high demand for labour and some difficulties in enacting a separation 
of the classes in the exigencies of early colonisation. Moreover, it is 
accompanied by difficulties, especially the intolerance of the ‘tall poppy 
syndrome’ and the exclusion of some groups. In fact, the ideology was broader 
and included some rejection of industrial and urban models as well as class 
ones, and Bill Sutch extended the concept to include a concern for security as 
well as aversion to both undue poverty and undue wealth. From the nineteenth 
century local writers and many intellectual visitors made this claim that New 
Zealand was a 'classless society' and this undoubtedly reinforced its hold. The 
fallback position was – as Keith Sinclair wrote in 1969 - that New Zealand 
"must be more nearly classless... than any advanced society in the world".  
The evidence for a limited class structure included and reflected: 
- the relatively small range of wealth (that is, the wealthiest did not 
earn hugely more than the poorest earners),  
- lack of deference to authority figures,  
- high levels of class mobility,  
- a high standard of working class living compared to Britain, 
especially post-WW2, 
- progressive labour laws which protected workers and encouraged 
unionism, and  
- a welfare state which was developed in New Zealand before most 
other countries.  
However, this view was increasingly contested by some writers and a 
widespread model was that class formation and political party alignment to 
represent this emerged during the 1890s and continued thereafter. Belich (2001) 
significantly develops a commonly held model when he includes a class 
analysis in his monumental history of New Zealand, placing his class analysis 
within his three-phase periodisation of New Zealand history. Four ‘class 
cultures’ are posited (each having “roots in a particular relationship of work and 
property, labour and capital” p. 126 but not necessarily binding everyone in that 
category): 
- Genteel: upper class 
- Respectable: middle class 
- Decent: working class 
- Disreputable: irregularly/illegally employed. 
In turn the Middle Class was subdivided into: 
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- a petite bourgeoisies of small-medium  urban proprietors 
- a farming class of small-medium rural proprietors 
- a lower middle class of white-collar workers.  
Onto this general model he adds a development analysis in which various ‘tight 
classes’ (i.e. fairly conscious and socially-linked class communities) rose and 
fell (see his Chapter 4 “Social Harmony: the touch of class”.) 
          By the 1870s there was the emergence of the New Zealand gentry as a 
nationwide class community and as a ruling class.  This gentry had rural and 
urban wings, and emanated in large part from genteel cabin-class immigrants, of 
whom there may have been a higher proportion than the migrant streams to 
other British colonies. This class became established particularly on large-scale 
sheep runs (often on lease-held lands). Their decline (or considerable 
transformation) took place by mid-century. Causes of their demise include “..the 
economic circumstances of the recolonisation era; stagnation; the rise of the 
protein industry; close-settling sentiment; and the actions of the Liberal 
government” (predominantly middle class). From c1900 the gentry was 
swamped with rising numbers of (aggravated by their different attitudes)  
members of the higher professions and higher-level managers and industrialists 
who spanned respectability and gentility. As the 20th Century wore on, this 
‘upper middle class’ increasingly merged with, even absorbed, the gentry. A 
large expansion of education fuelled change, servants became mutinous, and the 
officer corps they manned had a particularly high casualty rate in WW1. 
Moreover, the Gentry were vilified by Liberals as an aspect of their nationalist 
project – although there was less bite than bark. So the gentry disappeared into 
relative seclusion. 
          A New Zealand working class culture was of long standing but Belich 
claims was not a ‘tight class’ until 1906 or so. It covered both craft workers and 
working class workers: represented by different unions. Craft unions linked 
workmen to middle class ‘masters’. Around 1890 there was a big surge in 
unionism and again in 1912 – both combated by capitalists. Craft workers 
became strong supporters of the emerging arbitration system and the developing 
Labour Party actively represented their interests while strong linkages with 
Australian unions reinforced their local development. But, ‘Recolonial’ 
industries required bigger factories and therefore more organisation and so craft 
work became more sidelined and industrial education rather than 
apprenticeships grew. In the 1900s there was a shrinkage of opportunities for 
small businesses, but an expansion of working class jobs. Worker solidarity was 
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bolstered by sexism and racism. However, over a longer term affluent life styles 
(including home ownership and education) borrowed from the middle class 
became possible and this was another factor stunting their class action potential.  
             A newly emerging class of (small or medium) farmers reigned in the 
working class. This active grouping was able to span a range of different 
farming experiences and coalesce around a masculine and pro-farming 
ideology- a ‘Sturdy Yeoman’ image. Links were made to those providing 
supporting rural services etc. Belich’s class analysis is not extended to the 
current de-colonisation period apart from noting the expansion of inequalities 
over the last decades.   
 
Data sources and Scales 
One unfortunate effect of the New Zealand classlessness model is that it leads to 
resistance to studies on the topic. In the early 1950s, Congalton was attacked in 
newspapers for researching into class. This was reinforced with the conception 
that it was impolite (‘not British’) to raise such issues. So Vellekoop (1969) 
reports with relief that her then-recent study on vocational choices got a 75% 
response on occupation and income of head of family. Many researchers would 
agree with Caldwell & Brown’s argument that in researching their book: 
...we found that most New Zealanders will do a lot to avoid using the 
word class to describe their relationships with others. But they do 
recognise that there are some groups of people they identify with, and 
some they don’t. They will talk at length about the differences in 
behaviour, the attitudes, even the dress that make them different from 
their embarrassing cousins or the schoolmates they’ve outgrown 
(2007: 7).  
They also argue that while there are commonly expressed ideas about the 
typical New Zealander these have little analytical traction, since rather than one 
monolithic image there is a set of diverse social identities that summarise ways 
in which New Zealanders feel different from each other. These not overtly 
expressed but are readily recognisable and indicated by the typical areas of 
residence of such groupings.  
          Work on inequalities/class must be based on a firm measurement 
infrastructure. Official data can also be pressed into service. Such data sources 
include marriage, birth and death registers, probate data, tax returns, welfare 
records: but above all census data on income, occupation, education, labour 
force status, tenure and dwelling amenities, supported by other official surveys. 
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          The ‘Official statistics apparatus’ in New Zealand has had an ambivalent 
relationship with measures of inequality and class. Because of its connotations 
(but also difficulties in assigning a clear meaning to it and measurement of it) 
the term ‘class’ is somewhat justifiably banished from any official publications. 
          On the other hand, as Perry, 2013: 91 reports, whereas “as recently as 
1996, the government of the time in New Zealand was openly disapproving of 
any poverty discourse” by 2002 ‘poverty reduction’ was central in government 
and public discourse. Official recognition of what constitutes a ‘living wage’ 
was determined within the system (and this has been revisited recently by a 
widespread campaign) and monitoring of a semi-official ‘Poverty line’ has been 
carried out.  
         Since research work on inequalities/class in large part must be 
quantitative, it must therefore be based on a firm measurement infrastructure. 
The basic data for analysis is derived from a variety of sources including: 
- Census (Employment Status, Education, Income, Sources of 
Income, Tenure, Dwelling amenities),  
- Household Economic Survey,  
- Household Income Survey,  
- Survey of Family Income and Expenditure (Sofie),  
- The General Social Survey (GSS),  
- MSD’s Standard of Living Surveys (last fielded in 2008),  
- Inland Revenue data - see http://www.ird.govt.nz/aboutir/external-
stats/ 
- Estates and Gift Duties data – since discontinued with the lapsing 
of death duties in 1991. 
Further data on attitudes and characteristics of individuals and households in 
relation to Social Class/Inequality can be variously obtained from a range of 
other New Zealand non-governmental surveys such as Big City Quality of Life, 
International Social Science Programme (ISSP), New Zealand Values Survey 
(NZVS), New Zealand Election Survey (NZES), Office of the Children’s 
Commissioner material and the research work of a variety of action groups. 
Many of these add more subjective information (especially attitudes but also 
experiences and cases). However, irregularity of surveys being run and quality 
of data are issues detracting from some of these data sources.  
          The key data generated by these data-collection vehicles includes 
employment status, occupation, education, income, assets and tenure. Most of 
these have fairly well regularised coding frames although there are some 
difficulties (for a scale regularising educational qualification see Ministry of 
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Education: http://www.nzqa.govt.nz/assets/Studying-in-NZ/New-Zealand-
Qualification-Framework/requirements-nzqf.pdf); StatsNZ revises the income 
categories it uses from time to time and also has definitions of income – see 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/surveys_and_methods/methods/classifications-and-
standards/classification-related-stats-standards/income-bands/definition.aspx) 
Occupation has been coded using a variety of scheme over time: most linked to 
appropriate international frameworks and now firmly ensconced in a Trans-
Tasman common classification. Backwards linkage is possible through 
concordances. The rationale for the most recent coding schema is given on the 
website.  
           In turn, social researchers have endeavoured to construct occupation 
scales which will turn these official categories into a set of theorised categories 
or a continuous scale. Several early attempts (and others reported by Vellekoop, 
1969) were prestige scales in which respondents were asked to rank a selected 
number of occupations. Over the last few decades increasingly sophisticated 
‘objective’ scales of socio-economic status have been generated with the long-
running Elley-Irving series being gradually replaced by the more sophisticated 
NZSEI scale (which is formally adopted by StatsNZ): see Milne et al, 2013. 
Methodological issues that need to be dealt with in such scales include (see also 
Perry, 2013: 40, 208 for discussion about these issues in relation to standard of 
living research): 
- what measures to include and how to weight/combine each; 
-    what population base to use; 
-    how fine-grained the classification and its underlying units; 
-    whether adjustments needed for particular groupings; 
     -   dealing with assigning mid-points for open-ended bottom and top 
categories; 
- reporting of lower incomes self-employed workers than waged; 
- the different labour market situation of women more generally, self-
employed, part-timers and the economically inactive;  
- developing justifiable cutting-points to convert into categories; 
-  validation against likely associated outcomes such as smoking, motor 
vehicle access, housing tenure, household overcrowding, and 
deprivation.  
More recently, over the last two decades, this concern with measurement of 
inequalities has generated several streams of work including several projects: 
- the NZSEI scale (Milne et al., 2013); 
- NZDep: http://www.health.govt.nz/publication/nzdep2006-index-
deprivation;   
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- MSD’s SOL programme see http://www.msd.govt.nz/about-msd-
and-our-work/publications-resources/monitoring/living-
standards/index.html; 
- Poverty measurement program (see Waldegrave et al., 1996). 
Earlier official classifications (e.g. of occupation or industry: see Olssen and 
Hickey, 2005) tended not to be well-theorised. A continuing demand from New 
Zealand social researchers has been for ways of classifying socio-economic 
groupings based particularly on occupation. This methodological demand led to 
a long series developed by educational researchers Warwick Elley and Jim 
Irving (and sometimes others) who over successive censuses categorised 
occupations into 6 s.e.s. groupings based on average education and income for 
each – from time to time gender or ethnicity variants were also developed or at 
least explored. These scales are developed on a limited age-range and usually 
only include full-time workers. More recently the COMPASS team has 
developed the NZSEI using the same general approach, while adding some 
degrees of sophistication. The NZSEI-06 scores are based on a path-analytic 
representation of the ‘returns to human capital’ model of stratification, in which 
occupation is viewed as the means by which human capital (education) is 
converted into material rewards (income).  
          There are several advantages of an occupation-based approach (cf. Milne 
et al, 2013):  
- occupation is readily and accurately recalled (although there is some 
‘status inflation’ in job titles);  
- occupation can be retrospectively recalled with some accuracy (so  
retired respondents can be asked about their main occupation during 
their working years);  
- occupation is often recorded in survey datasets and on administrative 
datasets (e.g., birth and death records, although no in recent health 
surveys in New Zealand);  
- validation shows that expected stratification patterns across smoking 
prevalence and other socio-economic correlates are produced;   
- because of long history of occupation-based socio-economic 
measures that have been frequently updated, socio-economic 
comparisons over time can be undertaken (including cohort samples 
having socio-economic status to be assessed at different life-stages 
using the ‘current’ occupation-based socio-economic measure at each 
point).  
- proxy persons can be used to assess socio-economic status (e.g. for 
children).  
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          The MSD has sponsored an internal Living Standards research 
programme since the late 1990s (see Perry, 2013: 183-187) which has produced: 
- a 40-item material wellbeing and hardship/deprivation scale (Elsi)  
- a short form version (Elsi_SF)   
- an experimental alternative (the Fixed Reference Index of Living 
Standards- FRILS and  
- an updated/extended Material Wellbeing Index (MWI).  
Concern about inequalities in health led from 1995 to the development of an 
area index of deprivation, which has the advantage of enabling an assignment of 
s.e.s. status as long as an address is available for a respondent. Meshblocks from 
censuses are combined into small areas of at least 100 people and the NZDep 
scale is developed based on census measures including - for 2006 in order of 
decreasing importance:  
x being on a social welfare benefit 
x household income below an acceptable threshold 
x not owning own home 
x a single-parent family 
x unemployed 
x lack of qualifications 
x less living space 
x no access to a telephone 
x no access to a car.  
Several atlases of deprivation have been produced which vividly present the 
results. Difficulties are that comparison over time is limited by fresh 
calculations of indices (largely because of differential availability of 
information) and there needs to be further work on which are the most casually 
pertinent characteristics within the scale. (A ‘code red’ issue is that it is possible 
that the high deprivation areas will be over-targeted for assistance rending the 
pink (almost deprived areas) starved for attention and liable to regress.) 
          The Poverty Measurement Project carried out extensive work (mainly 
using focus groups, but also surveys) on respondent’s conceptions of income 
needs and related issue. The work which was carried out in the late 1990s was 
recently updated (at least in part) at the behest of the Campaign for a Living 
Wage (King and Waldegrave, 2012). 
          In addition, models have to be set up to slot the incoming data into proper 
frameworks within which stocks and flows can be traced. Over time various 
tools have been deployed, including: see Perry, 2013: 27 which noted two 
Treasury tax-benefit micro stimulation models which estimate tax liabilities for 
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individuals and benefit units: the current model Taxwell and the previous 
Taxmod.  
          It is also important that national data be included in international 
databases which have been assembled on these topics so that rigorous cross-
national analyses can be developed. New Zealand’s record on this is not 
altogether good. Although New Zealand information has been included in the 
High income data base, it was not considered possible to provide unit record 
data for the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). Nevertheless, the OECD has 
been able to include New Zealand in many of its data-bases and monitoring 
studies. 
          Despite the considerable resource and effort deployed to build up 
measures, the New Zealand situation faces many lacks (Rashbrooke, 2013: 19-
23): 
It is important to acknowledge that our understanding of income 
inequality in New Zealand is far from complete (especially compared 
with the domestic data available in many OECD countries) Despite 
committed and ongoing research by academics, commentators and 
various organisations and government departments (notably, the 
Ministry of Social Development), significant gaps in our knowledge 
remain. 
One gap is the lack of detailed information on the top 10 per cent of 
incomes (especially the top 1 per cent), including the composition of 
those incomes and how they have been earned. No country has a 
complete record of top incomes, which are difficult to sample 
accurately and can be obscured by tax avoidance. In New Zealand, for 
example, family trusts are used to avoid an estimated $300 million in 
tax each year. But New Zealand has less data than many countries, 
because we do not tax or record capital gains – an issue of policy as 
well as measurement. New Zealand researchers are also deprived of 
important income data because this country chooses not to participate 
in the flagship Luxembourg Income Study. 
Only chief executive pay for the period 1997–2002 has been studied 
in-depth, and New Zealand has relatively little data about how much 
this pay has increased, what form it takes, and why it has risen. 
Slightly further down the income ladder, we know even less about 
pay for senior managers and company directors, and the means by 
which these salaries are set. The only significant analysis of wealth in 
New Zealand is based on 2003 data. We have relatively little 
information about long-term social mobility, and our research into 
attitudes towards inequality has been limited. Our reporting of social 
indicators, many of which are tied to inequality, could be improved. 
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The Ministry of Social Development’s Social Report, for example, 
has been reduced in frequency from once a year to once every three 
years at most. New Zealand has recently been excluded from an 
international league table of children’s health because our data are so 
poor. 
One other, temporary limitation is that the delay of the New Zealand 
Census until 2013 leaves researchers reliant on data from the 2006 
Census.  
Further work on measurement is warranted with Milne et al. (2013: 122) 
concluding their report on s.e.s. scales with a useful challenge:  
...given that researchers have a number of different options for 
assessing socio-economic status in New Zealand (e.g., NZDep, 
NZiDep, education, income, living standards, as well as the NZSEI-
06), it would be worthwhile to assess the extent to which these 
different measures have independent as opposed to shared influences 
on outcomes of interest. 
 
The Contribution of Historical Studies 
The attention of New Zealand social historians to class has been exemplary, 
although their interest mainly is only up to Second World War, with very few 
exceptions. Sociologists have also contributed to historical studies: especially 
the Canterbury department, John Martin, David Pearson and Claire Toynbee.  
       Some histories of New Zealand have passages suffuse with class 
vocabulary and/or analysis: a far wider field than there is space to attend to 
more than cursorily here. Some historians have produced portraits of class 
groupings: notably the Southern Gentry (Eldred-Grigg, 1980 & McAloon, 
2002) and the rich more generally (Eldred-Grigg, 1996) but also the working 
class (Millen, 1984 for the 19th and Eldred-Grigg, 1990 for the 20th ) and 
recently portraits of the rich/ruling class have been advanced by Hunt, e.g. 
2003; Jesson, eg. 1999 and Murray, 2007). Labour histories are sometimes too 
fine-grained to see underlying class structures but the Labour History Project 
has been important together with books such as Len Richardson’s (1995) Coal, 
Class, and Community: the United Mineworkers of New Zealand. Some are 
important analyses of crucial events in Trade Union history (e.g. Green, 2001). 
     But the pertinence of class in the understanding of New Zealand’s past is 
more problematic. In a long review article reacting to a major collection of New 
Zealand historical writing drawn from the pages of the NZ Journal of History 
Jim McAloon (2004) argued that “Class, once a fundamental organising 
category of social science, has disappeared from New Zealand (and more 
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generally Western) historiography...Gender and Māori themes abound, but there 
is absolutely nothing about class in that collection”. He argues that class in New 
Zealand has been central from the beginning of its settlement and certainly in 
the colonial period. A difficulty he sees is that New Zealand historians have 
often failed to deploy a sufficiently sophisticated model of class, and have over-
emphasised the importance of class consciousness. Thus a common model, 
which began to be argued from Sinclair and Oliver’s work of the 1960s, was 
that class was irrelevant up until c1890 when working class consciousness and 
mobilisation began to develop. A major focus of debate concerns the extent to 
which New Zealanders were enmired in a grim world of deprivation required to 
shift often to track jobs   or whether the abundance of land allowed escape.     
McAlloon’s model of colonial class structure involves (p.70): 
- the upper class [which] comprised the movers and shakers of the 
colonial export economy, whether as pastoralists or as merchants and 
financiers, complemented by a significant element of manufacturers 
and of large agricultural farmers;  
- a very significant middle class of modestly-wealthy family farmers, 
reinforced by the plethora of comfortable country town merchants, 
and the self-employed urban business and manufacturing sector 
(facilitated by the fluidity of colonial society and the ready 
availability of land);   
- Wage-earners .. ranged from the relatively secure artisans of the 
towns to the itinerant rural workers. 
This model applied to the South Island situation, whereas the North Island 
varied from region to region:  
- Rural Hawkes Bay and Wairarapa were similar to Canterbury and 
Otago in combining pastoralism with smaller-scale agricultural 
farming (p.71);  
- A strong mercantile element clearly existed in Auckland and 
Wellington, while  
- A later frontier in much of the North Island might well have meant a 
larger proportion both of reasonably substantial family farmers and 
country town merchants in places like Wanganui and Hamilton, as 
well as smaller centres like Martinborough. 
 
Finally, Olssen and Scates’s (2008) reflective comments bring McAllon’s 
review more close to the present and contribute to the sociology of no 
sociology. 
Just three decades ago, most scholars in New Zealand thought that the 
major social, cultural, and political fault-lines ran along a rural-urban 
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axis, but that within the towns, as if in a minor key, social class 
generated the most significant and enduring divisions” It was 
axiomatic, of course, that New Zealand was a capitalist society and 
that the stratification or class structure of all towns was rooted in the 
industrial division of labour. This was the conventional wisdom and 
nobody doubted that from 1840 onwards New Zealand had been but 
an outpost of British capitalism with a 'normal' class structure.5 How 
to characterise family farmers occasionally caused a problem, but 
much of the best work ignored them and focused, as W.B. Sutch did 
in The Quest for Security (1966), on the colonists' attempts to remove 
the sources of insecurity and the consequences of poverty.  
Across the period from the 1880s until the 1930s, class by itself, even 
in the main towns, only possessed explanatory power when we 
disentangle or disaggregate the following: the occupational structure; 
the degree of demographic class formation; the extent of occupational 
and social closure; the level of unionisation, if not the nature of those 
unions, itself not unrelated to the local or regional product and labour 
markets. All need to be kept analytically distinct while allowing for 
personal and ideological influence to affect outcomes, and indeed for 
events such as strikes, changes in government or public policy, and 
not least such global events as wars and depressions. 
Review articles on aspects of New Zealand history are also valuable: e.g. Nolan 
(2009) draws attention to periods of increased social mobility and other phases 
of New Zealand history which were less amenable to social change. 
 
Historical overview of Sociological/Social Science Attention to 
Class/Inequality in New Zealand: 
In the preface to his splendid A Vision Betrayed Tony Simpson (1984) makes 
some pointed comments concerning the New Zealand literature in this area 
which somewhat echoes comments applicable to the historical studies: 
..the extraordinary amount of research undertaken in New Zealand, 
which, after its completion never sees the light of day or if it does is 
confined to a narrow and essentially academic audience. This is 
despite it often having broad general interest and arriving at 
conclusions which at a direct variance with generally received beliefs. 
In apparent contradiction of that there are clearly some subjects of 
research which have in the past and which to an extent remain taboo. 
The most important of these seems to be the subject of class division. 
It is rather too rare to find thorough examinations of the socio-
economic determinants of phenomena; this is becoming less the case 
but suggests that the dominant mythologies of any society set the 
agenda in research as much as in much else. In some few examples 
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which were examined the data sustained a socio-economic variable as 
the principal available explanation but the researcher, inexplicably, 
looked elsewhere for a conclusion. Related to these two is the 
question of access to sources. Much of the research is buried in 
specialist library and is theoretically available to all but in practical 
terms available to very few. 
The historical sketch presented here calls attention to studies rather than 
retrieving their details. The section is organised as follows: 
- SOL/Distribution Studies   
- Ethnographic or community-based studies 
- Political economic treatments 
- Social psychology studies of class in the 1950s and 1960s. 
- Burgeoning of class studies in the1970s and 1980s 
- The ‘long haul’ of s.e.s. studies in the more applied areas - education, 
health, welfare, recreation studies etc.  
- The inter-regnum of the 1990s and 2000s:  tangential and small-scale 
studies. 
The backbone of New Zealand Social Class/Inequality studies are those 
concerning SOL and distributions. SOL research in New Zealand goes back to a 
1893 study of family budgets  carried out by the then recently formed Dept. of 
Labour – involving a ‘sample’ of family budgets which were presented in some 
detail. (No doubt this emulated some of the poverty studies being carried out in 
the UK.) SOL has been revisited quite regularly from time to time since, often 
through investigative committees or Commissions. And determination of SOL 
was built into the heart of the Arbitration and Conciliation industrial relations 
system. Doig and fellow investigators carried out a field study of the SOL of 
dairy farmers in the late 1930s whose published findings shocked the nation and 
in part led to the closure of the unit carrying out a series of such studies before 
they were completed and published (see Robb, 1987).  A little later Doig’s left 
wing sympathies were even more openly expressed in probably the first 
systematic study of inequalities in New Zealand. 
           Since then a series of studies ensued with major investigations launched 
in the mid-1980s by the NZ Planning Council and continuing with work 
sponsored by VUW’s IPS in the late 1990s and more recently work from 
several government and government-related analysts. The use of official 
statistics was complemented with field investigations to pin down 
measurements (as discussed above), and then – through StatsNZ several surveys 
to measure wealth as well as income. Related studies, such as on fiscal 
New Zealand Sociology Volume 28 Issue 3 2013 
 
268 
distribution have also been carried out so that the costs and benefits of 
government transfer activities (taxes and benefits) can be reasonably assigned to 
different income and age groupings. 
          An interest in Class/Inequality accompanied the advent of ‘proper’ social 
science research in New Zealand: the ethnographic monograph on Littledene. 
This and later studies of Johnsonville,   and are adequately discussed in Pearson 
and Thorns, 1983: chapter 9. Since then, only a couple of more recent 
ethnographic studies come to mind – Hatch’s (1992) superb historical sociology 
of the Canterbury/Otago area in which he superbly deployed the imagery of 
one-table and two-tables lifestyles and Dominy’s (2001) study of a particular 
class/occupational grouping of high country lease-holders which particularly 
explicated the cultural meanings of their properties. 
         However, recently several journal articles report studies in which the lived 
experiences of various class-related groupings are examined. 
          In the early 1950s quantitative work began – in the Wairarapa – to 
develop understandings of class and rankings of occupations through surveys. 
Congalton conducted several studies and developed the Congalton-Havighurst 
scale – although this was criticised for mainly applying a US categorisation onto 
the New Zealand situation without much finessing. In the early New Zealand 
sociology readers, appropriate chapters were able to report a busy mini-industry 
of studies on class-related topics. Vellekoop (1969) notes a range of studies 
including her own monograph into occupational mobility aspirations. And the 
first significant international sociological publication on New Zealand 
concerned the impact of occupational mobility on suicide rates. Over these few 
decades a ‘community survey’ tradition developed, particularly at VUW but 
also at other New Zealand universities’ sociology departments such as Peter 
Davis’s early work out of the Canterbury department and Barry Smith from the 
Auckland department. Occupations of respondents was a standard item in 
questionnaires and at least one publication on occupational mobility was one 
result.  
         These concerns with class were swept up shortly thereafter into Pitt’s 
(1977) collection. This covered essays which nicely reflected then-current work 
on an extensive agenda: 
D. Pitt's "Are There Social Classes in New Zealand?"  
E. Olsen's account of nineteenth-century social classes 
 J. Macrae's income distribution & poverty 
D. Thorns’s urbanization & suburbanization  
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C. V. Baldock on occupational choice & parental social class. 
C. Macpherson on ethclass, and   
D. Bedggood’s Working class self-awareness. 
However, reviews were critical as well as appreciative. 
          Shortly after, Pearson & Thorns’s (1983) book was published which 
provided a complete ‘one-stop shop’ review, and again leading to wider 
discussion (Crothers, 1985 provides reactions by Auckland sociologists). 
          Moreover, during the 1980s several authors essay a more Marxist 
approach (e.g. Stephen, 1975) while other authors provided a broader political 
economic interpretation. Several other empirical studies ensued, carrying this 
agenda forward. The culmination of this fairly active period of work on New 
Zealand class/inequality was the Wilkes et al. (1985) attempt to seriously 
invoke the EO. Wright schema in carrying out a large-scale survey of New 
Zealand, with some of the authors providing themselves as the foot-soldiers for 
the task of questionnaire delivery and collection: but a full report was never 
published.  
          Sociological attention then became orientated elsewhere, particularly into 
the issues concerning ethnicity and migration engendered by political and 
cultural developments. Academic class/inequality studies in New Zealand were 
then mainly reduced to a trickle of studies – many historical or chapter 
treatments in introductory texts – together with some applied sociological work.  
         ‘Rogernomics’ (during the 1980s) involved a major shift of resources 
tilting against the working class in favour of allowing high class levels to 
accumulate more resources. In turn, this generated counteracting research work, 
both in government and from NGOs. The Ministry of Works & Development 
(MWD) set up a social impact unit which carried out studies of unemployment 
and related fallout from the ‘reforms’. As already mentioned, the Ministry of 
Social Development (MSD) initiated a programme monitoring household 
inequality which gradually picked up momentum generating a series of 
Standard of Living surveys and scale development to measure deprivation etc. 
Alongside these was a disparate array of ‘small studies’ on aspects of poverty 
and hardship. Some of these were carried out by action groups or by 
Commissions and Committees of Inquiry. Medical social research generated a 
series of Deprivation atlases as well as the scales used to produce them. At one 
point a vigorous argument erupted which involved (or could be interpreted as) 
the possible reduction of ethnicity to social class when it was pointed out that 
Māori differences nearly disappeared statistically when controlled for measures 
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of social class. Extending the government programme of concern with poor 
social outcomes led to the emergence of Social Indicator studies, which 
attempted to measure a wider array of socioeconomic outcomes (see Cotterell 
and Crothers, 2011).   
          Utilising the various updated socio-economic (s.e.s.) scales a steadily 
accumulating array of applied social research routinely deployed s.e.s. as a 
measure in their studies – medical, education, welfare and even political – 
although such studies were carried out in several areas quite independent of 
each other and no overall inventory of findings has yet been attempted. 
        Roper (1995: 79, 80) summarised the scene in the mid-1990s. He begins by 
stressing the continuing importance of class more generally:   
..the central argument...is that New Zealand society is fundamentally 
stratified by class and that class inequality, class interests, and class 
struggle are central both to the overall organisation of this society and 
its polity. Class matters. Whether we are conscious of it or not, it 
shapes our lives in profound ways.” 
..and more specifically (p. 83) ...other important empirical 
manifestations of class inequality, including the growth of poverty 
during the 1980s and 1990s, the rise of unemployment, the 
deterioration of the housing conditions of the poor, the restriction of 
working class ‘life chances’ for health, education, and travel, 
alienation in the workplace and in society, the prevalence of 
competition, accumulation, and material acquisitiveness, and the 
extent of industrial accidents and violence in capitalist societies”. 
He then provides an incisive critique of the lack of attention to class in New 
Zealand sociological writing (p. 79): 
Although it is understandable that those on the political right, such as 
the Treasury, the Business RoundTable, and the National Party, seek 
to deny that society is characterised by class inequality, many of those 
on the left have also failed explicitly to discuss class inequality and 
conflict. E.g. the terms ‘class; and ‘class struggle’ appear no more 
frequently in Kelsey’s (1993, 1995) otherwise valuable critiques of 
Rogernomics than in the Treasury brief upon which that program of 
reform was based. The feminist literature in New Zealand pays scant 
regard to the interconnections between gender and class – even 
DuPlessis (1993) seem reluctant to conceptualise socio-economic 
inequality explicitly in terms of class. And Awatere (1984) in her 
seminal text on Māori nationalism, fails to provide a systematic 
consideration of the class dimension to Māori subordination. 
..and more specifically he refers to New Zealand sociological writing (p.96): 
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Somewhat surprisingly, given the healthy size of the discipline of 
sociology in New Zealand, the empirical research and literature on 
class inequality is sparse and the quality of the available literature is 
highly uneven. Pearson and Thorns (1983, 1986) provide the most 
sophisticated neo-Weberian analysis of New Zealand’s class structure 
during the post-war era, while Stevens (1978) remains the most 
sophisticated Marxist analysis. Bedggood (1980) provides a valuable 
analysis of the historical emergence of capitalist class relations during 
the 19th century, but his analysis of the changing class structure during 
the 20th century fails completely to deal systematically with the 
available statistical data. Wilkes (1990) attempts empirically to 
operationalise Wright’s theoretical mode through a NZ survey but 
generated results that can be described as questionable at best.  
Some studies in political economy have paralleled these developments. These 
include some case studies of political action from business interests (peak 
bodies) and considerable analysis of ‘rich lists’ and directorship and share 
ownership data, since the rich like (or have a commercial need) to obtain 
information about each other. 
         Finally, over the last couple of decades the study of class has been decked 
out through some diagonally/orthogonally couched attempts which it is worth 
noting in more detail. 
         James and Saville-Smith in their Gender, Culture & Power (1989) argue 
that there are three forms of inequality or oppressive relationship – sex, class 
and race – and that one should not be “.. presented as more basic, more 
important, and, consequently, as taking political priority or precedence in the 
struggle for the fair society (p.2). They review in their introduction proponents 
of the various key points and point out that each on their own is inadequate as 
an explanation (p.6). They argue that inequalities are more than emergent from 
‘subjective individual interactions between oppressor and oppressed” but rather 
“..inequalities of race, class and sex emerge out of the very material conditions 
of people’s lives...out of the organisation of production and reproduction.”  
          Having raised the question of how the three dimensions relate together 
they intend in their book to: “...explore the notion that New Zealand is a 
‘gendered culture’, a culture in which the structures of masculinity and 
femininity are central to the formation of society as a whole (p.6)” and that “.. 
the gender culture should be challenged because it enables hierarchies of sex, 
race, and class to be maintained”. Expanding further on this conception they 
suggest New Zealand is: 
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..a culture in which the intimate and structural expressions of social 
life are divided according to gender. Notions of masculinity and 
femininity are a pervasive metaphor which shape not merely relations 
between the sexes, but are integral to the systematic maintenance of 
other structures of inequality a well. Inequalities of sex, race, and 
class in New Zealand are tied together by and expressed at a cultural 
level through the organization of gender relations.  
There is a constant struggle between the male world of mateship and the female 
world of kinship. Indeed, they see this culture as emerging from the social 
orders and problems of settling which required a collective societal response by 
the end of the 19th century. Whereas the female culture was constituted through 
the ‘cult of domesticity’ male culture integrated the two apparently 
contradictory constructions: ‘Man Alone’ and the ‘Family Man’. 
          Howland (2004) provides a wittily presented anthropology of ‘Middle 
New Zealand’ entitled ‘Lotto, long-Drops and Lolly Scrambles’. Middle New 
Zealand refers to the middle classes but also the geographical middle of New 
Zealand – the generalised experiences of New Zealand’s predominantly Pākehā 
urban middle classes. This is seen as a shared culture which operates as a model 
against which differences can be compared. He assumes “...that most members 
will be relatively affluent, educated to tertiary level and generally employed in 
white-collar jobs. Yet many blue-collar workers similarly possess the necessary 
wealth, learning and social sensibilities to be middle class” (p.12). New 
Zealand’s middle classes he sees as being characterised by ...an ethos that 
idealises individuality. The unfettered and vibrant expression of individualism is 
considered by many to be the ultimate goal of a healthy capitalist society, 
democracy and meritocracy... They also share the idea that education and 
wealth are the primary ways a person’s individuality can be creatively nurtured 
and expressed”. There is divergence “.. on the relative merit they attach to 
schooling or lucre as the ideal method for asserting their individuality”. Finally, 
in comparative terms New Zealand’s middle class “.. are still self-effacing about 
our social privilege. We often save our conspicuous displays of wealth and 
privilege for appropriate and compartmentalised occasions”.   
In the absence of comprehensive class analysis, two market researchers, 
Jill Caldwell and Christopher Brown, produced in 2006 another grouping of 
New Zealand society which they labelled the ‘8 tribes’. These were less a 
measure of material distinctions such as income, occupation or property 
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ownership, than they were distinctions of culture and ways of life. The ‘tribes’ 
were: 
- the North Shore tribe: achieving – ambitious, heavily mortgaged and 
suburban 
- the Grey Lynn tribe: intellectual – highly educated frequenters of 
inner-city cafés 
- the Balclutha tribe: staunch – down-to-earth and provincial 
- the Remuera tribe: entitled – children of privilege and breeding 
- the Otara tribe: community – urban, Polynesian, and focused on the 
family and church 
- the Raglan tribe: free-spirited – laid-back hedonists 
- the Cuba Street tribe: avant-garde – trendy and bohemian 
- the Papatoetoe tribe: unpretentious –urban working people who like a 
beer with their mates. 
This was not a division that arose out of tight statistical analysis, but rather a set 
of judgements about style. However, it appealed precisely because in a diverse 
society the old distinctions of class no longer successfully explained the 
growing differences and inequalities of New Zealand society. Money is not all 
that important except for the North Shore (spending) and Remuera (old money) 
- together with interest in titles. Relatedly, market researchers have indulged in 
various lifestyle segmentation studies and some of these impinge on 
inequalities/class (cf. Lawson and Todd, 2002). 
          Finally, class is not limited to a national location: Australia is also 
implicated in the Australasian cross-Tasman and there are also some South 
Pacific formations of class. Some articles have been written on the former while 
the later topic was reviewed in the 1987 Hooper book. Although the book does 
not glimpse class formation in any part of the South Pacific except Fiji it is clear 
that modernisation is exerting pressures on island socio-political structures. 
Latter, a flurry of debate has concentrated on class (non) development in Tonga. 
 
Conclusion 
We need a ‘sociology of no sociology’ (to use Harvey Franklin’s term). 
Because biculturalism and identity politics emerged in the 1970s and was then 
more generally put on the political agenda by Rogernomics as its area of ‘social 
conscience’ this locked-in these issues for consideration at the expense of 
adequate attention to Class/Inequality as an issue. Earlier, a focus on rurality 
had also subverted attention. On the whole in considering the literature it seems 
the glass is half empty rather than half full. There is a considerable scatter of 
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studies of social class in New Zealand, with some quite heavy concentrations at 
particular times. But with little cumulation. Inequality has been studied but not 
so much its embedding in social class. This is a difficult area leading to error 
and often valid critique has been aroused by studies. Much consolidation and 
updating are required. However, the recent emergence of interesting field 
studies on class and related topics (e.g. Stephens and Gillies, 2012) is 
encouraging. It is intended that this inventory of studies begins to outline the 
available stock of studies to assist in further work. 
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